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The thesis asks whether there is a role for competition law and policy in the music 
industries. It is argued that there is a need for updated competition policy in order to 
safeguard both end consumer welfare and the competitive process in these markets, 
characterised by fast-paced developments and business model innovation. Indeed, 
the past two decades saw the music industries undergo seismic changes, as even the 
term ‘music industries’ was not in use as such before the advent of the internet era 
and the decline in sales of recordings in physical format. Soon it became obvious 
that the traditional music industry’s end consumers had chosen to migrate to 
alternative methods of consumption, complementing and substituting between 
several products for music, such as the digital format, the live concert ticket, and the 
overall ‘music experience’. End consumers chose to completely by-pass the product 
on offer, meaning the recording of popular music in physical format, as provided 
top-down by a few multinational record companies, which the thesis identifies as an 
oligonomy. As alternative business models emerged in the music industries, the 
members of the oligonomy became followers of end consumer demand, remaining 
stuck in their notion that the end consumer remains the passive, mass market. 
Addressing this era as an era of market failure helps to identify the role of the end 
consumer within the business model of the music industry and to understand 
emerging trends and patterns in the music industries. Indeed, technological and 
copyright developments in the late nineteenth century enabled the hardware 
industries to morph into the recorded music industry, operating under the same 
business model of copyright exploitation. It follows that the market deriving from 
this business model is a market prone to monopolisation, resulting in a 
homogeneous product, designed and delivered top-down to the mass market. The 
resulting product was not only foreclosed by the few members of the oligonomy, but 
the operating business model made it impossible for the competition authorities to 
justify concerns. When the technology allowed for it, the creeping market failure 
came to the limelight and the end consumer started by-passing the oligonomy to 
gain access to the foreclosed content, generating consumer demand-driven business 
models. This translated into business model innovation. To illustrate, the thesis 
investigates the trial-and-error relationship between the competition authorities of 
the US, the EU, the UK and the old business model, addressing the failure to 
appreciate the bottleneck around the creative output that was being created, and the 
need to safeguard consumer welfare. To compare, the thesis also examines cases in 
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the new business model era, observing the stance of competition authorities towards 
consumer demand generated business models. The thesis concludes with the 
affirmation of the need to design welfare enhancing competition policy, which places 
the end consumer in the forefront. To achieve this, the thesis proposes the 
consultation of the relevant business model literature.  
 
LAY SUMMARY  
 
An overview of the music industries from the beginning of recorded sound until the 
most recent developments in the music world, which offers a detailed evaluation of 
antitrust investigations and merger cases in the US, in Europe, and in the UK. The 
aim of the research is to ask whether the end consumer of music has been best 
served by the music industry, by taking into account the way the industry has always 
been operating. Then, the thesis asks whether recent changes in consumer 
consumption have affected the way the industry operates, and if so, whether 
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Glossary 
Barriers to entry: obstacles preventing competitors from entering a given market 
in a timely, efficient, and effective way. The thesis addresses the extent to which a 
business model can restrict market entry in the context of the music industries.  
Complementarity (in products): a good demand for which increases with the 
decrease in price of another good. The thesis examines patterns of consumption for 
music from the end consumers’ (listeners) perspective, investigating the relationship 
between recordings in digital format and other products, traditionally thought of as 
ancillary e.g. a concert ticket or merchandise.  
Consolidation: the aggregation of industrial activities under one bigger industrial 
‘umbrella’. The thesis examines tendencies of consolidation in the music industries 
(see below) from smaller, independent activities to an era of stronger corporate 
presence, following changes in business modelling.  
Content Foreclosure: the alienation of the musical product from the ultimate end 
consumer (listener), as lying at the core of the music industry’s business model. 
Here the concept of ‘market foreclosure’ is taken at a liberty and extended upon, in 
order for the end consumer to be accommodated in the debate.  
Direct customer: in the cases and investigations examined, retailers and 
wholesalers are recognised as direct customers in the supply chain for the recorded 
product, leaving the end consumer by-passed. A ‘business model’ narrative allows 






Effective competition: non-objectionable competition in law. The thesis reflects 
on the ability to describe competition in a market as legally effective, when the end 
consumer is placed outside the authorities’ direct consideration.  
End consumer: the listener/purchaser of the recording product and its 
complements and substitutes, seeking access to music per se.  
Gatekeeper: the role assumed by the major record companies in the consolidated 
music industry, a catalyst in the alienation of the end consumer from the musical 
product. The thesis examines the relationship between the industry’s business 
model, and the consolidated industrial landscape that invites strong gatekeepers.  
Heterogeneity and homogeneity (in products): in the context of the music 
industries arguments are raised regarding the similar or dissimilar characteristics of 
several recordings that affect their interchangeability from the point of view of the 
end consumer. Even though a certain recording or a certain artist can be thought of 
as unique (‘a little monopoly’), the way the industrial business model is organised 
around the provision of popular or hit music irrespective of content, suggests a 
homogeneous approach to music top-down.  
Interchangeable: products considered substitutable by the consumers. In the 
given context, the interchangeability of several products for music is considered in 
light of the products’ heterogeneity or homogeneity (see above).   
Market (in a business reality sense): the thesis seeks to depart from the 
concept of the ‘relevant product market’ as defined in law, and seeks to identify 
supply and demand patterns for music from the point of view of the end consumer. 
Any discrepancies between the so-defined ‘business reality’ market and the notion of 
the ‘relevant product market’ can raise consumer access issues.  
Market disruption: a factor affecting the standardised operation of a firm or 
industry. The term is often affiliated with technological advancements, carrying 
negative connotations. Here, disruption is measured against the industry’s 
standardised business model and is seen as an opportunity to account for end 
consumers’ preferences.  
Market failure: the term is taken to describe a situation whereby consumer 
demand is not met by the offerings of the industry’s business model. Taking the 
induction in the digital era as an example, it appeared that end consumers preferred 
the consumption of a product (digital format), by-passing the official industrial 
channels. The inability of the industry to provide the consumers with their product 
of choice is taken at a liberty in the present in order to describe an era of market 
failure, acting as a tipping point for the future of the industry’s business model.  
Music Industries: the term relates to the existence of a plethora of music-related 






recorded music. It coincides with the unconsolidated phases of industrial activity 
and signals the existence of multiple business models.  
Music Industry: refers to the consolidated industrial landscape, characterised by 
few major multinational companies, operating under a similar business model.  
Niche: represents a variety of sounds and artists ‘awaiting discovery’. Upon 
entering the business model, the ‘niche’ is marketed and sold as the mainstream, 
reconfiguring the homogeneity that describes the product on offer by the traditional 
music industry.  
Offer (offering): the thesis employs the term provided by the American Marketing 
Association to encompass both products and services, according their perceived 
value as attached by various stakeholders (“marketing is the activity, set of 
institutions, and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and 
exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society 
at large”).  
Oligonomy: this term is borrowed by the Harvard Business Review to refer to a 
situation where a firm or a group of firms acts as an oligopoly to one group and as an 
oligopoly to another, signalling a simultaneous buyers’ and sellers’ market. This 
alternative to vertical integration is chosen in order to represent the position of the 
major record companies and their business model vis-à-vis artists and end 
consumers, rather than vis-à-vis retailers and other intermediaries.  
Oligopoly: a market structure with many buyers and fewer sellers (sellers’ market). 
Here, the position of the major record companies vis-à-vis the end consumers in the 
traditional business model.  
Oligopsony: a market structure with many sellers and fewer buyers (buyers’ 
market). Here, the position of artists vis-à-vis the major record companies in the 
traditional business model.  
Price: in an EU context, ‘increase of prices’ is used in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, as a shorthand for any competitive harm that may result from a 
proposed merger, which includes price increases, reduced output, choice or quality 
of goods and services and the reduction of innovation. Here, it can be taken to 
encompass content foreclosure and consumer access issues.  
Substitutability (in products): demand substitutability is used to define 
relevant product markets, as a first step to competition assessment. The thesis 
examines how product substitutability as per the end consumer is not taken into 
consideration as such by the competition authorities. 
Welfare (consumer): viewed as the ultimate aim of competition policy, consumer 
welfare is to be satisfied by the products of effective competition. The thesis 
examines the merits of this in an industrial landscape prone to consolidation, by 










1 ‘Overture’: Business Models for the Music Industries 
 
“Competition telling us to follow those guidelines, 
 and to stay right handed  
but music comes from the heart, 
 lyrics from my head to my hand,  
and I 'm left handed” 
Raised Fist, 2009 
 
The thesis asks whether there is a role for competition law and policy in the music 
industries. It is argued that there is a need for updated competition policy in order to 
safeguard both end consumer welfare and the competitive process in these markets, 
characterised by fast-paced developments and business model innovation. To this 
aim, the thesis suggests the employment of business model literature, which brings 
the end consumer to the centre of attention.  
1.1 Introduction  
The inspiration behind the present thesis stems from the merger between two key 
players of the music industries in 2010: Live Nation Inc. and Ticketmaster Inc. The 
two companies entered into a merger agreement in order to form Live Nation 
Entertainment Inc., the world’s first fully vertically integrated provider of live music 
entertainment.1 At first instance, the thesis argues that drawing distinct lines 
between several products of the music industries (e.g. ticketing, management, 
touring agency, merchandising and even recorded music) can be misleading in terms 
of assessing competition and no longer corresponds to the shape the industries are 
                                                        
 




The merger was notified in the US and the UK, but did not have an EU dimension. This 






taking: from the end consumer’s point of view the product for music has been 
subsidised by a bundle covering ‘all things music’, the overall music experience, or 
products that the traditional music industry did not have on offer. This realisation 
came to the limelight in the early days of the digital era, when the recorded music 
industry underwent seismic changes.2  
In the beginning of the past decade, thanks to Peer2Peer file-sharing technologies 
(such as Napster), the music industries and digital consumption dominated the 
discussion in the media, in politics, in academic literature, and at courts. While focus 
lied mainly on the perils of ‘disruptive technologies’ the main driver behind the 
seismic changes, the end consumer, was not evaluated as much. In lieu, the few 
major players of the recorded music industry concentrated on combatting file-
sharing by turning against their own consumer base and by arguing for stronger 
intellectual property protection. Yet, the question remained: what about the end 
consumer?  
End consumers were expressing the need to access products not offered by the 
traditional record companies, firstly through the sharing experience the internet had 
to offer and later by substituting and complementing between several music 
products, such as the live concert ticket and the recording. With regard to the 
recording per se, initially faced with no legal alternative on the one hand and with 
lawsuits against sharing platforms (and themselves) on the other, end consumers 
experienced a time of crisis, or in other words, a market failure. Moreover, few (if 
any) in-depth studies had been conducted with respect to the consumption of music 
from the consumers’ point of view. Thus, this era of market failure is further 
characterised by a lack of knowledge about the consumers of music, who have been 
traditionally treated as the mass market. Ultimately, assessing the role of the end 
consumer in a failed market opens the door for competition law: is there a need for 
intervention in the music industries in terms of competition policy making, and if so, 
how is this intervention justified?   
Thus, even though the thesis was triggered by a single merger case between two non-
traditional players of the music industries, there was an apparent need to evaluate 
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the competitive landscape of the music industries as a whole. This evaluation of the 
music industry would place the end consumer in the supply chain for music3 and 
hence, help understand how and why the tale of the music industry became the tale 
of a disenfranchised consumer.  
Further, one of the recurrent themes that emerged during the thesis’ research was 
the inconsistent definition and competitive assessment of the relevant market, 
where the music industry’s major players operate, compete, and merge. This led to 
an examination of the reasons behind the divergent approaches to the recorded 
music industry throughout the years and across jurisdictions, especially since the 
recorded music industry has traditionally been marked by the presence of the same 
few multi-national companies operating under the same business model: 
Designed to deliver a homogeneous product to the mass market top-down, the 
recorded music industry was not ready to cope with the ability of the end consumer 
to disrupt the traditional business model, for instance by blurring the lines of 
complementarity and substitutability between several products for music or 
requesting access to artists as such, irrespective of product offered. Indeed, the fact 
that many innovative business models are currently in operation in a music 
industries context, is partly attributed to those consumer-led changes in 
consumption. This vibrant ‘dialogue’ between end consumer and business model 
innovation translates into diversified views as to what the dominant product for 
music is. Thus, since a relevant product market for competition law purposes is 
defined based on substitutability of demand, it should be the case that such a 
definition can accommodate consumer-led changes in consumption.  
 The need to evaluate the above becomes evident in the relevant mergers, antitrust 
cases, and market investigations conducted in the music industries from the late 
1950s until today. It appears that the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger was just the 
tip of the iceberg. What lied beneath was a patch-work of (mostly) failed efforts to 
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the customers of the record companies e.g. retailers, wholesalers, and recently on-line 
streaming and downloading platforms. The thesis attempts to accommodate and include the 
end consumer in the supply chain for music as such, rather than examine relationships 






assess competition and define a market for both the traditional and the recent 
business models operating in the music industries, in both the US and the EU (as 
well the UK jurisdiction also examined herein).  
Ultimately, the purpose of the thesis became clear: in order to assess the need for 
intervention in the music industries with respect to competition policy making, there 
needs to be a clear evaluation of the previous ex post and ex ante interventions in the 
market. Firstly, this would allow the thesis to pinpoint exactly where the previous 
attempts had failed, leading to the market failures of the past decade. Secondly, it 
would allow the thesis to evaluate the assessment of emerging music markets, as 
resulting from new and innovative business models. To achieve this, whilst 
acknowledging the herculean task in hand, the thesis asks:  Is it the case that the 
music industries need an updated competition approach that will incorporate their 
ever-changing nature and their evolving business models?  
In light of the above, this introductory chapter unfolds as follows: the main research 
question of the thesis is presented directly below, as justified by the creative and 
music industries discourse of the post-industrial economies. Then, the thesis 
proceeds with the presentation of the ‘tool’ employed throughout its course, business 
modelling. The distinct characteristics and features of a business model are 
explained and business modelling is evaluated in both its industrial and in its music 
dimensions. As such, it becomes relevant to the overall aims of the thesis. 
Ultimately, the introductory chapter presents the structure of the overall thesis, 
under the section entitled ‘Grand Designs’ and concludes with a brief look at the 
jurisdictions examined throughout the course of the present thesis, as well as with a 
brief justification of its unorthodox choice of language and academic literature.  
 
1.2 Main research question  
Is there a role for competition law and policy in the music industries? 
Addressing the main question above requires examining the approach that the 
competition authorities have taken and need to take, when assessing competition in 






To take an example from the jurisdictions examined herein, the US Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines of 2010 are construed around the hypothetical monopolist test; 
this focuses on demand substitution for defining product markets.4 However, 
according to the guidelines the “analysis need not start with market definition” and 
other analytical tools can be used by the authorities instead.5 Nevertheless, the 
guidelines discourage a broad product and geographical market definition for fear 
that such an approach would lead to miscalculated market shares.6 This rationale 
reflects the general standpoint that it is always in the competition authorities’ best 
interest to provide a narrow definition contrary to the parties or the defendants e.g. 
in a merger case.7  
However, the following issue can be raised: even if the authorities are discouraged 
from taking the broader picture of a specific industry into account, how much 
narrow-er should their approach be in lieu? Is there a way for the relevant 
authorities to appreciate the industry holistically? To address this, the thesis 
examines the music industries in the cases brought before the competition 
authorities and the courts so far, following a historical approach, starting from the 
late 1950s. The purpose of the analysis is to re-define the markets for music, as they 
result from both the traditional and the recent, innovative business models 
operating in the music industries.  
The backbone of the present thesis is provided by the hypothesis that the traditional 
business model of the music industry as built around copyright exploitation, results 
in a specific product for music, designed and marketed top-down to the mass 
market. New business models operating in the music industries lead to the creation 
of different products and thus, to different relevant product markets for music. Even 
                                                        
 
4 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) 8-13. The 
product market definitions toolkits employed by the authorities are referred to throughout 
the present. Also see R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law, 7th edn, (2012), 27-42, for 
market definition and the SSNIP test in EU competition law.  In brief, the hypothetical 
monopolist test supposes that the producer of a product introduces a Small but Significant 
Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) and asks to what extent this increase is sustainable. 
Should the customers migrate to other products as a result of the increase, these are 
considered substitutes to the hypothetical monopolist’s product and thus, are included in the 
relevant product market. The demand-driven nature of the SSNIP test is therefore attested.  
5 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 7.  
6 Ibid 8.  






when new products for music corresponding to specific markets are not easily 
identifiable, the thesis argues that the music industries can benefit from 
differentiated treatment and policy design by the competition authorities. This need 
for intervention is further evidenced by the market failures in the traditional music 
industry in the past decade. Ultimately, both evidence that the sector is prone to 
market failures and more recent evidence of business model innovation and growth, 
can be employed to justify competition policy intervention.   
This argument stems from the debate on the ‘creative industries’ as promoted in the 
late 1990s. In the post-industrial developed economies, government interest (e.g. 
Tony Blair Labour Government’s Creative Industries Mapping Documents)8 turned 
to the production of cultural products namely publishing, literature, performing 
arts, music, film and broadcasting among others, as main contributors to wealth 
creation and sustainability.9 The EU confirmed the ever growing financial and 
entrepreneurial importance of the sector across its member states,10 whereas 
academic thinking evolved to encompass Schumpeterian notions of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in the form of producing new business models across the creative 
industries’ sectors (alongside new products and employment opportunities).11  
The recognition of the financial importance of the creative industries and the 
subsequent study of the cultural economy raises cultural policy issues: namely, the 
need to formulate new policies for the cultural industries, and the need for these 
policies to accommodate the sectors’ particularities and their economic value.12  
The thesis takes the view that the music industries have provided ample examples of 
this need, should attention be paid to their historical development. Further, the 
study of the relevant competition law cases and investigations highlights that the 
                                                        
 
8 Creative Industries Mapping Documents, April 9 2001, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/creative-industries-mapping-documents-
2001.  
9 F Terry and S Cunningham, “Creative industries after the first decade of debate” (2010) 26 
The information society 113-123.  
10 Ibid.  
11 S Cunningham and P Higgs, “Creative industries mapping: where have we come from and 
where are we going?” (2008) 1 Creative Industries J 7-30, and S Cunningham, J Banks and J 
Potts, “Cultural economy: the shape of the field,” in Cultural Economy H Anheier and Y R 
Isar 2008 at 15-26.  
12 J Potts and S Cunningham, “Four models of the creative industries” (2008) 14(3) 






lack of policies can even result in misleading competitive assessments of the markets 
active within the music industries. However, it is not the aim of the thesis to 
examine new policy theories for the creative industries. Rather, the thesis aims to 
present and analyse the music industries as a key component of the creative 
industries, able to demonstrate the necessity of this approach on their own merit. 
The example of the music industries could then serve towards the re-evaluation of 
adjacent intellectual property industries, which share similar characteristics with 
respect to business model innovation, including of course, the creative sector. This 
point is subsequently raised in the concluding part of the thesis.  
Indeed, in the past decade a category of intellectual property markets stood in the 
competition authorities’ spotlight: the study and the debate over the markets defined 
as Innovation Markets13 raised a series of issues for the competition authorities to 
examine. Glader examines how the need to promote and protect innovation, the 
fast-paced nature of the markets, the inability to predict and define the resulting 
products, the role of intellectual property rights, and the design of hi-tech and 
pharmaceutical industries with their network effects and costs structures, altered or 
at least ‘broadened’ the traditional competition assessment.  As he argues: 
“negative effects on competition have been predicted where the analysis was not 
restricted to competition between current products but also considered the parties’ 
unique position and highly concentrated capabilities in R&D… the innovation 
perspective allows for a comprehensive analysis of competitive effects and 
appropriate remedies.”14  
It could be argued that the creative industries as a whole and the music industries in 
particular, share some similar characteristics. The examination of the business 
models of the music industries can help clarify this point. Nevertheless, the thesis 
does not aim to engage in an in-depth comparison between the creative and the 
innovation markets. Nevertheless, a lot can be learned from the authorities’ choice 
to engage with these markets differently, a choice that can be applied to the creative 
sector.  
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Competition Analysis: EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law (2006) 3.  






Hartley et al. could not have been clearer in that regard when they argued that “the 
purpose of competition in the creative industries is to set up institutions that 
incentivise producers to do best by consumers, which typically means developing 
new ideas.”15 They see a role for competition policy aimed at promoting effective 
entry for the ultimate benefit of consumers, of whom competition law is the ultimate 
guardian.16 They acknowledge the need for maximising innovation and competition 
policy, based on evolutionary growth arguments.17  
On a related note, it has been debated whether there exists a need to accommodate 
cultural expression and diversity concerns in competition law and policy, especially 
in a creative (and a music industry) context.18 Indeed, cultural diversity and 
expression concerns found their way into EU competition law and policy, assuming 
the role of one of competition’s stated aims.19 It is argued in the present that 
consumer welfare can be promoted without a need to accommodate such concerns, 
by simply broadening the perception of the industry’s operational dimensions. This 
way, business model innovation becomes innovation enough to justify bespoke 
policy making, able to place the end consumer within the supply chain for music and 
able to best serve consumer welfare. 
In practice, the need for such differentiated treatment and more precise relevant 
product market definition should have been taken into consideration when assessing 
competition in most recent cases such the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger and the 
merger cases following the break-up of EMI,20 meaning cases that follow the 
emergence of multiple business models. By considering the broader picture of the 
music industries as a market driven by innovative business models and innovatory 
                                                        
 
15 J Hartley, J Potts, S Cunningham, T Flew, M Keane and J Banks, Key concepts in the 
Creative Industries (2013) 27.  
16 Ibid 24-28.  
17 Ibid 28. For more on economics, innovation and competition in this context, see Glader, 
Innovation Markets 20-58. More recent work by Hartley and Potts argues that culture, as 
“the population-wide source of newness and innovation it faces the future, not the past.” 
The authors utilise evolutionary science (e.g. M Pagel and H Gintis), semiotics (Y Lotman), 
economic theory (from Schumpeter to McCloskey); and system theory. J Hartley and J Potts, 
Cultural science: A natural history of stories, demes, knowledge and innovation (2014). 
18 This is discussed in relation to the EU jurisdiction in the merger control part of the thesis. 
A broader debate on cultural policy can found in Hartley et al., Key concepts 69-73.  
19 As presented in the merger control part of the thesis, in the fifth chapter.  







product propositions, the role of the consumer and the key players becomes clearer 
and their conduct gets easier to examine under a competition law light. 
To this aim, the present thesis proposes the employment of a tool stemming from 
business studies literature, which has almost become a catch-phrase in the broader 
digital and creative economy discourse: business modelling.  
 
1.3 Employing business models to examine the creation of relevant markets for 
the music industries and raise the thesis’ hypothesis  
Business model literature has been employed in academia to describe business 
trends and practices in the digital era and has also attempted to provide answers 
about the music industries. Therefore, before raising the relevant research questions 
of the thesis, an introduction to the literature on business modelling is provided. 
Emphasis is given to Alexander Osterwalder’s 9 Building Blocks of the Business 
Model Generation,21 as this specific author has addressed the issue of the music 
industries quite extensively.   
Further, Osterwalder’s work has been heavily employed in the study of the business 
model concept, providing common conceptual ground among scholars and 
professionals.22 The 9 Building Blocks have been employed in literature in order to 
identify what a business model actually is, why the study of the concept is important, 
and how business models affect the way a market operates. In other words, does the 
choice or the evolution of a certain business model have real life consequences in the 
affected market? 
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1.3.1 Business models: studying and defining a concept23 
Even though the term ‘business model’ reflects a concept more or less familiar to 
most entrepreneurs and scholars, it had not gained popularity or even proper 
recognition as a research area among business academics until recently, and more 
specifically until the late 1990s.24 Literature review on the topic suggests that the 
concept of a business model has no theoretical grounding in either economics or in 
business studies.25 Nevertheless, its study has been constantly flourishing, especially 
in relation to the global economy,26 the emergence of e-commerce, and ancillary 
internet-based entrepreneurial activities.27  
There have been numerous attempts to provide a solid and precise definition of the 
term in the past few years;28 confusion stems from the fact that authors use the term 
to address matters that do not necessarily coincide with what a business model 
actually is, but rather imply components or types of business models.29 However, a 
more careful examination of these various attempts allows us to detect some 
common ‘conceptual’ ground in the use of the term. 
According to David J Teece “a business model is a conceptual, rather than financial, 
model of a business.”30 He goes on to describe it as “more generic than a business 
strategy,”31 reflecting the general tendency in a considerable part of the relevant 
                                                        
 
23 The most recent attempt to map, define, and study the concept can be found at D Andreini 
and C Bettinelli, Business Model Innovation: From Systematic Literature Review to Future 
Research Directions (2017). 
24B Demil and X Lecocq, “Business model evolution: in search of dynamic consistency” 
(2010) 43.2 Long Range Planning 227. 
25D J Teece, 2010, “Business models, business strategy and innovation” (2010) 43 Long 
Range Planning 172.  
26 Ibid.  
27A Ghaziani and M J Ventresca, “Keywords and cultural change: frame analysis of business 
model public talk, 1975-2000” (2005) 20(4) Sociological Forum 523-559.   
28 A detailed taxonomy of which has been compiled by C Zott, R Amit and L Massa, “The 
business model: theoretical roots, recent developments, and future research” (2010) WP-862 
IESE Business School University of Navarra.  
29 A Osterwalder, Y Pigneur and C L Tucci, “Clarifying business models: origins, present, and 
future of the concept” (2005) 16 (1) Communications of the association for Information 
Systems 5 “in the literature, the expression stands for various things, such as parts of a 
business model (e.g. auction model), types of business models (e.g. direct-to-customer-
model), concrete real world instances of business models (e.g. the Dell model), or concepts 
(elements and relationships of a model).” 
30 Teece (n 25) 173.  






literature to attempt a placement of the business model concept within a firm, and 
compare it with other terms such as process models32 and business strategy.33  
Osterwalder, Pigneur and Tucci suggest a ‘direction’ in which reflection on the 
concept should go:  
“a business model is a conceptual tool containing a set of objects, concepts and 
their relationships with the objective to express the business logic of a specific firm. 
Therefore, we must consider which concepts and relationships allow a simplified 
description and representation of what value is provided to customers, how this is 
done and with which financial consequences.”34  
This model of ‘reflection’ attempts to depart from the simplified point of view, which 
describes a business model either as the way a company does business, as advocated 
by Galper,35 Gebauer and Ginsburg,36 or as the generic concept of “telling an 
enterprise’s story.”37  
Moving towards a more unified perspective and locating some consensus in the 
relevant literature, at the core lie some shared concepts, such as value creation for 
the customers,38 value sustainability as a goal,39 and business architecture,40 among 
                                                        
 
32J Gordijn and J M Akkermans, “Business modelling is not process modelling” (2000) 
Proceedings of ECOMO Salt Lake City USA 40-51.  
33A Osterwalder et al. (n 29) 7. The authors refer to J Linder and S Cantrell "Changing 
business models: surveying the landscape" (2000) Accenture Institute for Strategic Change, 
M E Porter, "Strategy and the Internet" (2001) Harvard Business Review, P Stähler, 
"Business models as a unit of analysis for strategizing” (2002) Proceedings of the 1st 
International Workshop on Business Models inter alia.  
34 Ibid 3. 
35J Galper, “Three business models for the stock exchange industry” (2001) 10(1) Journal of 
Investing 70-78.  
36 J Gebauer and M Ginsburg, “The US wine industry and the internet: an analysis of success 
factors for online business models” (2003) 13(1) Electronic Markets 59-66.  
37 J Magretta, “Why business models matter” (2002) R0205 Harvard Business Review.  
38 See e.g. A Afuah and C L Tucci, Internet Business Models and Strategies 2nd edn (2003), 
R Amit and C Zott, “Value creation in e-business” (2001) 22 Strategic Management Journal 
493-520. 
39 D W Steward and Q Zhao, “Internet marketing, business models, and public policy” (2000) 
19 (Fall) J Public Policy Mark 287-96, referring to “how a firm will make money and sustain 
its profit stream over time.”  
40 See e.g. M Morris, M Schindehutte and J Allen, “The entrepreneur’s business model: 
toward a unified perspective” (2005) 58 Journal of Business Research 727, P Timmers, 
“Business models for electronic markets” (1998) 8 (2) Electronic Markets 3-8, J Hedman and 
T Kalling, “The business model concept: theoretical underpinnings and empirical 
illustrations” (2003) 12 European Journal of Information Systems 49-59.  For a more recent 






others. According to J Magretta, a good business model addresses Peter Drucker’s 
questions: what does the customer value, how does the business generate income, 
and who is the customer?41  
Admittedly, the pronouns who, what and how lead to the description of an 
architecture (how) that will create something of value for the customer (what and 
who). Hence, despite the apparent multitude of interpretations found in the relevant 
literature, it would be possible to reach a conceptual consensus on the nature of the 
subject. Capturing and creating value and designing a way to reach the customer, 
appear to be the key components of the business model idea. 
Recently, academic work has attempted to group pre-existing business model 
literature and map its future directions. Georg Strampfl in the Process of Business 
Model Innovation,42 moves beyond the taxonomy of the business model concept and 
proceeds with the exploration of innovation in business modelling within the 
corporate environment.43 As he summarises: 
 “the issue of business model innovation has gained significant prominence in 
various research streams especially in recent years. It has overcome initial critics 
and is now recognized as a distinct type of innovation.”44 
Ultimately, even though the term has been associated with entrepreneurship and 
examined on individual firm level, Johnson and Suskewicz refer to the broader 
picture by applying the term on industry level.45 These authors in particular examine 
new technology industries and analyse a business model that encompasses 
technological progress, developments, market strategies, ultimately arguing for 
favourable government policy.46  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
business model a useful strategic concept? Conceptual, theoretical, and empirical insights” 
(2015) 17 (1) Journal of Small Business Strategy 27-50. 
41J Magretta (n 37), V L Vaccaro, D Y Cohn, “The evolution of business models and marketing 
strategies in the music industry” (2004) 6 (1-2) International Journal on Media Management 
46-58.  
42 G Strampfl, The Process of Business Model Innovation (2016).   
43 Ibid 4, the author asks: “why and how do incumbent companies re-configure their 
existing business model and /or why and how do they develop new business models?” 
44 Ibid 49.  
45  M W Johnson and J Suskewicz, “How to jump-start the clean tech economy” (2009) 87 
(11) Harvard Business Review 52-60.  






1.3.2 The music industries as a field of study for the Business Model Generation 
It is exactly this discussion of business models on industry level and the subsequent 
departure from single firm treatment that brings us closer to the music industries.  
It appears that a broad understanding of the business model concept has been 
employed with respect to the music industries in both business and in music studies. 
Teece for example, acknowledges the problem that the recorded music industry was 
facing in the past decade as a ‘business model’ problem and calls for its complete 
reconsideration.47 Other authors representing the music industries’ point of view 
‘backed-up’ by a plethora of industry professionals,48 also refer to the need to 
formulate innovative business models.49 Consequently, various alternative business 
models have been proposed in the relevant literature,50 either as the main subject of 
a book or as a designated chapter in one. Relevant literature in music studies 
however, does not include a solid definition of the term; the term is either used 
generically (e.g. Passman, Gordon, Weissman and Jermance) or borrowed from 
business studies’ literature, albeit rather haphazardly.51 
Amidst these ‘voices’ raised, Alexander Osterwalder of the Business Model 
Generation ‘stretches’ the traditional music business model on his ‘business model 
canvas’ and analyses its weaknesses by referring to his 9 Building Blocks: key 
partners, key activities, key resources, offer, cost structure, customer relationships, 
customer segments, channels and revenue streams.52  
Applying this business model ‘toolkit’, the market failure that characterised the 
recorded music industry at the wake of the 21st century can be viewed as such: loss of 
value (decline in sales of physical recordings), inability to deliver a product that the 
                                                        
 
47 Teece (n 25) 174.   
48 See e.g. D Passman, All you need to know about the Music Business, 7ed edn (2011), D 
Weissman and F Jermance, Navigating the Music Industry Current Issues and Business 
Models (2003), S Gordon, The Future of the Music Business (2005).   
49 V L Vaccaro and D Y Cohn (n 41) 46-58.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Vaccaro and Cohn ‘borrow’ the definition provided by Afuah and Tucci (n 38), and 
Magretta (n 37).   
52 Osterwalder et al., Business Model Generation (n 21).  Also see A Osterwalder, “The music 








consumer values (digital files), and inability to maintain a healthy level of consumer 
relationships. Further, still in the context of Osterwalder’s 9 Building Blocks, we can 
picture the failure of the old (recorded) music industry model in the following 
manner: as technological advancements influenced or eliminated the key resource of 
the ‘old’ business model (copyright exploitation’s value leaning to zero), the main 
revenue stream (album sales) became obsolete, the channels (retailing, distribution) 
collapsed, whereas the cost structure (marketing, promotion and operational costs, 
royalties payments) remained unchanged, and the customer relationships neglected, 
as consumers were ‘mistreated’.  
1.3.3  The 9 Building Blocks of the Business Model Generation in detail 
Thus, this part applies Alexander Osterwalder’s 9 Building Blocks53 to the old 
business model of the recorded music industry, whereas a similar application to the 
new players of the music industries (record companies, concert promoters or other 
recently emerging intermediaries) is being attempted in the forthcoming chapters of 
the thesis.  
In the pre-digital evolution era, the business model of the recorded music industry 
was ‘undisputed’, given that the industry was profitable enough not have its patterns 
and practices questioned.54 It is also undisputed that these patterns faced an urgent 
need to reform following the induction in the digital era or, most importantly, 
following the fact that record companies started losing ‘wallet share’ post-1996, 
meaning the “proportion of disposable income that people devoted to buying music 
recordings.”55  
At this point, many issues came to the limelight, including questions about the 
nature of the music business, the impact of illegal downloading, and the replacement 
of recorded music by live music performance as a main source of income for the 
artists.56 The above led to the production of a vast amount of relevant literature and 
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are being thoroughly addressed in the third chapter of the present. As Dr Nicola 
Searle points out in her 2011 Intellectual Property Office (IPO) commissioned 
report, “the music industry has been at the forefront in dealing with the changes 
arising from the shift from analogue to digital.”57 
Consequently, as the internet-based approach to conducting business expedited the 
study of business models,58 a thorough examination of the dominant business model 
of the recorded music industry becomes relevant. Such a study could be used to 
address the market failure of the past, and potentially help prevent similar issues in 
the future. It was seen how Osterwalder employed his 9 Building Blocks to address 
the failures of the recorded music industry59 and that Nicola Searle employed the 
same literature in her case studies (Heist Records and Clash Music).60 Thus, 
business model literature and the Building Blocks in particular can be related to the 
music industries and have been employed in this context in the past.  
To summarise again briefly, the 9 Building Blocks consist of customer segments, 
value propositions, channels, customer relationships, revenue streams, key 
resources, key activities, key partnerships and cost structure.61 These are applied to 
the old business model of the recorded music industry along with a brief analysis, 
aiming to investigate the creation and the competitive assessment of markets 
deriving from business models. It is argued that adopting a business model point of 
view in a competition law context can provide a holistic and thus, a better 
understanding of the music industries. This approach can accommodate 
anticompetitive concerns and appreciate the role of the end consumer in a market 
for music, without the need to compartmentalise a firm’s activities for market 
definition and competitive assessment purposes.  
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The authors of the Business Model Generation handbook distinguish between 
several customer segments depending on whether the market has a mass, niche, 
segmented, diversified or multi-sided character. They discern different segments 
according to customers’ needs, willingness to pay for different aspects of an offer, 
relationships, and distribution channels through which customers are reached.62  
In the old business model of the recorded music industry, the market was treated as 
a mass market for music consumption,63 meaning that firms treated their customers 
as one single large group with similar needs.  
Value propositions  
A value proposition is related to the customer segment it serves; firms provide what 
the specific segment values and cater for its needs. Osterwalder describes it as a 
bundle of products and services that make customers prefer one firm over the 
other.64 
With regard to the music industry, what was actually on offer during the pre-digital 
era was the provision of homogeneous hit music or wannabe hit music65 or a 
bundled product containing multiple songs (the album), according to Nicola 
Searle.66 The issue arising here is whether customers’ needs are being satisfied by 
this specific value proposition. Should we envision a mass market, consisting of 
customers with homogeneous music needs, then the answer can be yes. This forms 
the basis for the recorded music industry’s inability to foresee and respond to 
consumer consumption changes in a timely and successful manner.  
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This Building Block describes the way in which each value proposition reaches each 
customer segment.67 The authors discern five consequent phases as part of this 
Building Block: raising awareness about a firm’s products and services, helping 
customers evaluate the firm’s value proposition, providing the customers with 
purchasing solutions, delivering the value proposition, and providing post-purchase 
support.68 
Applied to the music industry, delivery channels refer to the sales of the tangible 
object (CD, cassette, vinyl record) through a network of wholesalers and retailers, or 
to the TV and the radio as promotional tools.69 As posited later in the present, 
creating key partnerships with the channels in question, translates to strong 
synergies for profit maximisation. It comes as no surprise that firms operating as 
key partners of the music industry amassed strong leveraging powers vis-à-vis the 
traditional record companies, ultimately to become gatekeepers of the music 
product in a broader music industries discourse.   
 Customer relationships  
The Building Block of customer relationships is described as three-fold: acquisition, 
retention and boosting sales (or upselling).70 In the music industry this has mutated 
to an Achilles’ heel. Customer relationships were completely neglected in the old 
business model, where it was undisputed that the mass market would generate an 
interest for the heavily marketed and promoted hit music through extended 
airplay.71 Upon entering the digital era, the major players in the industry accused 
customers of switching to alternative value propositions, including but not limited to 
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illegal downloading, at a time which marks the decline in sales of recordings in 
physical format.72  
Instead of building stronger relationships with their customers, record companies 
turned against them initiating legal action, whilst lobbying for stronger legislative 
protection, such as copyright extension. Indeed, the third part of the thesis 
addresses these issues quite extensively.  
Osterwalder’s presentation however, leaves this point blank and rather suggests that 
customer relationships are being built by the customer directly through social 
networking.73  
Revenue streams  
Revenue streams are also related to each specific customer segment and represent 
income earned post cost deduction.74 According to the Business Model Generation, 
the important question to ask is “for what value are customers really willing to 
pay” as opposed to what it is they are actually paying for (desired versus actual value 
proposition).75  
In a music industry context, loss of revenues due to the decline in sales of recordings 
in physical format led to questioning the old business model. In a mass market, such 
as the market for hit music, the record companies’ main source of revenue relied on 
massive sales of a few hit albums and on licensing hit music.76 Nevertheless, the 
bundled product (album) has been disfavoured and has been replaced by unbundled 
singles to be purchased or listened to separately, the price of which was tending 
towards zero,77 following consumer consumption changes.  
Further, ancillary revenue streams, such as touring and merchandising income,78 
started entering the new business model propositions in the form of exclusive rights 
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with artists (e.g. 360 degree deals),79 alongside services generating income through 
subscription fees or advertising (e.g. Spotify).  The fact that these, formerly views as 
ancillary, revenue streams are marked by the presence of strong key partnerships, 
controlling the key channels of exposure and distribution through exclusive 
licensing and strong contractual relations, raises further concerns for end consumer 
access, and thus, consumer welfare.  
Key resources  
Key resources create and offer specific value propositions to customers. They can 
either be physical assets or intellectual assets, including intellectual property rights, 
human resources, and financial resources and guarantees.80  
Copyright has played a pivotal part in the music industry, constituting its most 
important key resource. A portfolio of artists would assign copyright on musical 
works to the record companies (often through their publishers), which would build 
and expand their business model around it.81 The second chapter of the present 
thesis is in fact dedicated to the role of copyright in the business model of the music 
industry, depicting how copyright exploitation gave birth to the industry’s business 
model. Naturally, an industry built around an intellectual property right is and has 
always been prone to monopolisation, an issue that also characterises more recent 
business models. The old business model, as built around copyright exploitation, is 
being presented as doubly oligopolistic: towards both the mass market and towards 
the artists themselves. This is in fact addressed in the third chapter, which describes 
the old business model as ‘oligonomic’. Finally, since the very nature of the industry 
is prone to gatekeepers, the role of competition law and policy becomes crucial.  
Key activities  
Key activities are described as actions undertaken by firms in order to make their 
business models work. Even though the authors leave room for interpretation when 
it comes to this term,82 they do provide the key activities of production (mainly in 
manufacturing firms), problem solving (providing new solutions to individual 
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customer problems), and networking (for business models designed with a 
platform).83  
When it comes to the music industry, Osterwalder speaks of marketing and 
promotion and detecting and building new talent, also known as A&R (Artist and 
Repertoire).84 Promotion and discovery of new talent has been employed by the 
music business lobbyists as a rationale behind attempts to legislate for copyright 
extension,85 as presented in the second and the third chapters of the thesis.  This 
approach neglects the importance of social networking (or word-of-mouth) to the 
discovery and promotion of new talent. In other words, it neglects the consumer as 
such.  
Key partnerships  
This Building Block refers to the “network of suppliers and partners that make the 
business model work.”86 The authors distinguish between three motivations for 
creating partnerships: optimisation and economy of scale (aimed to cost reduction 
through vertical relationships), reduction of risk and uncertainty (partnerships in 
competitive environments), and acquisition of resources and related activities (e.g. 
licensing).87 
The old business model relied either on vertical partnerships with manufacturers 
and wholesalers,88 or on partnerships with channels such as radio stations. The 
importance of the radio for the promotion of new music in the analogue world is 
highlighted by the payola scandals that mark the relationship between the record 
companies and the radio stations. Further, radio magnets such as Clear Channel 
Communications, evolved to bottleneck the music product on their own, introducing 
an additional layer of gatekeepers in more recent business models. Indeed, Live 
Nation span out of Clear Channel, following antitrust concerns. This is of utmost 
importance for the present thesis, as it is only through the business model approach 
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that these anticompetitive concerns can be viewed as concerns belonging to the 
same business model. Indeed, an evaluation of these cases alongside the competition 
authorities’ intervention into the deregulated radio industry in the US follow in the 
fourth and fifth chapters.  
Cost Structure 
This block refers to the cost occurring during the operation of a business model. 
Depending on the importance of cost structure the authors discern between cost-
driven and value-driven business models (e.g. low-cost airlines and luxury 
products).89 Cost structures can bear the following characteristics: fixed costs, 
variable costs, economies of scale or economies of scope.90 
Osterwalder recognises marketing and promotion, subsidising less successful artists, 
and paying royalties as the main costs of the old business model.91 This point figures 
more prominently in the UK investigation into the prices of CDs that followed in 
199492 and invites price uniformity in the traditional business model. 
Moreover, these cost structures remained unchanged, even when key resources and 
key activities were in decline, resulting in the crisis or the failure of the traditional 
music industry.  
1.3.4 Taking the Building Blocks further 
i. Business model innovation and innovation in the creative industries: what does a business 
model reveal? 
As stated previously, Potts and Cunningham have attempted to define the 
relationship between the creative industries and the economy as a whole, initially by 
suggesting innovation and growth model scenarios.93 According to the innovation 
model, the creative industries have crucial policy significance (similar to science and 
technology), thanks to their ability to promote and foster innovation in ideas and 
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technologies.94 Potts and Cunningham observe that evidence for the innovation 
model scenario stems from the new shapes that the traditional creative industries 
acquire, facilitating and generating new activities, and consequently new products.95 
With respect to the growth model, this implies a positive relation between the 
creative industries and the aggregate economy,96 where the creative industries are 
seen as a growth driver with the ability to influence growth in adjacent sectors.97 
Other factors that imply the validity of the growth model would be the creation of 
new jobs and new commodities, affecting the broader economy. 
Whereas the innovation model works on the current economy or parallel to it 
(similarly to science and education) by fostering and promoting ideas or otherwise 
influencing the economy indirectly, in the growth model the creative industries are 
seen as “growth mechanisms for the ‘generic’ adjustment and adaptation of the 
knowledge-base of the economy. In this case, policy has a distinctly less substantive 
role: to minimize distortionary interference.”98  Thus, in terms of policy, the growth 
model requires the creative industries to be treated as a ‘special sector’ with 
subsequent special sectorial requirements, whereas the innovation model requires a 
“substantial and significant role for public support based on innovation policy.”99  
Research conducted by the authors in the same paper tended to support the two 
theories almost equally: the creative industries are responsible for both product 
innovation and for business innovation through the presence of diverse business 
models in each creative sub-sector. Whether they act on the economy or as its 
principal drivers, there seem to be general policy implications that require adequate 
and relevant policy making: innovation (in terms of product or business design), the 
promotion of cultural goods, the development and diffusion of new knowledge, the 
creation of wealth for the creative industries and for the aggregate economy, 
constitute factors that necessitate appropriate policy making.100 
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In 2013, Hartley et al. explained that the creative industries are in fact transitioning 
from cultural and industry policy, as construed around welfare promoting 
arguments, to competition and innovation policy, evolving from an industry to an 
innovation narrative.101 The former justifies intervention based on market-failure 
arguments, whereas in the latter intervention is justified in order to foster the 
innovative process. The thesis sheds light into both sides of the spectrum and 
configures this perspective. Thus, these theories stemming from cultural economics 
can provide the background for the need for intervention in theory and the studied 
cases can provide the evidence. 
In this sense, the study of the business models operating in music industries is vital: 
either as a form of innovation themselves or as a factor resulting to product 
innovation, business models influence heavily the production process. A business 
model ‘describes’ the process that leads to a product from its inception to its 
production and beyond. It reveals what is valued in an industry and how it reaches 
the end consumer, proving the existence of this double innovation (process and 
product) for the creative and subsequently the music industries.  
1.3.4.1 Business models and copyright  
During the brief presentation of the Building Blocks, copyright was presented as the 
key resource of the music industry’s business model, since revenue streams and 
value propositions were built around copyright exploitation. Therefore, the first the 
relationship to be examined is the one between business models and copyright. 
With the decline in sales of recordings in physical format, the question that needs to 
be answered is whether a business model narrative can adequately explain market 
failure in the traditional music industry. An examination of the history of copyright 
in relation to the recorded music industry can shed light to this question. Hence, the 
thesis examines the relationship between copyright laws and the birth of the 
recorded music industry, following legislative reforms and evaluating the way they 
affected the industry, enabling the key players (the major record companies) to 
emerge.  
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To achieve this, the second chapter of thesis looks at the US (home of the first big 
record companies Columbia, Capitol and RCA Victor) and the UK (originally home 
of Decca), passing by other European countries when needed. For instance, the US 
1909 Copyright Act introduced compulsory licensing for musical compositions, 
allowing for multiple covers of the same song to be released across labels,102 
suggesting an early need to intervene in an industry prone to consolidation. On this 
side of the Atlantic, the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations of 1961, suggests the 
presence of a strong industry advocating its interests through lobbying (IFPI). 
Hence, the connection between copyright and the music industries in this context is 
multifaceted: the law seems to influence the industry and vice versa.  
Additionally, evaluating the relationship between business models and copyright 
passes through competition’s welfare enhancing aims. To illustrate, and going back 
to Potts and Cunningham’s models for the creative industries and the aggregate 
economy,103 the authors have argued that the innovation model views the creative 
industries as a complex innovation system that can originate and coordinate change 
in knowledge, rather than an industry per se. Thus, the innovation model is justified 
by changes in business modelling. In the growth model on the other hand, the 
creative industries both transfer novel ideas to other sectors and absorb novelty in 
ideas and technology from adjacent industries.  
It follows that the implications of this categorisation lie in the way public policy is 
designed. As seen earlier, if the creative industries have the ability to influence 
substantially the aggregate economy through their own growth, then public policy 
should be designed to minimise distortionary interference and promote investment. 
Against this background, the need to look at competition law as it relates to the 
music industries becomes even more important: can competition policy be designed 
in order to accommodate these models? Speaking of innovation and welfare policy 
making establishes the relevance of competition policy to this concept.104 
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Indeed, ‘notoriously’ established as antitrust’s only articulated goal, the role of 
consumer welfare in competition policy has been disputed in academia ever since 
the Antitrust Paradox.105 It has been argued that Bork ‘confused’ consumer surplus 
as consumer welfare, a concept well established in economic literature.106 Consumer 
welfare in economics takes into consideration the overall benefit of the consumption 
of goods and services in a relevant market.107 Competition methodology focuses on 
consumer surplus, which according to the Chicago School, is equal to allocative 
efficiency and overall prosperity.108  
Ever since, the Chicago School has been contradicted and many of its theories have 
been reconsidered, including the antitrust goal. It has been argued that antitrust 
may even harm consumer welfare in the “pursuit of innovation in durables and 
fashion goods.”109 It is wrong therefore to ignore the dynamic nature of the creative 
and the innovation industries, as also argued by Potts and Cunningham.110 In this 
sense, antitrust laws have the same goal as intellectual property, as evidenced by the 
1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the licensing of intellectual property, namely “to 
promote innovation and enhance consumer welfare.”111 In this context, innovation 
and consumer welfare go hand-in-hand in terms of the supply of “new and useful 
products, more efficient processes and original works of expression.”112 It is argued 
that in IP-centred industries, competition law and policy have an even greater role to 
play with regard to consumer welfare, exactly because these industries are de lege 
prone to monopolisation.  
With the roles of intellectual property and competition policy tied together towards 
the provision of creativity and innovation, it is crucial for these two fields to work 
closely to achieve their common goal. This requires agreement on a conceptual 
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basis: what intellectual property laws create should be understood as such by 
competition policy. This could not be more relevant for the purposes of the present.  
It is crucial for competition law to operate on the same conceptual level as 
intellectual property, when dealing with intellectual property (copyright in the 
present case) generated business models. 
To this aim, the third chapter of the present thesis is dedicated to the linkage 
between the copyright-led business models and the creation of relevant markets for 
music, in both a business reality and a competition law context. Is there common 
ground to be found?  
1.3.4.2 Business models and markets for music  
Indeed, the examination of the relationship between business models and copyright 
exploitation inevitably leads to the examination of the markets for music, where the 
key record companies operate.  
The underlying question about the relationship between a business model and 
markets for music is: to what extent does a specific business model influence the 
creation of products and markets for music from a consumer’s point of view? In 
other words, how has the business model of the recorded music industry shaped the 
demand for recorded music? 
This question is of great importance when assessing relevant cases in the music 
industry, as the research aims to identify the markets for music in a legal context. 
After analysing the recorded music industry as built around copyright exploitation, 
the relationship between the consumer and the provider comes next.  
Is there a single market for music from a consumer’s point of view based on the 
predominant business model? Is this market different from the market the 
authorities define when assessing competition in the markets for music? To answer 
this question, the research focuses on the relevant market definitions provided by 
the authorities in the relevant cases. How have the authorities treated the market for 
recorded music until now? How does the treatment relate to relevant policy making 
and what aspects are being promoting (welfare or multiple aims)?  
According to the relevant literature on the history of the music industries and the 






as homogeneous throughout its history. This idea of the homogeneous market goes 
as far back as the 1940s, when the four dominant firms at the time presented the 
market with a homogeneous product. This product was aimed to appeal to a target 
audience, which was also treated as the homogeneous market for big-bang, swing, 
and predominantly “white non-offensive” music.113 The perception of the 
homogeneous market has been following the recorded music industry ever since and 
it is important to examine how niche markets have been treated over the years. The 
examination shows that hit music is created by ‘absorbing’ niche genres and re-
marketing them for mass consumption.114  
This realisation shows the ‘flexibility’ that characterises the music industries in 
creating strong value propositions and gaining control over the markets where they 
operate, leading to the re-shaping of the relevant question:  how has the specific 
business model that revolves around copyright exploitation influenced the market 
for music on the supply side?  
1.3.4.3 Business Models for music and competition law 
Moving a step forward, after having analysed the triadic relationship between 
business models, copyright and markets for music, the research focuses on the 
competition authorities’ point of view, when defining and assessing competition in 
the markets for music. Thus, a chain is created between the business model of an 
industry, the subsequent creation of markets where the relevant firms operate, and 
the way competition is assessed.  
Returning to the assumption of a homogeneous market for music, the research seeks 
to evaluate the relevant market definitions that the competition authorities have 
employed, when dealing with cases and investigations in the music industries until 
now. How have the competition authorities ‘complied’ with the dominant business 
model in terms of accepting or employing a relevant market definition based on its 
structure? Additionally, are the competition law regimes tied to the idea of a 
homogeneous market deriving from a specific business model? To this aim, the 
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research focuses on the relevant cases and market investigations aiming first and 
foremost to evaluate the differentiated relevant markets defined across jurisdictions, 
with respect to the same few firms operating under the same business model. 
Subsequently, the research delves into the competitive assessment in order to learn 
lessons from the substantive tests the jurisdictions employ, as well as from the 
several theories of harm examined. These are measured against the stated aims the 
competition authorities attempt to achieve with respect to intervention.  
Thus, the research is able to move towards the evaluation of recent business models 
and the alternative shapes that the music industries have taken after the ‘digital 
revolution’. The relevant part re-examines the same points raised, only this time 
under a new prism: the new business models proposed by and for the music 
industries following the induction in the digital era. The research does not focus 
much on the issues of file-sharing and illegal downloading and their effect on the 
recorded music industry, as these issues have been over-analysed in the past 
decade.115 Rather, the aim of the research is to examine a post-market failure world, 
evaluating the business models operating in the music industries and aiming to 
support business model innovation instead. Additionally, after the era characterised 
by market failures, the role of the neglected end consumer changed to a powerful 
participant in the market for music and this should be accounted for in a relevant 
competition law scenario.   
To this goal, the current business practices and trends provide the basis for the 
subsequent parts. As already mentioned, recent developments have witnessed the 
emergence of new corporate players such as music promoters, ticket agents, as well 
as downloading and streaming services, employing new business models. To what 
extent are these products considered substitutes from the consumers’ point of view? 
Do they also form part of the same relevant market from a competition law 
perspective? To illustrate, some empirical research has already been conducted 
asking whether concerts are complementary products to recordings and therefore 
                                                        
 






whether a decline in the artists’ income from recordings (royalties) justifies or 
accelerates an increase in ticket prices.116  
Based on this, the thesis examines how new and innovative business models affect 
the product on offer. To what relevant market(s) do these products relate? And 
finally, are the competition law regimes under examination fit for assessing 
competition in the respective markets? In other words: do the competition 
authorities need to adjust their point of view to accommodate the changing 
landscape of the music industries and is there a need for specific competition policy 
making?  
By answering the last question, the thesis broadens the relevant market definition 
attempted by the competition authorities. This helps connect the thesis to the overall 
issues of policy making in the creative sectors e.g. art, publishing, or other markets 
that have had to reconsider their business models in the last years. Even though this 
is only indirectly presented in the thesis, a broader way of thinking regarding the 
potential effect of an affirmative answer to these questions is accommodated in the 
concluding chapter. The findings leave room for future comparative research.  
 
1.4  ‘Grand Designs’ 
Ultimately, the thesis addresses the issues raised by employing the following 
methodology: in the second chapter, the birth of industry is attested, as built around 
copyright exploitation. This helps present an industry prone to monopolisation by 
gatekeepers with little if any room for end consumer involvement. Thus, the 
characteristics of the music industry’s business model are traced to its inception. 
The second chapter introduces the building model and the Building Blocks relating 
to copyright explicitly and sets the scene for all developments in the music industries 
that follow.  
                                                        
 
116 Among others, M F Schultz (n 56), A Krueger, “The economics of real superstars: the 
market of concerts in the material world” (2004) 23 (1) Journal of Labour Economics 1-30, 






Subsequently, the third chapter is dedicated to supply and demand patterns 
operating under the business model of the music industry and the business model of 
the music industries. This chapter presents the business or commercial reality of the 
music industries, explaining the business models in action, whilst showcasing both 
instances of market failures and business model innovation. The third chapter 
illustrates the establishment and the stabilisation of the business model and follows 
a narrative closer to competition law this time, as it explains patters of supply and 
demand. Thus, its narrative switches from an intellectual property narrative to one 
closer to competition law.  
By the end of the third chapter the theories advocating policy making with respect to 
growth (market failure) and innovation (competition and innovation maximisation) 
become justified, as the reader becomes familiarised with the operating business 
models of the music industries past and present, as well as with the role of the end 
consumer. Adopting a consumer-focused approach, highlights the need for any 
advocated policy to ensure consumer welfare either as a safeguard against failures or 
as a guarantee of innovation, which benefits consumers indirectly.   
To address the above, the thesis consults business studies, marketing, popular 
music, and economics literature, alongside the relevant primary and secondary legal 
sources. Ultimately, the business reality narrative that the thesis attempts is 
generated through literature employed by the fields that study business models and 
the music industries per se.  
Against this background, the two subsequent chapters provide the necessary 
evidence. Hence, the thesis’ fourth and fifth chapters (the second part) are dedicated 
to the thorough examination of the competition authorities’ point of view. Case law, 
interventions, and investigations into the business models (old and recent) are 
presented and analysed. Specifically, the fourth chapter deals with the examination 
of the business models ex post, aiming to assess whether the competition law 
regimes under examination could address anticompetitive concerns within the 
music industries; concerns that ultimately led to market failures. The fifth chapter 
evaluates the business model ex ante, aiming to assess whether the competition 
authorities could prevent anticompetitive concerns in relevant merger cases. An 






examined in chronological order within each jurisdiction. This enables the reader to 
follow the business model evolution more closely.   
The concluding sixth chapter groups the key findings together. These key findings 
are connected to the overall aim of justifying intervention into the industries, as both 
a result of the market failures of the past and the consumer-led business model 
innovation that followed. Recommendations for further comparative research within 
the aggregate creative sector conclude, marking the end of thesis.  
 
1.5 Jurisdiction  
Briefly, with respect to jurisdiction the research focuses on the US, the EU and to a 
lesser extent, the UK. Thus, the world’s most mature antitrust jurisdictions, the US 
and the EU, are presented substantially, whereas the UK features as a country with a 
prominent creative and, most importantly, music sector. Further, the choice of 
jurisdiction is justified by the nature of the business model of the music industry and 
popular music, as historically tied firstly to the US and then to the UK. However, the 
choice of jurisdiction is justified throughout the present, as related to each case and 
to each era examined.  
 
1.6 ‘Language’  
The thesis acknowledges the unorthodox choice of academic ‘language’ and 
terminology, and the potential ‘surprise’ this might impose upon the reader. The 
chosen language and its accompanying literature are employed with a view to 
‘disentangling’ academic knowledge on competition law and business studies. 
Aiming to offer novel approaches to these fields of study, traditional terminologies 
are taken at a liberty, not always aligning with their normative confines (e.g. 
economics in competition law). The thesis provides a dedicated Glossary at its very 









2 ‘Permanent Waves’: The Copyright Story of a Business Model 
 
“A lot of a, sharks out there,  
try'na take a bite of somethin' 
what's hot 
lot of chameleons out there, try'na change up 
anytime somethin' new comes along, everybody wants a bite 
don't happen overnight” 
Cypress Hill, 2000 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The present thesis proceeds with the examination of the traditional model of the 
music industry, which posits copyright exploitation in the heart of the industry’s 
activities. The aim of the present chapter is to place copyright exploitation at the 
core of the business model of the recorded music industry since its inception. 
Consequently, the present chapter examines the history of the music industry from a 
copyright perspective. The chapter places copyright within the business model from 
the very first stages of the industry following legal and technological advancements. 
The historical approach is drafted with the view to addressing the specific issue: how 
has the role of copyright evolved alongside the creation and evolution of an 
industry? How has this legal concept evolved to become a business asset and a 
business model’s key resource?  
Following the presentation of the Business Model Generation’s Building Blocks in 
introduction, the current chapter attempts a business model review of both the 
music industry and of copyright legislation. To this aim, key issues are addressed 
through the business model lens. The alternative reading of the music industry 
enables a first insight into the forthcoming issues to be analysed, including the 
creation (or the perception) of a homogeneous market for music, the treatment of 
the niche, and the identification of the key players of the music industry.  
The present chapter concludes with an evaluation of the role of copyright throughout 






define the relationship between the music industries, as characterised by a 
copyright-driven business model and the law. This provides the conceptual link 
between the second and the third chapter of the present thesis, dedicated to the 
significance of the music industry’s business model for the creation of markets for 
music.  
Initially, it is necessary to identify the Building Blocks of the business model that 
relate to copyright. Copyright is found to relate to three separate Building Blocks: 
key resources, key activities, and value propositions.117 Therefore, the sub-sections 
of the present chapter expand on these Building Blocks, aiming to present how the 
business model was formed in relation to the copyright regimes in place.  
The analysis begins with an overview of the recorded music industry until the 
Second World War. The era following the Second World War is addressed in the 
third chapter, as distinct in its ‘music industry’ dimensions. Indeed, following World 
War II the recorded music industry grew rapidly (following an increase in 
consumers’ disposable income)118 and its business model became sustainably 
profitable. However, it was only midway through the 1950s that the music industry 
fully ‘realised’ its commercial potential, with industrial interest turning to markets 
previously considered as niche. As shown in the third chapter, the incorporation of 
niche genres in the record industry’s mainstream rota (jazz, blues, rock’n’roll), 
served the business model of the industry by enabling the exploitation of these 
genres under the mainstream ‘popular music’ umbrella.119 In brief, without popular 
music the recorded music industry would not have been able to evolve into its 
corporate stage and sustain its business model.  
However, the beginning and the initial industrial organisation of the recorded music 
industry highlights the way in which the initial market segments were formed 
through record labelling,120 an initiative that came to acquire a specific meaning in 
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terms of segregating the market and creating the relevant supply and, to a certain 
extent, demand for music. It is shown that even though the market was technically 
segregated by labels, the purpose behind this was to ‘catch’ the popular sound and 
incorporate it into the dominant, top-down business model. Thus, popular music is 
tied to the business model examined, as the driving force of the music industry and 
its raison d'être. This came to place gradually, as the historical analysis unveils.  
However, for the time being the analysis begins with the creation of the music 
industry as an industrial concept, shedding light to the role of copyright legislation. 
As the historical analysis continues, the formation of the business model becomes 
clearer. The specific business model examined herein evolved around the creation, 
marketing and provision of hit music, as the main revenue generator for the 
industry. The aim is to illustrate how copyright legislation helped the industry evolve 
and acquire its commercial power. Thus, the explicit presentation of the birth of an 
industry, its business model, and its relationship with copyright merits its own 
chapter within the thesis. 
The first part of this chapter deals with the recording industry, which originally did 
not cater for the provision of music. The role of intellectual property for that 
industry is presented in the form of analysing its key resource, the patent. It is 
established that a change in key resource made the recording industry relevant not 
only to music, but also to copyright law. Secondly, the initial form of the music 
business is also analysed alongside its primary key resources and key activities. The 
closer relationship between two separate activities (recording and publishing) 
signals the entry into the era of the ‘music industry’. The thesis will continue with 
the value propositions of this ‘single’ music industry in the third chapter. Again, 
recorded popular music will be identified as the main value proposition of the 
industry, providing its major revenue stream.  
Thus, the present chapter focuses on the initial stages of the industry, aiming to 
introduce the business model since its inception, by examining how the law 
influenced the creation of the business model and vice versa. It is argued that this 
occurred early on in history and that this business model did not change until the 
induction in the digital era. Ultimately, by the end of this chapter the business model 
of the music industries will have been presented as resulting from the key resource 






 As such, the chapter begins by introducing the early days of the music industry and 
discussing the several technologies relating to patent law. Subsequently, 
advancements in copyright law are presented to explain the transition from a patent-
centred to a copyright-centred music industry. To achieve this, the chapter focuses 
on the law and on the commercial activities as related to recording, publishing, and 
performing, concluding with the protection of sound recordings, as lobbied for by 
the emerging recorded music industry.  
Value propositions and the supply of music are being analysed in the third chapter 
of the present, dealing with the creation of markets resulting from the business 
model under examination.  
 
2.2 The early days of the music industry: key resources and key activities 
The Business Model Generation has identified key resources as the Building Block 
that relates to the most important assets required to make a business model work.  
Key resources can therefore be identified as physical (including facilities, buildings, 
and distribution networks), intellectual (including intellectual property rights), 
human (a portfolio of artists), and financial (including guarantees and lines of 
credit). These are of a de facto tangible nature, as they can be leased, rented, and 
sold. The same characteristics are also borne by intellectual property rights thanks 
to their monopolistic nature. Indeed, the economic right can be owned, leased, and 
acquired by others. It is therefore evident that intellectual property rights belong to 
this Building Block.  
Further, the analysis expands into key activities, as a direct result of the key 
resources in question. Key activities were described in the previous chapter as “the 
most important things a company must do to make its business model work.”121 
These can include problem solving, production, and networking endeavours. The 
following analysis investigates several key activities to the extent that they relate to 
the key resources under examination. For the music industries, these two Building 
                                                        
 






Blocks are interrelated, as key activities result from reforms in copyright legislation 
directly.  
2.2.1 The patent as key resource 
Traditionally, the recorded music company is seen as relying solely on the 
exploitation of copyright. However, the initial recording industry was far from 
evolving around copyright exploitation. Originally, the manufacturers of records 
paid less attention to what was being recorded and more attention to what it was 
being recorded on; the art to be showcased was the art of recording with precision 
rather than the art of music.122 Hence, the most significant asset of the recording 
industry until the early twentieth century was the tangible machine itself, rather 
than the rights incorporated in the music. 
As a matter of fact, the record and the sound reproduction hardware in the 
nineteenth century were seen as innovative technological inventions. The idea of the 
record as a treated good was not realised until 1889, when the first commercially 
manufactured discs were produced for Emile Berliner, the inventor of the 
gramophone.123 Even though music was recorded on them, the three companies 
dominating the industry in the early years of the twentieth century124 were not 
interested in marketing the music, focusing on showcasing sound reproduction 
techniques instead. To this end, the labels appearing on the discs contained little 
information about the music and were rather focused on the awards each company 
had won in various industrial exhibitions, as well as on patents owned by the 
manufacturing company.125 Almost of equal importance, and thus occupying a large 
part of the record label, was the trademark of the company. The famous terrier 
listening to ‘His Master’s Voice’ was used in 1909 for the first time, as the trademark 
appearing on the Gramophone Company’s discs.126 Moreover, record reviews in the 
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123 Ibid. 
124 Thomas Edison’s “National Phonograph Company”, Emile Berliner’s “National 
Gramophone Company” or “Gramophone Company” in the UK, and the “Columbia 
Phonograph Co” originally created to exploit the patented invention of the graphophone (an 
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press were categorised by record company rather than by artist, a practice that 
stayed with the music press up until the 1940s in some cases.127 This practice was 
held in accordance with each record company’s manufacturing process, utilising 
either the phonograph or the gramophone ‘talking machine’.128 
Initially, the record companies were unaware of the commercial potential of their 
inventions. The head of the US company Victor, Eldridge Johnson, acknowledged 
this fact as early as in 1900, when he wrote to the manager of the UK Gramophone 
company: “…one of our greatest difficulties has been the proper marking of these 
records. We never tried before to mark them properly, as if we were making them 
to sell.”129 Again, the importance of recorded music was not fully realised and the 
labels appearing on the records were focused on providing information on the 
product itself. 
This is rather obvious in the case of Thomas Edison’s National Phonograph 
Company, as no artist information was to appear on his company’s discs. The only 
figure ‘decorating’ the disc was the figure of Edison himself.130 As a matter of fact, 
Edison endeavoured his machine to become a vessel for reproducing speech for 
educational purposes.131 A similar practice was followed by Columbia records that 
refused to provide any artist information until 1904.132 Pursuant to that year, the 
composer was given more credit than the recording artist.133 It was Eldridge 
Johnson (Berliner’s business partner in Vector) who first introduced the idea of 
signing exclusive recording contracts with the most famous performers of his era; 
nevertheless, the aim was to enhance the popularity of the ‘talking machine’.134 This 
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practice however, shows the importance of securing long-term exclusive contracts 
with artists, as they enter the business model themselves. This discussion resurfaces 
later in the present, during the UK investigation into the prices of recordings. At that 
stage, the thesis points to the longevity of the practice, referring to its inception by 
Johnson himself.  
Back to the ‘patent wars’ of the time, Edison and Berliner held patents for the 
phonograph and the gramophone respectively.135 Their aspirations regarding their 
inventions differed as well. Edison’s company provided licences for the 
manufacturing of dictating machines and it was only under the Columbia 
phonograph licence that the invention became linked to the entertainment sector, 
since the machine’s appeal to crowds at fairs and amusements parks got noticed.136 
This led Berliner to develop a system for manufacturing duplicates of recordings, 
using a zinc plate as the master, with the purpose of bringing entertainment to 
people’s homes.137 What Berliner actually achieved was the separation of the 
recording from the reproduction process, guaranteeing cost reduction, as well as 
easier storage and distribution for the resulting product.138 Berliner’s gramophone 
entered the home entertainment market in 1895.139 Edison’s response was to further 
innovation in his invention, and to sign a deal with Columbia to also enter the home 
entertainment market.140 The subsequent post-1895 period is characterised by 
‘patent wars’ and minor technological improvements on the pre-existing 
technologies.141 It appears that in such a competitive environment, where rivalry in 
innovation thrived, patents and trademarks were the weapons in a company’s 
arsenal, since companies were competing in the market for sound reproduction and 
not in the market for recorded music. The dust settled around 1907, with the 
prevalence of the disc over Edison’s cylinder.142 Nevertheless, the so called ‘patent 
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wars’ did not end there, as recording music companies would later compete on the 
standardisation of the record’s format.  
Victor’s (Berliner’s and Johnson’s company) patent expired in 1914 and more 
competitors entered the market for the supply of machines, as well as the market for 
record manufacturing, either for self-supply or for further exploitation.143 The 
distinction between hardware manufacturing and the manufacturing and 
distribution of records (software), started to become apparent. Independent record 
companies specialising in a variety of genres started to appear, as it became clearer 
that profit via the sale of records was easier to achieve than via the sale of 
machines.144 However, research shows that success for these companies failed to 
materialise, as sales of a few recordings per title were typical, disabling economies of 
scale.145 As regards the US hardware sector, home entertainment market penetration 
reached 50 percent by 1929, leading to the introduction of segmentation policies by 
furthering innovation in the machines once again.146  
The ‘preoccupation’ with enhancing sound reproduction technology appeared to 
have an adverse or rather a ‘stalling’ effect on the materialisation of the record’s full 
commercial potential. Engineers and sound technicians dominated the recording 
companies and all music-related decisions were left to them, including talent 
acquisition or A&R (Artists and Repertoire). This resulted in imitative policies, such 
as the competition for a small number of established theatre and opera names, 
releasing different version of the same songs.147 A cheaper alternative was to record 
live performances of popular music by ‘anonymous’ artists.148 It is noted once again 
that these ‘imitation games’ never left the business model, resulting in the treatment 
of the product as ‘homogeneous’ and of the market as ‘mass’, as attested later in the 
following chapters.  
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In order to fully apprehend the practices of the time, it is crucial to look into the 
intellectual property rights affiliated with the industry. The legal framework at the 
time confirms that copyright was not able to provide the sought-after return on 
investment. After all, the key participants in the industry were the inventor and the 
company created to market the invention. This comes to prove the relevance of 
patents for financial success on both single firm and on industrial level. The industry 
created around this technology amassed a substantial amount of funding that was 
subsequently channelled into the music part of the business, as further explained in 
the third chapter.  
Turning to the US patent regime at the time, it becomes evident that a favourable 
patent regime, combined with the absence of any legislative framework regarding 
music, can explain why primary focus lied on the invention rather than the music. 
Investigating the relevant patent and the copyright laws, as well as their progressive 
changes, is also crucial for addressing any commercial opportunities that these 
intellectual property rights provided. The change of the industry from hardware to 
software-oriented is linked to the laws of the era. It becomes clear that the key 
resource of the industry switched from the exploitation of patents to the exploitation 
of copyrights; a change that shaped the industry throughout the twentieth century. 
In the US, patents have been granted on federal level since 1790,149 three years after 
the Constitution called for monopolies to be granted to authors and inventors under 
the Copyright Clause.150 In the UK, the patent office was established in 1852, and the 
process of obtaining a patent was characterised by a lack of vigorous examination.151 
In both countries, patents were granted for a 14-year period. Another major 
development in the history of patent and trademark law was the signing of the Paris 
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Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in March 1883.152 The UK 
adhered to the Paris convention in 1884 and the US in 1887.153  
With regard to the US, the importance of patents for the American economy during 
and after the Industrial Revolution cannot be underestimated. The US posited itself 
as the innovation hub of its time and that is in great part a consequence of its 
favourable patent regime. The US patent regime was focused on promoting 
technological and commercial development through strong proprietary rights, based 
on lower application fees than in the UK, efficient enforcement mechanisms, and 
specific requirements for each new invention to advance the ‘state of the art’.154 It 
should be noted that post-Industrial Revolution Britain was less favourable towards 
the patent system, with many viewing it synonymous to ‘royal favouritism’, and with 
few inventors relying on it for the award of a monopoly.155 In general, patent 
abolitionism movements were popular around Europe until the late nineteenth 
century.156 On the other hand, the patent regime of the US provided a favourable 
environment for the exploitation of new technologies to thrive and international 
commerce to expand, especially after the adherence to the Paris convention, which 
also contained provisions enabling the acquisition of nationally registered rights on 
a multinational level.157 
Throughout the nineteenth century, individual innovation flourished across the US, 
seeing an increase in the number of inventors who were awarded multiple patents 
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throughout their careers, Edison being one of them.158 These inventors were more 
likely to succeed financially, as they were more likely to assign or license their rights 
to third parties, either firms or individual entrepreneurs. Individual inventors 
having received more than twenty patents were likely to sell off 60 percent of their 
patents for further commercialisation.159 The ‘golden age of the inventor’ as it has 
been called,160 is also characterised by an increasing interest in the market for 
technology. This is further attested by the publicly available information held at the 
US patent office161 and by the role that patent agents and lawyers played at the 
time.162 It appears that the role of those agents and lawyers did not remain the static 
role of a legal consultant, but it grew to encompass marketing and commercial 
advice to patent holders:163 there was some sort of patent marketing know-how at 
the time, and investing in an invention was an almost risk-free entrepreneurial 
choice.  
After the turn of the century, commercial interest in technology had advanced to the 
point of attracting more interest from intermediaries. This trend led to long-term 
contractual attachments between inventors and assignees willing to provide the 
capital necessary for the commercial exploitation of the patent,164 like in the case of 
the partnership between Berliner and Johnson. From a commercial point of view, it 
seemed that an industry for the manufacturing and marketing of technology had 
been established. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the promotion of the machines 
and the award of multiple patents was the norm. The late nineteenth century further 
sees the emergence of international technology licensing agreements, since the 
forefathers of what was to become EMI entrepreneurs Owen and Williams, acquired 
Berliner’s patents for Britain. They set up the British Gramophone Company, 
importing machines from Johnson’s US factory (hardware) and discs from Berliner’s 
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native German company, Deutsche Grammophon.165 The British Gramophone 
Company integrated vertically following the acquisition of the controlling interest of 
the German company, securing an unlimited supply of discs, and thus achieving 
economies of scale. By the time that the First World War broke out, a third of all 
British households owned some sort of gramophone, and The Gramophone 
Company had supplied them with more than three million discs.166 
The sound carrier machines and their variations started out as ‘generic’ inventions, 
without a specific commercial purpose attached to them by their inventors. The 
post-Industrial Revolution era, along with a favourable patent regime in the US, 
helped the new technology become known to the public and attract the interest of 
entrepreneurial intermediaries, who saw the machines as a business opportunity to 
sell music. However, it was only after being tied to music that the invention reached 
its full potential and became a standard electrical appliance for the average 
American and British household. Full market penetration however, meant that the 
sole supply of hardware would not continue to be as profitable as the supply of the 
accompanying software, the record. Apart from a switch in market conditions, the 
legal framework governing the supply of music itself helped the industry acquire the 
business model researched in the present thesis.  
2.2.2 How the hardware business became the music business and role of copyright: a 
change in key resource and the standardisation of the industry’s key activities  
2.2.2.1 Recording  
Turning to the initial ‘music business’, this was the business of publishing sheet 
music as required for the performance of musical pieces by musicians or members of 
the public. Printed copies of the works to be performed were subject to copyright as 
any other printed work published by a publishing house. By the end of the 
eighteenth century, the piano was present in many affluent households in America 
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and in Europe, and demand for sheet music grew. Composers were therefore able to 
benefit from the printing and selling of their music.167  
Protection was initiated in the US by the 1831 Copyright Act that added printed 
music to the protected subject matter under federal law.168 In the UK, music was 
protected through case law until the enactment of the 1911 Copyright Act, since the 
original provisions in the Statute of Anne catered only for printed books, whereas 
the first case to bring forward the issue of the protection of music was the 1777 case 
of Bach v Longman, when printed music became protected as a form of ‘writing’.169  
From the composers’ point of view, one could speak of a key activity of publishing 
sheet music with copyright exploitation as a key resource, even though it would be 
incorrect to speak of a music industry at this stage (in terms of comparing individual 
commercial practices to the commodification of business and the creation of an 
industry). Specifically, music before the recording era was not seen as a commodity. 
Before the advent of technology, a piece of sheet music was a product to be sold to 
individual purchasers, but it was not seen as part of an exchange system seeking to 
generate surplus value in a market. The actual commodification of music resulted 
from the commodification of technology, which gave birth to a new market and a 
new industry for the exploitation of music.170  
As seen previously, ‘talking machines’ were not initially affiliated with music. 
However, a different invention was linked to the music business and played an 
important part in the industry’s legislative advancements. Apart from the ‘talking 
machines’, the first music commodification attempts followed the invention of the 
player piano, a mechanism attached to the piano (either to the exterior or to the 
interior of the instrument’s cabinet) that helped the aspiring musician ‘read’ music 
instructions as encoded on a paper roll.171 The technology of the player piano evolved 
to encompass a mechanism that would fully reproduce the music pre-recorded on it, 
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thus eliminating the personal element of pro-active participation and establishing 
the passive pass-time of listening to music.172  
By the turn of the twentieth century the player piano industry had entered the 
business of marketing the music rather than the music reproducing technology, 
similar to the ‘change of heart’ witnessed in the recording industry.173 Consumers 
were buying the player piano for the music and not as an ornament, as was the case 
in the nineteenth century.174 The success the player piano and the advancement of 
sound reproduction techniques in the recording industry, signalled an era of 
transition into a new industry built around the music itself. The reason why the 
player pianos deserve special mentioning herein is that the role of the player piano 
was akin, if not more important, to the role of the record in terms of influencing the 
introduction of mechanical royalties in copyright law.  
The mechanical reproduction of the music ‘encoded’ in player pianos and recordings 
was met with dismay from the part of composers, who were being excluded from the 
profit made by the manufacturers and the sellers of the machines. As regards the US, 
the first case to address the matter was Kennedy v. McTammany in 1888,175 where 
the plaintiff argued that the ‘transformation’ of his music into piano rolls amounted 
to copyright infringement. Stern v. Rosey176 addressed the issue from the 
perspective of the recording industry: does the record manufacturer infringe upon 
the copyright in the music? In both cases, the answer was negative and no copyright 
infringement was found to subsist upon the composition.  
The issue of what became known as ‘mechanical reproduction’, reached the Supreme 
Court in 1908, in White -Smith Music Publishing Co. v Apollo Co.177 Confronted with 
the dilemma of whether this kind of reproduction amounts to copying as per the 
status quo, the Supreme Court held that the mechanical reproduction of 
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compositions was not copying as per the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1870, and 
subsequently composers were denied the exclusive right of the mechanical 
reproduction of their compositions for piano rolls and recordings.178 The Copyright 
revision of 1870 had preceded the invention of the phonograph and the commercial 
success of the player pianos, resulting in the composers’ demands to remain 
unregulated for a few more years. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in White-
Smith proved unpopular and it was subsequently followed by complains to Congress 
from composers claiming that the “manufacturers of music rolls and talking-
machine records were reproducing part of their brain and genius without paying a 
cent for such use of their compositions”.179  
The matter was resolved with the enactment of the 1909 Copyright Act and the 
introduction of mechanical licensing.180 Concerned with the issue of exclusivity and 
the monopolisation of music by a few recording or player piano companies, the US 
Congress introduced a licensing mechanism, whereby any person could make a 
‘similar use’ of the work “whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or 
permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work upon the 
parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work.”181  
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The compulsory licensing scheme was introduced following Aeolian’s (the Pianola 
manufacturer’s) attempts to sign long-term exclusivity contracts with music 
publishers in order to control the reproduction of all the music they represented.182  
In the UK, the case Boosey v Whight183 (the British equivalent to White-Smith) was 
decided in 1899, prior to the American case. The UK decision was similar to the 
Supreme Court’s point of view and composers were denied compensation. It was 
further established in subsequent English cases in 1907 and in 1912 that mechanical 
reproduction did not infringe upon the composers’ copyright.184 The UK did not 
introduce any regulation regarding the mechanical reproduction of music 
compositions until the Copyright Act of 1911. The 1911 Copyright Act implemented 
Article 13 of the revision of the Berne Convention, signed in Berlin in 1908, when 
composers were granted the exclusive right to control the mechanical reproduction 
of their compositions.185  Even though the text of the Berne Convention as it stands 
to the day allows for the introduction of a compulsory licensing system for 
mechanical reproduction, this was not implemented in the UK.186  
The introduction of mechanical royalties (or mechanicals as referred to in the 
industry) signalled a change in the music landscape by bringing music publishing 
and record producing closer together. Copyright law became relevant to the 
production of records. Even though it appeared a small victory for the composers 
and the publishers at the time, this was a big step for the shaping of the music 
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industry, especially with the establishment of the rights-based multinational record 
companies later in the 1960s. The integration of the publishing business into the 
recording business helped reduce transaction costs. At the same time, bridging these 
key activities was the driving force behind the formation of the unified ‘music 
industry’, as it went on to be known. 187 
2.2.2.2  Publishing and performing  
Before going forward in time, it is important to take a closer look at the key activity 
of the publishing industry separately. Music publishing is the part of the music 
industry that deals with the music composition itself, exploiting the copyright in 
music and lyrics. The publishing industry represents the initial part of the music 
industry, as evidenced by the publishers’ lobbying efforts to introduce mechanical 
rights.  
The publishers of music however, lobbied and pushed for the introduction of 
another right that provides a substantial part of the musician’s and the industry’s 
income to the day: the introduction of the public performance right. The history of 
this specific right is tied to the history of the music industry per se, as its subject 
matter signalled further changes on industrial organisation level. Indeed, the public 
performance right introduces a further key activity based on copyright exploitation. 
The foundations of the music business were set and the industry was ready to be 
born and expand once publishers, record producers, and authors of music were 
being recognised as the first relevant stakeholders, with the prominent absence of 
performers and the public, at this initial stage.  
The public performance right when it was first introduced, covered live 
performances of music compositions, since the recording industry was nascent at 
the time of its debate. Indeed, the protection of the public performance of recordings 
followed significantly later, when the music industry started acquiring its corporate 
format. In the US, the public performance right for music compositions was 
introduced for the first time in 1897.188 Its enactment was preceded by a series of 
unlicensed public performances of musical compositions (mostly comic operas at 
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the time) that resulted in a series of lawsuits brought by composers against the 
producers of ‘pirated’ versions of their work. Perhaps the most famous relevant case 
was that of the famous duo Gilbert and Sullivan, composers of the famous operettas 
“The Pirates of Penzance” and “The Mikado”.189 Through the Gilbert and Sullivan 
litigation series it became clear that common law was unable to protect public 
performances.190 What followed, was a series of proposed bills to Congress backed by 
the music publishing industry.191 The road for establishing a public performance 
right would pass by Congress rather than by courts.  
In a nutshell, before 1897 there was no statutory right in the US granting exclusive 
public performance rights. Fixated versions of works however, manuscripts in this 
case, enjoyed proprietary status,192 thus justifying the extension of the protection 
into the public performance right.193 Nevertheless, once a work had been published 
it became public property and all rights were lost, as no statutory provisions existed 
stating otherwise. This caused a particular problem regarding the publication of 
musical and dramatic works.194 The general apprehension at the time was that works 
could be transcribed by ear without the occurrence of any infringement, which led to 
many performances being ‘pirated’.195 No direct copying of the work having 
occurred, the composers’ and publishers’ cases were hard to argue.  
During the years that preceded the 1897 Act, music publishers had begun to grow in 
numbers and strength, and had already started lobbying for copyright revisions that 
would favour their business, the public performance right being one of them.196 It is 
not a coincidence that the Music Publishers Association of the United States was 
formed in June 1895, only two years prior to the Act, since their mission was the 
“revision and improvement of the administration of the present copyright system, 
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with the view of making it an adjunct of greater value to the publishing interests of 
this country.”197 Music publishing gradually became a profitable business, eventually 
leading to its association.  
In Europe, the idea of a public performance right for music was conceived in 1664, 
when a German composer included on the printed edition of his work his disproval 
of any unauthorised public performance of his music.198 In France, a performance 
royalty system was introduced during the seventeenth century,199 followed by a 
primary form of a collecting society for dramatic works, all in accordance with spirit 
of the French revolution. Indeed, prevailing schools of thought called for artistic and 
creative freedom, a traditional that was later translated into the droit d’auteur.200 In 
the UK, performing rights were first recognised in 1842 and royalty arrangements 
became a common practice between publishers and authors, as a risk spreading 
mechanism.201 In the UK as in the US, the introduction of performance royalties was 
justified as in the best interests of publishers and composers alike.202  
Finally, both in the US and the UK, the publishers’ associations lobbied for the 
creation and introduction of collecting societies.203 The British Performing Rights 
Society (PRS) was formed in 1911204 and the American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) was formed in 1914.205 After the public 
performance of music had been established in the status quo, it soon became 
apparent that an efficient enforcement mechanism was required in order to secure 
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the sufficient remuneration of authors and subsequently, publishers. A few years 
later, even background music in restaurants was found to be protected by copyright, 
as the Supreme Court held in Herbert v. Shanley.206 The public performance right 
became one the most profitable key resources of the music industry and of 
composers in particular.  
The publishing business, apart from pushing for the aforementioned copyright 
reforms, was vital for the provision of music in the years that followed: the famous 
Tin Pan Alley that housed most of New York’s publishing houses, which represented 
the most famous composers until the 1940s, served as a prominent example of the 
business’s success.207 The original music publisher represented the composers of 
music and acted as a link between the authors, the record companies, and the 
collecting societies. The publishers were, and still are, the first point of entry of a 
composer into the music business, as the latter assigns the administration of all 
music related copyrights to the former (also known as ‘administration rights’ in the 
industry).208 
Before the 1940s and until the 1960s, it was rare for performers to compose and 
record their own music material. It was the publishers’ task to match the music they 
represented with the right performer, who would subsequently record or perform 
the music in public. The publishers’ power in this decision-making process grew to 
the point of making it impossible for a songwriter to exploit the music without the 
collaboration with a major publisher.209 From a business model perspective, it can 
be argued that the publishers acted like a hub of human resources for the industry 
by managing the relationships between the human capital of the business, a function 
that follows the business model to the day.  
Additionally, the introduction of mechanical licensing meant that it was impossible 
for record companies to use a music composition for the first time without the 
publisher’s permission. It has already been stated that the compulsory licensing 
scheme would be in effect only after the first use of the music had been made. Those 
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charged with the decision regarding a composition’s first use were the publishers, 
who also acted as the music’s sole representatives. The publishers profited, and still 
do, from the mechanical royalties paid to them by the record companies.210 The 
importance of mechanical royalties to the industry can also be asserted by the 
subsequent inclusion of monies paid not only for each record manufactured, but also 
for each digital copy of music downloaded.211 
With respect to the public performance royalties, they constitute an additional key 
resource for the publishing industry to the day. It is not only individual composers 
who affiliate with collecting societies, but also publishers.212 Collecting societies 
distribute monies collected through blanket licenses issued to music venues and to 
the media. The royalties are allocated according to the number of plays on the radio, 
the television, through digital streaming and to a lesser extent, at live events. For 
instance, in the US only the top 200 grossing tours as reported in Pollstar magazine 
are considered,213 whereas in the UK promoters of large-scale events submit relevant 
playlists to PRS for this purpose.214  
Finally, the role of publishers and collecting societies does not end here. Inter alia, 
their role gets highlighted in the payola scandals explored in the third chapter. The 
discussion turns once again to publishing in the merger control part of the thesis, 
where the European Commission discusses the combined market position of a major 
record company in both the recording and the publishing sector. Nevertheless, this 
part of the chapter introduced publishing, and of course copyright law, to illustrate 
the emergence of a pronounced business and industrial interest in music. This is 
subsequently ‘picked up’ by the recording business and embedded as a key resource 
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2.2.2.3 The protection of sound recordings  
“…on the whole the record [of copyright owners] in having lobbies translate into 
legislation has been impressive”215 
It would be impossible to present the key resources of the music industry and the 
importance of copyright legislation without including the protection of sound 
recordings. This was not previously addressed, as the protection of sound recordings 
was not introduced until the recorded music industry had already matured and 
acquired its dominant shape; that is until the record had become the most famous 
form of supply of music. As already stated, by the end of the 1920s the phonogram 
had become a standard appliance for the average US and British household. Without 
a doubt, this meant that the role of the publisher becomes steadily less powerful 
than the role of the record producer. It was a matter of time until the publishing 
business lost its status as the sole key player in the music industry. In the 1950s, 
some record companies integrated into the publishing business, eliminating 
exogenous costs.216 By the beginning of the 1970s, the handful of multinational 
companies representing the music industry would have merged the key activities of 
distribution, A&R, and music publishing,217 thus enabling the notion of a single 
‘music industry’ to become established.  
For the time being, the analysis separates between the recording and the publishing 
business and their impact is assessed based on who set the corresponding legislative 
reforms in motion. The lobbying efforts prove the existence of an industry with 
activities worth protecting by law.218 Hence, it is fair to treat the music publishing 
industry as the initial key player in a music industries context, with copyright 
exploitation as the corresponding key activity. However, the recorded music 
industry’s growth in commercial value had a direct effect on the introduction of the 
Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organisations in 1961 (albeit, not in the US). Hence, as this part deals 
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with the main key resources of the industry, it is important to mention the targeted 
efforts towards the separate protection of sound recordings.  
The International Federation of Phonograms Producers (IFPI) was formed in Rome 
in 1933 with the explicit objective of promoting new legislation for the interests of its 
members.219 International cooperation between the record companies was 
important, as the international environment by the 1930s lacked the necessary 
framework that would enable trans-border commercial activities: official exports 
were limited, there was no incentive to set up foreign subsidiaries, and ‘parallel 
imports’ undermined the domestic product.220 Additionally, unlicensed versions of 
records were the norm, a practice that would become more popular with the 
invention of the cassette.221 
The organised efforts of IFPI resulted in the introduction of the Rome Convention. 
The Convention included provisions conferring protection to the recording of 
performances, including provisions for distributing, renting and duplicating 
recordings.222 However, it failed to attract the sought-after membership, partly due 
to its efforts to introduce property rights for artists and producers in the field of 
public performance, something that would be difficult to enforce, as Burke 
explains.223 Ultimately, the UK became a signatory to the Rome Convention in 1963, 
whereas the US did not implement the convention.  
Nevertheless, the industry agreed on the importance of a regime regulating the 
reproduction of recordings, leading to the introduction of the (Geneva) Phonograms 
Convention in October 1971. The WIPO-administered Convention for the Protection 
of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms 
was met with success and by 1983 it represented 95 percent of the word’s record 
                                                        
 
219 A E Burke, “How effective are international copyright conventions in the music 
industry?”(1996) 20 Journal of Cultural Economics 51-66. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Art 3, International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations. 






production.224 In the US, the Convention was implemented in 1971,225  amending 
Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act: 
 “material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  
The anomaly lies in the fact that no performance right was recognised in sound 
recordings, due to broadcasters’ lobbying efforts to avoid having to pay royalties for 
the use of records over the radio.226  
However, the public performance right in sound recordings was present in the rest 
of the world, the UK included. The debate dates back to the Berlin Revision of 1908, 
which first highlighted the exclusive right to the public performance of recordings 
alongside the introduction of mechanical royalties. However, the implementation of 
the Berlin Revision was left to the signatory parties.227 As the US remained outside 
the Berne Convention until 1988, this issue was not addressed until the Digital 




This brings the present chapter to its concluding remarks: the debate over the 
protection of sound recordings and the public performance right illustrates the 
importance of the lobbying efforts of the recording industry, compared with similar 
efforts put forward by the publishers. It follows that the industry pushing for 
effective reforms is the industry that can be named the dominant player in the music 
sector at a given period. The lobbying efforts of publishers prevailed until the Rome 
Convention. However, the economic significance of the recorded music industry 
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post-World War II alongside its association, come to prove that the music industry 
gradually became synonymous to the recorded music industry, as lobbying suggests. 
Moreover, the fact that publishing activities became part of the record company’s 
key activities, enables the ‘music industry’ to come forward as a unified concept. As 
the key activities ‘merge’, so do the key resources they represent in terms of 
copyright exploitation (mechanical royalties, public performances, and later the 
protection of sound recordings).228  
Ultimately, in terms of addressing the relationship between copyright laws and the 
birth of the music industry, it was established that the need to afford copyright 
protection to the various nascent economic interests in music, led to the creation of 
the new concept of dealing in music. The music industry’s first stakeholders were 
identified as the publishers, the authors, and the record producers, with the notable 
absence of performers, who were subject to exclusive contractual relationships 
instead. Thanks to copyright law, the activities of these stakeholders become linked 
in the face of a commodified music ‘product’ that enters an exchange system seeking 
to generate surplus value in its own market.  
In consequence, when it comes to addressing the issue of whether the law influenced 
the industry or vice versa, the following can be observed: it was showcased that even 
though individual transactions in music had always been in place thanks to 
copyright protection (e.g. sheet music), it was through copyright law reforms that an 
industry came into existence. This is especially important for the recording part of 
the business that emerged as the predominant ‘music industry’.  
Of course, from an intellectual property perspective there can be no 
commodification of music without copyright exploitation. In practice, this means 
that there can be no industrial interest in music as a product outside the realm of 
copyright protection from the initial composition of music to the supply of a 
recording, passing through the publishers’ activities. Hence, it becomes clear that 
the law transformed the individual commercial activities into industries through 
commodification. From that moment onwards, it was a matter of time before the 
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separate industries merged, responding to various externalities. This way, the law is 
seen a platform that fosters innovation in business modelling, entrepreneurship, and 
overall industrial organisation.  
As this chapter has shown, the music industry absorbed ideas and expanded on the 
technological innovations of the nineteenth century. This comes to satisfy the 
growth model requirements put forth by Potts and Cunningham.229 The recording 
industry grew by adopting novel ideas that occurred in the fields of engineering and 
by introducing into the aggregate economy the idea of ‘dealing in music’. 
Additionally, ‘dealing in music’ expanded into dealing in recordings thanks to 
copyright law. Simultaneously, the supply of hardware (talking machines and similar 
inventions) got stabilised thanks to the economic interest in music, proving the link 
between music and adjacent industries. The role of copyright law in this sense has 
been two-fold: copyright reforms were introduced to promote investment and to 
facilitate the design of an innovative way of doing business (the business model).  
Thus far, Potts and Cunningham’s growth model criteria seem to be satisfied. It 
appears that this has been the case of the music industries since their inception, 
justifying the adoption and the call for investment-oriented copyright laws. 
Accretion of subject matter meant accretion of key resources and key activities, 
which translated into a stabilised and sustainable business model. A stabilised and 
sustainable business model translated into a need for further investment through 
law. The innovation model enters the picture later, following developments and 
changes in the business model. It is therefore examined in the forthcoming chapters 
in order to support the current need for maximisation of competition and innovation 
in the music industries.  
It has been established this far that legal intervention in music-related commercial 
activities both created and helped expand investment opportunities. However, it has 
also been shown that the music product as protected by intellectual property, 
becomes prone to monopolisation by publishers and record producers, culminating 
in the merging of two to form a single music industry. Further, it was shown that 
this music industry is designed top-down from the very beginning, with little 
                                                        
 






consumer involvement. In lieu, the recurrent theme of long and exclusive 
contractual relationships becomes noticed early on.  
These patterns followed the industry in the years to come and assisted in the 
establishment of a dominant business model, which was not ‘questioned’ until the 
digital era. It follows that the discussion on ‘the birth of an industry’ is neither the 
time nor the place to address and examine market failures, even though their 
foundations had been laid (monopolisation, exclusivity, absence of interest for the 
consumer and the artist). Nevertheless, this does not mean that competition policy 
design is not justified. Even at this early stage the creation of an intellectual property 
industry experiencing growth, could have invited relevant policy making, aiming to 
safeguard the role of the end consumer and to potentially prevent market failures. A 
‘hint’ of this was observed with the establishment of the compulsory licensing 
scheme, designed to ‘break’ monopolies in the product of ‘potentially’ hit music. 
Noble as this might have been, the industry responded by focusing on the ‘making 
and breaking’ of superstar artists instead, since these were tied to exclusive 
contracts. This however, becomes obvious later in history and is addressed in the 
forthcoming third and fourth chapters.  
Additionally, the forthcoming examination of consumer-generated business model 
change, signalling the need for updated policy making, highlights the relationship 
between the music industries and their operating business model. In this light, the 
role of the third chapter is two-fold: the third chapter addresses the business model 
in-depth and the role of the end consumer therein and evaluates the creation of 
business model-specific markets for music from the end consumer’s perspective. As 
supply and demand are addressed in a business model context, the thesis can open 
the door to the evaluation of the same topics, only this time from the competition 
authorities’ perspective. Ultimately, parts of this second chapter are being 
highlighted throughout the development of the thesis, whenever there is a need to 
understand why and how the competition authorities erred in the assessment of 
music industry’s practices. Perhaps it would not be out of place to borrow George 
Santayana’s famous quote “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 







2.4 A timeline of events 
1664 German composer includes on the printed edition of his work his disproval of 
any unauthorised public performance of his music 
1777 UK, in Bach v Longman printed music becomes protected by copyright as a 
form of ‘writing’ 
1790 US, Patents are awarded on federal level  
1831 US, Copyright Act 1831 adds printed music to the protected subject matter 
under federal law 
1852 UK, Establishment of the UK Patent Office  
1879 US, Gilbert and Sullivan litigation series against unauthorised public 
performance in Sullivan v. White and Sullivan v. Goulland  
1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
1884 UK signs the Paris Convention  
1886 Switzerland, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works 
1887 US signs the Paris Convention  
1888 US, in Kennedy v. McTammany the ‘transformation’ of his music into piano 
rolls does not amount to copyright infringement 
1889 The first commercially manufactured discs are produced for Emile Berliner, 
the inventor of the gramophone 
1895 Berliner’s gramophone enters the home entertainment market  
1895 US, Formation of the Music Publishers Association of the United States  
1897 US, January 6, Music is protected against unauthorised public performance 
1898 Owen and Williams acquire Berliner’s patents for Britain and set up the 
British Gramophone Company, importing machines from Johnson’s US factory and 
discs from Berliner’s native German company, Deutsche Grammophon 
1899 UK, in Boosey v Whight mechanical reproduction does not amount to 
copyright infringement (also Newmark v National Phonograph Co [1907] and 
Monckton v Gramophone Co [1912])  
1900 Eldridge Johnson writes to the manager of the UK Gramophone company: 
“…one of our greatest difficulties has been the proper marking of these records. We 






1901 US, in Stern v. Rosey the record industry is not found to infringe upon 
copyright by “transforming” a composition into a record  
1904 Columbia records starts providing artist information on its discs  
1905 Eldridge Johnson introduces the idea of signing exclusive recording contracts 
with famous performers of his era “to enhance the reputation of the talking machine 
by including artistes of celebrity to sing and play into it” (according to the British 
journal “Talking Machine News”) 
1907 Berliner’s disc prevails over Edison’s cylinder as the standard format for the 
“talking machine”  
1908 Berlin Revision of the Berne Convention. Composers are awarded the 
exclusive right to control the mechanical reproduction of their compositions (Article 
13)  
1908 US, the mechanical reproduction issue reaches the Supreme Court in White -
Smith Music Publishing Co. v Apollo Co, and composers are denied exclusive rights 
in mechanical reproduction  
1909 ‘His Master’s Voice’ is used for the first time, as the trademark on the 
Gramophone Company’s discs 
1909 US, Copyright Act 1909 introduces mechanical licensing 
1911 UK, Copyright Act 1911 adds music to the protected subject matter  
1911 UK, Formation of the British Performing Rights Society (PRS)  
1914 US, Formation the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
(ASCAP) 
1914 Victor’s (Berliner’s and Johnson’s company) patent expires and more 
competitors enter the market for the supply of machines 
1917 Background music in restaurants is found to be protected by copyright, as per 
the Supreme Court in Herbert v. Shanley 
1924 The player piano industry enters the business of marketing the music rather 
than the music reproducing technology  
1929 The phonogram becomes a standard appliance for the average US and British 
household by the end of the 1920s  







1949 The Gramophone is the last publication to start categorising record reviews by 
artist rather than by record company (Sound Wave magazine started using this 
format in 1941)  
1961 Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organisations 
1963 UK signs the Rome Convention  
1971 (Geneva) Phonograms Convention in October 1971 
1971 US implements the (Geneva) Phonograms Convention 























3 ‘Moving Pictures’: Examining Old and New Business Models, and the role of 
the End Consumer in the Music Industries 
 
“Now that ain't workin' that's the way you do it 
you play the guitar on the MTV 
that ain't workin' that's the way you do it 
money for nothin' and your chicks for free” 
Dire Straits, 1985  
 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented how copyright laws in the US and on international 
level, led innovation in the face of turning an exchange system for music into an 
industrial activity. It was posited that without advancements in copyright, the music 
business would not have been able to turn into a music industry evolving around the 
supply of an intellectual property product for music. The purpose of the present 
chapter is to further the argument and shed light into the creation of the market for 
music where this business model operates, firstly from a business reality 
perspective. Therefore, the present chapter considers the establishment of the ‘old’ 
or dominant business model of the music industry and the business model evolution 
that followed. 
As such, the chapter aims to explain the relationship between a business model and 
the creation of product markets for music. Are there new markets for music being 
created following the changes in business models and if so, what is the role of the 
consumer therein? By answering this research question the thesis advances with the 
evaluation of what constitutes a product market for music, both in business or 
commercial reality and in competition law terms. The research acknowledges that 
relevant product market definition as conducted in competition analysis is a distinct 
concept from the market as defined in a business and economics context.230 
Moreover, even in the context of competition analysis, a relevant product can derive 
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among several candidate markets argued by the parties or it can be by-passed 
altogether in case of differentiated products.231  
 
The extent to which such a distinction alienates the concept of the competition law 
market from commercial and business reality even further, is subsequently 
investigated and presented in the forthcoming chapters of the thesis: to what extent 
can competition law overlook this reality and at what cost (e.g. reduced welfare)? 
This question assists in the evaluation of the markets formed in the music industries 
following the consumer-led changes of the past fifteen years (file-sharing scenarios 
and beyond). It is posited that consumer-led business model changes are associated 
with demand responsiveness and demand elasticities; thus, they are relevant in a 
competition law scenario.232 
 
To examine the above, this chapter follows directly on the narrative style of the 
previous one. However, its focus is no longer the intellectual property law 
presentation of the birth of an industry.233 Rather, focus lies with attesting the 
establishment and the stabilisation of the dominant business model, which 
translates into a specific market in a business reality sense.  
 
While doing so, the present chapter adopts the following methodology:  pursuant to 
the theme and the structure of the overall thesis, this chapter consults business 
model, marketing, and broader business studies literature, in order to provide an 
accurate picture of the music industry, as studied in academic research. This part of 
the chapter examines how academic areas that study the industry per se appreciate 
its dominant traits and characteristics and how they evaluate the roles of consumers 
and producers. Borrowing from marketing research, the thesis estimates how the 
                                                        
 
231 G Niels, H Jenkins, and J Kavanagh, Economics for Competition Lawyers (2011) 47.  
232 Cross-price elasticity of demand for defining a relevant market was introduced for the first 
time in the US in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 US 549 (1952).  
233 Referring to the creation of an industry (and of a business model) as ‘innovation through 
the law’ helps justify the policy-making arguments further, as per the examination of the 
creative industries and their role in the aggregate economy, in J Hartley et al., Key Concepts 






offering called to reach a consumer is identified and what channels the producers 
utilise.234  
 
The examination is enhanced by an evolutionary approach vis-à-vis the music 
industry that places business literature into perspective. Hence, from a historical 
point of view, the presentation of the industry continues with the era pursuant to the 
Second World War, as the aim is to present the expansion and the globalisation of an 
industry organised around a successful business model, responsible for the supply of 
a homogeneous product. Indeed, the industry’s dominant model was able to 
internalise consumer demand in niche genres and re-configure them as ‘popular’ or 
‘hit’ music via the relevant distribution and marketing channels.  
 
As justified by the narrative of this chapter, focus lies with the US competition 
authorities, due to the lack of material from the UK and, naturally the EU (an 
analysis from an EU perspective is incorporated later in the thesis). Furthermore, 
market definition following the widely used hypothetical monopolist test as an 
intermediary step in competition analysis, had not been introduced at the time 
investigated (when the dominant business model was established).235 As such, the 
analysis develops on a conceptual level attempting to compare the business practices 
of each given time examined against more current notions of market definition.236 
 
In broader terms, the thesis acknowledges the constraint placed by the limited 
amount of primary material available in competition law in the first years of the 
music industry. This is a direct result of the lack of a priori regulation and a 
posteriori intervention into the industry, perceived as a branch of either the 
                                                        
 
234 According to the American Marketing Association “marketing is the activity, set of 
institutions, and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging 
offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society at large”(Approved 
July 2013), available at https://www.ama.org/AboutAMA/Pages/Definition-of-
Marketing.aspx. It is of interest to note how Marketing research distinguishes between 
products and services, and opts for the broader term ‘offering’ when it comes to official 
definitions. It is also of interest to note how what constitutes an offering results from the 
perceived value attached to it by various stakeholders (not restricted to consumers).  
235 The hypothetical monopolist test was introduced by the US Department of Justice 1982 
Merger Guidelines and has subsequently served as the basis for market definition in other 
jurisdictions, including the EU.  
236 This analysis will not be jurisdictionally tied, but will try to evaluate the economic 






communication or the feature film industries in the US, but for the few instances 
addressed in the present. At this stage of the analysis, these instances include the 
payola scandals and the impact the authorisation of new radio stations by the US 
Federal Communications Commission in 1947 had on the industry. Indeed, the only 
significant antitrust investigation into the matters of the record companies initiated 
in late 1950s,237 is thoroughly analysed in the fourth chapter.  
 
It should also be noted that the majority of the sources on the history of the industry 
remain US and UK focused.238 Nevertheless, this does not pose a major constraint 
on the present thesis, as its focus lies with the investigation of the ‘majors’ of the 
music industry that have been expanding on a global level since its establishment.239 
Currently only ‘Big Three’ players remain in the music industry,240 two of which are 
American corporations and the third one is American-French (Universal). In any 
event, the primary material investigated in the subsequent chapters derive from the 
US, the UK, and the EU jurisdictions, which therefore provide the appropriate 
geographical ‘boundaries’ for the thesis (whilst the German background of BMG is 
acknowledged, emphasis is placed on these jurisdictions for competition maturity 
and industrial development reasons).241 
 
Subsequently, as the historical timeline evolves, this chapter proceeds with the 
investigation of consumer-led changes in the business model of the music industry, 
following the induction in the digital era. The aim is to identify the new-found role 
for the end consumer of music and assess new patterns of consumption, based on 
product substitution on the demand side. As this chapter reveals, the relevant 
literature until the digital era focused mainly on the supply side and demand 
appears to be of lesser importance.242 Most of the material consulted analyses 
industrial behaviour and organisation supply-side, whereas the end consumer of 
                                                        
 
237 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., and Columbia Record club, Inc., Petitioners, v. 
Federal Trade Commission, Respondent, 414 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1969). Again, this 
investigation was undertaken before the hypothetical monopolist test.  
238 See e.g. B Southall, EMI Records (n 124). 
239 Namely, Sony BMG, Columbia Record Club, Universal, EMI, Warner, as well as Live 
Nation Entertainment, a new and emerging yet different type of ‘major’.  
240 Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and Warner Music Group at the time 
of writing.  
241 Case No COMP/M3333 Sony/BMG OJ 2005 L62/30. 






music appears neglected. This constitutes a very interesting observation as in market 
definition for competition law purposes, it is the demand side that leads the relevant 
analysis.243  
 
The research conducted identified relevant literature on the consumer demand side 
for music only after the dominant business model was challenged. An example of 
this is consumer migration from the recording to the live music product, which is 
addressed explicitly towards the end of the chapter. Additionally, another instance of 
new-found interest in researching the consumer per se, is the introduction of 
‘consumer value co-creation’ in the field of marketing.  This concept relates to the 
Building Block of value proposition, as it allows for “customised products and 
services, while still taking advantage of economies of scale.”244 Indeed, this concept 
has been investigated in relation to the music industries post file-sharing.245 Even 
though not part of the present thesis, it is mentioned to highlight that the consumer 
becomes indeed relevant in business reality terms. 
 
A question that stems from such observations would be: to what extent can the 
consumer assign value to differentiated products for music? And subsequently, what 
consequences can such behaviour have on the way product markets are perceived 
and shaped, if any?  
 
In light of the above, the structure of the present chapter evolves as follows: 
following the historical timeline established in the previous chapter, the current 
chapter proceeds with the examination and the presentation of the music industries 
following the Second World War. As such, the establishment of a dominant business 
model is presented alongside an examination of the product market for music as 
perceived in a business reality context. In the forthcoming chapters, this context will 
                                                        
 
243 As demand-side substitution is the most immediate constraint producers face “Customers 
are generally quicker to vote with their feet if they are unhappy,” as per Niels et al. (n 231) 
31.  
244 Business Model Generation (n 21) 23. Indeed, value proposition refers to what Alexander 
Osterwalder describes as the offer to consumers on the canvas of his presentation (n 52).  
245 See H Choi and B Burnes, “The internet and value co-creation: the case of the popular 






be compared with the concept of the relevant product market as introduced by the 
competition authorities, on which the thesis focuses.246  
 
The aim is to establish the theoretical framework applied to the subsequent chapters 
of case analysis: does the existence of a specific business model signify the existence 
of a specific product market? And if it does, is this specific product market a market 
that would and could be identified by the relevant competition authorities, were they 
called to assess competition in it? 
 
In addressing the above, the present chapter reconfigures the validity of the business 
model as presented by Alexander Osterwalder. It is posited that indeed, the music 
industry appears centred around the provision of the product defined as ‘hits or 
wannabe hits’ or ‘hit music’. Further, this chapter examines how this business model 
sustains an omnipresent and powerful oligonomy that creates a bottleneck around 
the product’s distribution, acting as its gatekeeper. The chapter proceeds with 
emerging business models initiated by consumer demand patterns and ends with an 
assessment of business model creativity and innovation. By the end of the chapter 
the reader becomes familiar with the established oligonomic business model and 
with the issues brought forward by alternative consumption patterns following the 
digital era; issues that need to be addressed in a competition scenario, as the two 
subsequent chapters demonstrate. Overall, this chapter acts like a canvas for the 
substantive legal chapters to follow in the second part of the thesis.  
 
3.2 The old business model of the music industry  
3.2.1 The record company and its dominant business model: towards the creation of an 
oligonomy for the supply of music  
As stated earlier, according to the business model theory, revenue streams are tied 
to specific customer segments, which are presented with specific value propositions. 
Revenue streams represent the way that customers are paying for what is being 
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provided. The provision of music was in the hands of record companies and 
publishing houses, whose activities got closer thanks to a series of legislative 
reforms, as examined in the second chapter. Hence, the supply of recorded music 
becomes more relevant, as record players become omnipresent in households, 
surpassing player pianos by the 1930s and leading to an increase in demand for 
recordings rather than for sheet music.  As the market for records grew, the power of 
the record companies grew alongside it, making these companies the most 
important players in the market for music.  
The present sub-chapter deals with the establishment of a successful business model 
for this industry. It is shown how this business model results in an oligonomy of a 
few major players, who act as the gatekeepers of the music product, by remaining 
able to absorb disruptive forces threatening to affect their market share. As these 
forces get internalised, they guarantee the oligonomy’s longevity. It is posited that 
the dominant business model sustains the oligonomic model of the industry and vice 
versa.  
The term oligonomy was coined relatively recently by Steve Hannaford to describe 
an industry where “companies act as an oligopoly to one group and an oligopsony 
to another,”247 which translates into a simultaneous buyers’ and sellers’ market. 
Hence, this concept is subsequently employed to refer to the gatekeeping function of 
the major firms in the music industry, since they operate as an oligopoly to the mass 
audience, the end consumers of the homogeneous product that is popular or hit 
music and as oligopsony to the artists seeking exposure. The existence of this market 
phenomenon is a direct result of the industrial organisation identified in the 
previous chapter and it becomes intensified by the merger between publishing and 
recording activities under the same corporate umbrella. Indeed, copyrighted content 
appears on Osterwalder’s canvas as the major key resource of the majors’ business 
model, whereas the end consumer is being referred to as the mass market, bringing 
the business model canvas in line with Hannaford’s oligonomy.248   
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The industrial ecology surrounding this oligonomy and the impact it has on the 
provision of music in the aggregate, is subsequently presented herein; in order to 
identify its size and impact, it is important to take a closer look at the structure of its 
key players (the gatekeepers themselves) and their ability to develop and sustain 
their oligonomic position. For this reason, disruptive forces in the market for music 
are presented alongside the oligonomy’s business model evolution. 
The examination focuses on the 1950s as a period in history when the major record 
companies were ‘forced’ to deal with the emergence of a new sound and a new 
demographic and target audience (rock’n’roll music and teenagers). This era is 
significant, since it boosted the majors’ ability to establish their dominant business 
model in a manner flexible enough to accommodate trends, foresee them, and 
market them through linear top-down marketing channels. Moreover, this 
exploration enables the characterisation of the music industry as an oligonomy, the 
sole purpose of which is the continuation of its dominance.  
Prior to the 1950s, the popular music industry in the United States was dominated 
by four big record companies (RCA Victor, Columbia, Decca and Capitol).249 
Subsequently, the market for recorded music can be characterised as highly 
concentrated supply-side, with the ‘Big Four’ firms releasing 81 percent of all records 
appearing in the weekly top-ten hit list from 1948 to 1949.250 
The high levels of concentration in the recorded music market were sustained 
thanks to vertical integration, and more specifically, thanks to the control of 
distribution and retail channels and thanks to the establishment of strong 
affiliations with the dominant national radio stations, as well as with the Broadway 
theatrical scene and the Hollywood film industry.251 As seen in the second chapter, 
the story of vertical integration dates back to the very beginning of the record 
industry and is apparent throughout its history and evolution: for instance, EMI 
(Electric and Musical Industries) was the result of a merger between recorded sound 
and electrical goods companies, Warner Music was formed when Warner Brothers 
Pictures purchased the Brunswick record label, and Universal was a by-product of 
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Universal Pictures.252 Once again, the role of technology behind the recorded music 
industry is clear, as is the need of firms operating in adjacent industries to 
internalise costs. As a result, these four dominant firms in the late 1940s presented 
the market with a homogeneous product, aimed at appealing to a target audience, 
which was treated as the homogeneous market for big-bang, swing, and “white non-
offensive” music,253 as presented at the beginning of the thesis. 
Peterson explains that this dominance was easy to maintain for a number of era-
specific reasons. These include the existence of long-term contractual relationships 
with composers and lyricists of hit music (even since the time of the player piano, as 
Aeolian had also engaged in the practice), the distribution of 78 shellac records, 
which were costly to manufacture and distribute nationally and thus, automatically 
excluded independents from successfully entering the distribution market; and the 
nature of the recorded material itself that fitted the national radio broadcasting 
requirements of the time. Indeed, there is no documentation of phonograph records 
being played on air prior to the 1950s and hit music was performed on air by the 
studio’s live band instead. This raised and sustained the demand for music that 
could be easily reproduced in the studio and performed during the designated music 
shows, such as the early morning ‘breakfast’ shows and the lunch time ‘homemaker’ 
shows.254  
These characteristics suggest not only that the oligopolistic nature of the recorded 
music industry sustained its dominance on the supply side, but also that nothing was 
foreseen to replace this standardised conventional and studio-friendly product. In 
that regard, it becomes apparent that high concentration in the supply of recordings 
promoted and sustained a homogeneous outcome, with little room for sound 
diversity.   
Peterson and Berger have argued that homogeneity and standardisation are 
characteristics of high market concentration and that the drastic changes in the 
market for popular music in the late 1950s (and later in the early 1960s) were a 
consequence of the entry of new players (suppliers) and the subsequent low 
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concentration of the market.255 Even though their results have been questioned, as a 
number of alternative reasons that led to the lower concentration of the market have 
been taken into account,256 it remains undisputed that the market was indeed highly 
concentrated and that there has been a tendency towards high concentration ever 
since.257 
Thus, despite the fact that the music scene at the time appeared more or less 
standardised and targeted towards the continuous consumption of a homogeneous 
product, a series of technological, legislative and industrial changes influenced the 
demand for alternative musical genres, laying the path for the introduction of niche 
sounds into the ‘mainstream’.  
In other words, according to the 9 Building Blocks, the business model of the 
recorded music industry at that stage appears as follows: key partnerships were 
formed via vertical integration and thanks to the control of distribution and other 
promotional channels (radio, Broadway, Hollywood). Key activities relied on the 
supply of recorded music in 78 shellac format. Costs were controlled and sustained 
thanks to the establishment of solid partnerships and were easily calculated thanks 
to the prevalence of specific recording formats. The above led to the offer-ing of a 
standardised product to a non-segmented market and enabled the last Building 
Block of customer relationships to be left unattended or even neglected altogether.  
Consequently, this dominant oligopoly for recorded music did not cater for the 
needs of niche markets that consisted of teenagers, young adults or African-
American buyers. Several of these categories were satisfied by labels (branches) of 
the majors, dedicated to jazz or country music like the Columbia-owned Okeh 
label.258 The existence of different labels catering for different needs within the same 
company, has always been in line with the prioritisation of the homogeneous 
market, consuming the homogeneous product, as promoted through a network 
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oligopoly of homogeneous channels (e.g. the radio). As a matter of fact, when 
patents and awards were removed from the labels of recordings and information 
about the composer and the music started being provided instead, record companies 
introduced colour-coded labels to explain the genre of music recorded on the disk 
(classical, country etc.).259 The second chapter presented, however briefly, that this 
market segmentation enables the oligonomy to foresee and internalise the popular 
sound. This however, comes as a result of the changes presented in the present 
chapter.  
Indeed, a series of events shifted the balance in favour of the thought-to-be ‘niche 
markets’, also considered as ‘outsiders’ by the major record companies.260 It should 
be born in mind however, that these markets had always existed, even though the 
major record companies refused to openly satisfy them and include them in their 
top-down marketing strategies for the provision of popular or hit music.261 As a 
result, these markets received little centralised attention. More specifically, 
Columbia’s Mitch Miller, the company’s ‘gatekeeper’ and notorious rock’n’roll 
opponent, refused to permit “any three-chord nonsense from slipping through.”262 
During a CBS stockholders’ meeting in 1957, stockholder and songwriter Gloria 
Parker demanded the network’s divestiture of its BMI interests as it promoted “this 
rock’n’roll junk which is creating juvenile delinquency.” 263 
In any case, the demand for a different music genre (rock’n’roll) grew bigger in the 
mid-1950s, and therefore greater diversity was apparent in the mainstream music 
charts. Even though Columbia did not succumb to rock’n’roll until Bob Dylan was 
signed to Columbia’s CBS label,264 DECCA was behind the hit singles by Bill Haley 
and His Comets “Rock around the clock” and “Shake Rattle and Roll.”265 Smaller 
independents entered the market for the new genre since its very beginning. Atlantic 
Records for instance, which had been present in the niche markets for rhythm and 
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blues and jazz since the late 1940s,266 was the first record company to produce the 
charting rock’n’roll single “Shake Rattle and Roll” in 1954 (in its original version as 
recorded by Big Joe Turner).267 Another prominent example was Sam Phillip’s 
famous Sun Records, formed in the early 1950s, which was responsible for the 
success of most major rock’n’roll recording artists, including Elvis Presley and 
Johnny Cash.268   
These examples come to show that it was not the presence of numerous suppliers 
that created the demand for a new genre and promoted diversity, as Peterson and 
Berger have argued among others.269 The major record companies at the time, 
described as ‘deaf’ to the demands of music fans (demand-side), took advantage of 
the nascent interest in ‘new’ music only around the mid-1950s. It also appears that 
for a number of coincidental reasons, the market itself was ready to expand on both 
the supply and the demand side.  
These reasons relate to several distinct characteristics of the era and can be 
summarised as legislative, technological, industrial, organisational as well as 
occupational career and market facets.270 Richard Peterson analyses several factors 
and compares the years 1948 and 1958, in order to justify the advent of rock music. 
Serge Denisoff and William Romanowski ‘de-romanticise’ the birth of rock’n’roll, 
traditionally seen as the revolution of a generation.271 In summary, it is worth 
analysing these factors to examine the birth of new demand for music, as this can 
help understand current industrial practices through a historical lens. In a nutshell, 
as demand showed evidence of diversification, the industrial response was to 
internalise and market the sound in demand through the already established lines, 
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thus reinforcing the notion of the homogeneous product. Even though musically 
diverse, the product remains the same: the hit record.272 
Peterson in his comparison starts by referring to the copyright and patent regimes at 
the time. In copyright territory, ASCAP had been responsible for the collection of 
public performance royalties since its formation in 1914.273 By the 1930s only music 
licensed by ASCAP could be heard, performed, and played on the radio, in films, and 
in Broadway productions.274 As a result, until the 1950s all music reaching the public 
ear was controlled by an oligopoly of just eighteen publishers.275 Eventually, 
ASCAP’s reign proved short-lived as the rival collecting society BMI (formed in 
1939) recruited publishers and artists that represented music genres belonging to 
the niche markets of rhythm and blues and country.276 This transition from 
monopoly to duopoly in the field of collecting societies enabled the exposure of a 
series of artists representing the sounds on which rock’n’roll was based.277 
The importance of patent law lies in the inability of Columbia and RCA to reach a 
consensus for the establishment of an industry standard for a high-fidelity long 
playing record made out of a resistant material.278 Only through government 
mediation did the majors agree to pool their patents in order to reach an agreement, 
allowing them to manufacture both long playing (LP) and 45-rpm records.279 In 
other words, what was on ‘offer’ was beginning to change both externally (design 
and material) and in context (popular music, rhythm and blues, country, or a 
mixture thereof). The fact that the new recording format was more resistant, 
ironically called the ‘unbreakable’,280 and easier to store and ship than the previously 
                                                        
 
272 Osterwalder’s presentation (n 52).   
273 More on the early days of ASCAP and BMI at J Ryan, The production of Culture in the 
Music Industry: the ASCAP-BMI Controversy (1985).   
274 More in R Sanjek, American Popular Music and its Business, Volume 3, From 1900 to 
1984 (1988).  
275 R Peterson (n 113) 99.  
276 Ibid.  
277 For-profit SESAC was formed in 1930 and it originally represented the interests of 
European composers in the US, hence the name “Society of European Stage Authors and 
Composers”. It started expanding its approach in 1960 and as such, it is excluded from the 
narrative at this point. More at https://www.sesac.com.  
278 R Peterson (n 113) 100-101, more at G Marmorstein, The Label (n 258), R Metz, CBS: 
Reflections in a Bloodshot Eye (1975). 
279 R Peterson (n 113) 100.  






dominant shellac, enabled the market to expand, since more independent 
distributors entered on national level, meaning more distribution channels were 
available for the new products.281  
The last pivotal legislative factor mentioned by Peterson is the increase in the 
number of licensed radio stations in the US. In 1947, the US Federal 
Communications Commission (hereafter FCC) authorised a number of applications 
for new radio stations, leading to an increase of even 100 percent in certain 
geographical markets within the US; it should be noted that the number of radio 
stations per geographical market prior to 1947 was limited to three or five large 
corporate networks, with very few independent radio stations in operation.282 As 
stated previously, the daily programme of these radio stations relied solely on live 
studio performances of hit music. Apparently, the smaller newcomers were 
incapable of hiring big bands for their daily programme, leading them to air pre-
recorded music for the first time in radio history. Coincidentally, distribution of 
recorded music had just become cheaper and easier. From that moment, the 
relationship between the radio and the recorded music industry changed 
dramatically. It was only a few years prior to these developments that the radio was 
considered a competitor to the record, based on the assumption that the radio 
enabled the free consumption of music.283 
Ironically enough, this interrelation between technology and the entertainment 
industries does not appear to have changed much, as technology gets ‘accepted’ by 
content providers only once its value has been consolidated. Prominent examples of 
this include the rivalry between television broadcasters and the VCR and more 
recently, the rivalry between the oligonomy and the internet. 
For instance, Liebowitz wrote in 2004: 
 “it is common in literature, particularly in the popular press, to encounter the 
claim that copyright owners always cry wolf when a new technology approaches 
to threaten the old, only later to discover that the new technology was nothing 
short of a bonanza. This claim implies that foolish copyright owners 
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misunderstood the new technology and were fortunate enough to have been 
thwarted in their attempts to restrict the new technology.”  
The commercialisation of the VCR was met with heavy criticism by television 
broadcasters, as they feared that it would have a negative impact on their ability to 
sell advertisement.284 Similar reactions to technology are evident in the 1980s and 
the 1990s, following the introduction of the digital audio tape (DAT), the MiniDisc, 
and the digital compact cassette (DCC) that appeared to threaten the industry’s 
preferred format (CD).285  
In the present case, apart from the introduction of the new recording formats to the 
market, another technological development ‘pushed’ the market in the mid-1950s: 
the lightweight, cheap and portable transistor that enabled young adults and 
teenagers (customer segments) to keep in touch with their favourite music 
everywhere they went.286 
As far as the radio and the record companies are concerned, symbiosis is not the 
ideal word to describe their relationship, as they do not appear to belong to the same 
level of the supply chain for music. This can be concluded by examining the 9 
Building Blocks: the record is what a record company has on offer (the product), 
whereas the radio falls under channels, with which key partnerships should be 
created.287 As already explained, establishing close relationships or even controlling 
channels and partnerships, is vital for the sustainability of a business model. As 
such, a close relationship with the radio was vital for the viability of the oligonomy.  
At first, an increase in the number of radio stations dedicated to the repetition of the 
trending rock’n’roll sound as favoured by teenagers and produced by independent 
record companies, was not taken light-heartedly. Having lost three-quarters of their 
market share by the late 1950s, the majors were aware that in order to regain control 
of the market, they had to control what was played on the radio, as well as adjust (or 
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succumb) to the demands of this new market and offer new music genres in their 
catalogues.288  
As far as the relationship with the radio is concerned, it naturally follows that 
whoever controls what is played on the radio, can foresee a subsequent rise in 
market share. This became evident during the notorious payola scandals that 
brought the relationship between record companies and the radio under 
investigation by the House Legislative Oversight subcommittee of the Commerce 
Committee in 1960.289 As regards the accumulation of music genres formerly 
considered niche but growing in popular demand nonetheless, the majors either 
acquired the recording contracts of popular rock artists such as Elvis Presley, or 
invested in their own A&R activities in search for the next rock’n’roll superstars.290  
These activities resulted in the majors re-acquiring their dominance and by the 
beginning of the 1970s the scene was set for the multinational conglomerates to 
emerge: at the beginning of the 1960s, record companies became “professional in 
their management style” and even more “dominated by lawyers and 
accountants.”291 This comes as a direct result of a combination of factors such as the 
promotion of music via the radio and the juke box, the dominance of the LP format, 
the popularity of rock’n’roll and other formerly considered as niche sounds, changes 
in demographics, as well as promotional support from live music performances.292 
As mentioned previously, the majors’ ability to absorb sounds and artists originating 
from independent labels and niche genres, highlights not only the existence of 
powerful players in the supply of music, but also the existence of a business model 
that supports them. This trend continued all the way up to the 1970s and the 1980s, 
as disco, funk, heavy metal, and punk musicians entered the majors’ rota and 
reached the market via the established corporate route. At the same time, companies 
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dedicated to their own sounds, such as Motown or Atlantic, merged with the majors 
or were acquired by these few corporate entities.293  
The concentration of power and market share by the majors is evident throughout 
the history of the music industry. Even though the era following the Second World 
War was examined in order to showcase disruptive forces in the majors’ paths that 
coincide with consumer choice, it was also posited that disruption can get easily 
internalised and absorbed by the dominant firms.  
According to the ecological theory of competition in the music industry, the smaller 
independent specialist or peripheral labels concentrate on the production of niche 
products, such as the sounds described earlier.294 The opportunities for niche 
products to be produced and supplied to narrower market segments grow, as 
concentration increases among the so-called generalist firms (coinciding with the 
major record companies). The outcome is that as the specialists gain market share, 
they become absorbed by the generalists, which results in a circle of perpetual 
innovation and absorption of niche products, or sounds in the present case.295  
This ecology points to an industry whereby a dualistic system flourishes, to the 
ultimate benefit of the few major multinational or generalist firms. Even though 
there exists space for the establishment of middle-size or middle-tier companies, 
their existence on single firm level proves short-lived, as their purpose is to supply 
the majors with sounds, artists, and ideas. This comes as no surprise since the 
majors possess unprecedented power, evident in their ability to internalise 
disruptive forces and turn them to profit. The thesis expands on these in the 
forthcoming chapters, when the perspective of the competition authorities is 
introduced. It is reminded that the present chapter acts as the background against 
which the authorities’ point of view will be compared and evaluated. 
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3.2.2 The oligonomy gets established  
This ability to internalise disruption and generate profit appears to be mainly due to 
the organisation of the industry, to horizontal and vertical integration on firm level, 
and to the business model built and sustained around the provision of copyrighted 
material. It is worth repeating that an oligopolistic tendency has always been 
apparent in the industry, ever since the patent days of the machine manufacturers, 
highlighting the importance of intellectual property for the expansion and 
establishment of success, as according to Jack Bishop commenting on the history of 
the industry, “property equals power.”296 
Oligopoly aside, the major firms also operate as an oligopsony towards musicians 
and songwriters seeking recording deals, signalling a market of buyers.297 This 
double-sided concentration of power seems to favour the prolongation of this 
favourable to their interests situation and it stems directly from the merger of 
commercial activities in music, as per the previous chapter. In other words, it stems 
directly from the established business model that called for all commercial activities 
concentrated under the same corporate umbrella. 
It would not be possible but to agree with literature characterising the major firms as 
“gatekeepers to the industrialisation process through which music must pass in 
order to be entered into the global market.”298 In the aggregate, this oligonomy can 
tip the scales to its advantage and influence not only the creative output that reaches 
the market, but also the law that protects its key resource: copyright. As per 
Osterwalder’s canvas, concentrating on copyright as a sole resource has steered the 
collective efforts of the industry towards its protection by all means, even though 
competition on firm level for the ‘lion’s share’ can be fierce.299 
Indeed, as per the previous chapter, IFPI was created in 1933 as a non-profit 
organisation registered in Zurich,300 and its US counterpart, the Recording Industry 
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Association of America (RIAA) was established in 1951, also as a non-profit 
organisation.301 IFPI’s, and most importantly, RIAA’s lobbying and litigating efforts 
have been remarkable, showcasing the existence of an industry with immense 
power. According to RIAA’s website their mission is “to protect artists and all music 
creators from the damaging impact of music theft. It’s up to all of us to safeguard 
the creative value of artists’ work.”302 Additionally, IFPI is “campaigning for the 
rights of record producers: we work to make sure that the rights of our members, 
who create, produce and invest in music, are properly protected and enforced.”303  
Naturally, both mission statements translate to co-ordinated lobbying efforts aimed 
at influencing law-making in the US and in Europe respectively. More evidently, as 
regards the US, RIAA can be seen influencing copyright indirectly through litigation 
or directly by lobbying Congress.304  
There is no need to repeat that lobbying to such an extent signifies impermeable 
industrial organisation. The argument to be furthered here is actually the existence 
of a nexus of interests so powerful that justifies the apparent neglect of the Building 
Block dedicated to customer segments. It has already been established that any 
changes in demand for music from the part of the audience will be encapsulated one 
way or another by the dominant corporate shape, either through the acquisition of 
the independent label, or through the acquisition of the famous artist, or even 
through investment in A&R pursuing a similar sound. If anything, the oligonomy of 
the major record companies ascertained that this trend would continue in 
perpetuity.  
Thus far, this can be observed not only on the business model canvas, but also in the 
relevant literature on the production (supply) of popular music investigated directly 
below. As Robert Burnett explained in 1996, the connections and ties within the 
“highly complex systems for the production of (musical) culture - the firms, roles, 
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structures and processes - are analytically, if not factually, distinct from the 
system of cultural consumption… The relationships among record producers, 
artists, marketing, and promotion specialists, trade press and so on, are stronger 
than the relationships between producers and consumers.” 305  
Again, this comes as no surprise given the gatekeeping nature of the majors and the 
fact that, even on the business model canvas, customer segments under this 
business model appear as the mass market. One of the major changes brought 
forward in the digital era, is the enhanced and participatory role of the end 
consumer, a role that had not been investigated during the era presented above.   
3.2.3 The behaviour of the oligonomy: supply and distribution of a product for music to 
the mass market  
3.2.3.1 The oligonomy as gatekeepers  
Up until this point, it has been observed that the industrial ecology is built to 
support the oligonomic model of the few major record companies that are 
responsible for the production of a homogeneous product, aimed at satisfying the 
mass market. Furthermore, this homogeneity owes its longevity to the constant 
absorption of the niche, signalling consolidation. It is worth investigating the 
oligonomic model further, as this record-company-centred simultaneous buyers’ 
and sellers’ market emerges again in the forthcoming chapters on competition 
analysis and relevant product market definition. It also plays a pivotal part in 
understanding the ‘journey’ of the musical composition to the end consumer 
through the majors’ marketing functions, as it is exactly thanks to this process that 
music becomes a ‘product’, as per the term used by the labels themselves.306 
Adopting a holistic view, Hull has identified three general income streams 
surrounding music in its broader sense: the recording stream, the publishing 
stream, and the live stream.307 At the peak of the major record companies examined 
below, the multinationals integrated the recording and the publishing leg in order to 
internalise costs, meaning royalties paid to the publishers, who dominated the music 
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business in its initial formation.308 Live appearances and performances of songs (the 
live music stream) perform an ancillary function, promoting records and marketing 
new or established acts. This also supports the argument that the music industry was 
indeed the recording industry, ever since the merging of publishing and recording 
activities:  
“while one might argue that the song is the thing because it is included in all three 
streams, it is really the recording that provides most of the drive for the cash flows 
in all three streams.”309  
Therefore, for the majority of the music industry’s history, industry and literature 
focus on the provision of recordings of hit music to the audience, a product so 
profitable that can guarantee the creation and sustainability of an oligonomy for 
decades.  
Robert Burnett discusses the aesthetic and the material production of the music 
product (also referring to the recording), highlighting the strong links between 
several professions involved with the recording directly (artists, studio engineers, 
song writers, musicians) or indirectly (independent producers, the majors, 
wholesaler distributors, promotion, concert production, retail sales).310 On the 
antipode, the consumption of music by the end consumer is provided as the weakest 
link in this figure, encompassing media exposure, concert attendance, peer opinion 
leadership, listening habits, and gratification.311 This is of relevance later in the 
thesis, when consumers declare their presence and their ability to affect these links 
in a material manner. At this stage however, it becomes evident that the production 
and the consumption of music are being treated as two distinct areas of interest. 
Whereas the production of recordings focuses on the industrial and organisational 
principles encountered in business, the consumption is being treated as a cultural or 
psychological phenomenon. 
The top-down organisation of the music industry, here the majors, allowed for 
minimal consumer involvement; a pattern that has led to the characterisation of the 
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music industry as a mass medium, since recordings are produced and distributed 
symbolically to wide audiences that, albeit representing diverse tastes in music, are 
treated as the mass market. The existence of multiple technologies and methods of 
dissemination, the low degree of regulation (as well as the haphazard effect that 
regulation has had on the music industry), the high levels of internalisation, the 
diversity of reception possibilities, and the existence of gatekeepers, have all 
contributed to these mass communication attributes, according to McQuail.312  
As with traditional mass media (broadcasting and the press), the music industry as 
represented by the majors, is dedicated to fierce market share competition for 
audience.313 This of course translates into fierce competition for the production of hit 
records. Despite the co-ordination for lobbying (e.g. the establishment of IFPI and 
RIAA), the existence of well-tuned industrial practices (e.g. marketing strategies), 
and the almost identical firm-level organisational structure among the majors (part 
of the industry’s business model), the members of the oligonomy have faced limited, 
compared to their power, interest by the competition authorities, and most 
importantly, by the US antitrust investigators that have failed to reduce the majors’ 
influence over the years.  The forthcoming chapters will show that the go-to 
justification for this, is exactly the mass medium attribute of competition for the 
lion’s share. Nevertheless, this tells us nothing about the role of the end consumer 
and the promotion of welfare.  
However, at this point it is important to note the existence of one ex ante and one ex 
post attempt to legal intervention, aimed at fostering competition in the market for 
hit music; the compulsory licensing system introduced with the 1909 US Copyright 
Act (also in the previous chapter) and the extensive payola investigations in late 
1950s. These two examples of legal intervention in the music industry deal with the 
oligonomic nature of the majors and highlight the gatekeeping function of both the 
                                                        
 
312 D McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, 3d edn, (1994) 20. McQuail discusses 
gatekeeper theory in relation to both the radio and the record companies themselves, since 
they control the ‘gates’ the songwriter/artist must pass to reach the audience.  
313 The omnipresent ‘lion’s share’. This form of competition is repeated throughout the 
investigations presented in the forthcoming chapters, as the justification of the pro-
competitive environment the music industry enjoys. The thesis questions the welfare 






majors and the radio stations as per McQuail, as well as the existence of a market for 
the provision of hit music.  
Indeed, the need to legislate for (potentially) hit music to be ‘shared’ equally through 
copyright law, proves the existence of a single product that can be subjected to 
monopolisation directly. Bringing this analysis closer to its legal dimensions, it 
should be noted that in a competition law context, a market is indeed something 
worth monopolising,314 a premise that forms the basis of the introduction of the 
hypothetical monopolist test in market definition. 
Nevertheless, the compulsory licencing system instead of hindering the majors’ 
route to dominance, enabled them to re-brand niche genres on the verge of 
popularity, and market them to the mass market, a practice evident in the 1950s 
with rhythm and blues and country music: 
 “the thinking of both the Victor and Columbia heads… is that if is this was what the 
kids wanted, this was what they were going to get.”315  
This quote further supports the view that the major record companies acted as 
gatekeepers of music, as it was in the songwriters’ best interests to profit from the 
majors’ distribution system and general exposure techniques, such as the notorious 
payola scandals. What this outcome further highlights, is the inability of such legal 
intervention through copyright law to regulate a gatekeeping oligonomy efficiently. 
A more targeted and dedicated approach appears to be necessary, should the aim be 
to target concentration in the industry, as attempted by the payola investigations 
that follow.  
Interestingly enough, payola did not constitute an offence at the beginning of the 
industry. Rather, it was a well-established way of seeking exposure and 
strengthening ties with the stronger gatekeepers of the relevant dominant industry: 
Gilbert and Sullivan were also paying money to get their hits played as far back as 
the 1880s, according to Chapple and Garofalo.316 According to the same authors, in 
the publisher-dominated days of Tin Pan Alley, payola was paid to bandleaders and 
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lead singers in order for musical compositions to attract the interest of the 
audience/purchasers of sheet music.317  
In the era coinciding with the dominant recorded music industry however, the most 
important exposure was the one the radio had to offer. It is not a coincide that 
payola investigations were initiated as a result of ongoing legal battles between 
collecting societies ASCAP and BMI, namely the antitrust lawsuit brought against 
BMI alleging a conspiracy to “dominate the market for the use and exploitation of 
music composition.”318 ASCAP used the legal route to ensure the longevity of a 
business that had tuned its focus upon music recordings, a model that BMI was 
familiar with and had sought to embrace since its incorporation in 1940.319 The 
congressional payola investigations of 1959-1960 resulted in scandals surrounding 
famous rock’n’roll DJs taking the ultimate blame for  commercial habit of over 50 
years. Further, it signalled a new era in commercial radio programming through the 
role of the station’s program director, who would handle all the ‘transparent’ 
communications with the record companies’ personally and who would be 
ultimately responsible for the ‘sound’ of the radio station (rock, country, rhythm and 
blues), a format that still prevails in commercial radio to some extent.320 
From a legal standpoint, payola became a federal criminal offence in 1960, described 
as an unfair and deceptive practice,321 which points to the relevance of antitrust 
legislation and commercial bribery. Indeed, attempts to introduce a code outlawing 
payola with the support of the Federal Trade Commission, were discussed as far 
back as the 1930s by a group of publishers.322 Under Section 15 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act ‘‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’’ 
are prohibited, a provision upon which payola was construed as a breach. Hence, the 
payola scandals of the late 1950s provide a vital insight into the dominance of the 
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oligonomy. The attempts from the part of the law to restrict unfair and 
anticompetitive behaviour, signal the existence of such behaviour in the music 
industry, which appears to favour a situation where the phonograph record market 
is susceptible to unfair and anticompetitive practices by a few dominant players.  
The involvement of the FTC in the music industry becomes more evident in the early 
1960s, with the Trade Practice Rules for the phonograph record industry 
promulgated in October 1964 and adopted in November 1964, following a trade 
practice hearing in Washington DC, where the industry’s proposals were heard.323 
These Trade Practice Rules constituted one the most extensive attempts of the FTC 
to codify the requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act324 for an entire industry,325 
and as such attempted to introduce a price-discrimination prevention mechanism.326 
Rules targeted discriminatory price differential practices, advertising or promotional 
allowances, price-fixing, sales, and deceptive practices, including competitor 
defamation.327  
The Robinson-Patman Act itself was introduced as an amendment to the Clayton Act 
to prevent unfair price discrimination against consumers, which are business for the 
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purposes of the Act. As per the FTC’s guide, the Act applies to commodities (not 
services) of “like grade and quality” and there must be likely injury to competition 
for a claim under the Act to succeed.328 The above relate to the music industry as 
indeed, the recordings (commodities) of music are perceived as being of “like grade 
and quality,” which in turn implies the interchangeability of the recordings as 
products. 329  
Indeed, during the extensive and exhaustive investigation into Columbia Record 
Club, the debate on relevant market focused on whether there was a relevant 
product market for all records.330 However, as far as the specific investigation is 
concerned, it was deemed necessary to further delineate a sub-market for record 
clubs,331 pursuant to Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.332 A thorough evaluation of 
the Columbia Record Club investigation follows in the forthcoming chapter,333 
aiming to showcase the inability of the FTC to address the issues of the oligonomy 
successfully, despite its efforts; a pattern repeated through the years.  
3.2.3.2 Gatekeeper function: controlling supply and distribution  
The final piece of the puzzle introduced in the production and supply of music 
during the rise of the dominant majors, is the issue of controlling the channels of 
distribution. Pursuant to the Building Block of key partnerships, controlling key 
channels (e.g. supply) is favourited in order to achieve optimisation and economies 
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of scale in a business model and as such, buyer-supplier relationships are pertinent 
to a business model’s success.334 This sub-section therefore, investigates these key 
partnerships in the oligonomy’s business model.335 
Up until now, the industry’s focus was presented as lying with the production of the 
hit record and its supply to the audience and it was also noted that the model of 
vertical integration favourited by the majors, includes control of the distribution 
channels. A closer look highlights the importance of vertical integration for the 
industry’s dominant business model and identifies how control of the distribution 
channels lies at the core of the industry’s activity from the early 1970s onwards, a 
reliance that will cause sufficient problems once the internet eliminates the need for 
the supply of physical copies. The relationship between the record companies and 
the radio was examined under channels, aiming to prove the ‘change of heart’ and 
the realisation of the radio’s potential as a promotional tool as supported by the 
payola scandals. Juke boxes were also mentioned as another promotional outlet that 
offered sampling of music to the potential buyers.  
Traditionally, there were two ways of reaching the consumer: either directly, by-
passing the retail level or vertically, through a hierarchically aligned supply chain. 
This way, the recording would reach the market through middlemen or directly 
through the company’s own record clubs,336 a practice that trigged the antitrust 
investigation into Columbia Record club to follow.  
Passing through the distribution channel, the recording would reach the market 
through wholesalers, supplying dedicated sections of department stores and 
supermarkets (rack jobbers), traditional retailers, or even ‘one-stops’, supplying juke 
boxes and radio stations.337 It is important to emphasise the role of the distributer in 
this indirect supply chain, as it is the distribution’s “role to convince retailers that 
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they should stock their products, and to ensure that those products are supplied 
and replenished in a timely fashion.”338  
A pivotal part of this distribution chain is the retailers’ ability to return unsold 
products to the record companies, a quite unique characteristic of the music 
industry.339 This norm showcases the bargaining power retailers possessed, 
especially large chain stories such as Tesco or Walmart, where the majors turned 
their main attention in the 1980s for their retailing needs, once their hold on 
distribution channels had been consolidated.340 Of course, other retail channels 
continued to operate, even though they attracted less strategic attention. These 
retailers include independent specialised retailers (focusing on niche sounds) and 
second-hand retailers or bazaars.341  
Overall, this retail system does not only coincide with the consolidation of the 
distribution channels, but also showcases a change in marketing strategies, as the 
existence of smaller specialised stores with knowledgeable staff is no longer as 
favourited as the stocking of few large ‘mega’ record stores is.342  In more recent 
years, the focus changed onto either distribution of physical copies via electronic 
commerce means such as Amazon, or onto the distribution of digital copies e.g. 
iTunes.  
In the days of old business model of the oligonomy, focus lies with the control of the 
supply system that signals not only the existence of vertical integration in the 
industry, as most majors own their own distribution networks, but also the 
importance of the majors as gatekeepers for smaller independent labels wishing to 
enter into distribution agreements with them in order to profit from the majors’ 
global networks.343 As stated previously, Alexander Osterwalder places distribution 
channels under key partnerships on the canvas of the old business model and 
includes retailers (as well as the radio and the television) under channels.344 It 
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naturally follows that it is in a firm’s best interest to internalise costs associated with 
these Building Blocks, a strategy omnipresent in the globalised, vertically, 
horizontally, and laterally aligned music industry.345  
Going back to the importance of the majors’ role as gatekeepers with regard to the 
independent labels, owning and controlling distribution and supply channels also 
enables the majors to profit from the success of a potentially successful artist signed 
at an independent label, whereas there is little risk in the case of less successful acts, 
since marketing and promotion activities remain with the artist’s label. This 
structure enables the creation of a web (or nexus) of minors and majors, whereby 
truly independent labels without any ties with the majors are hard to come by.346 
Agreements between the oligonomy and the independents include manufacturing 
and distribution deals on a global scale and highlight the trend appearing in the 
early 1970s, whereby the strategic focus of the majors falls on the creation and 
sustainment of these major-minor webs via globalisation networks. 
By the end of the 1970s, the majors (by then the ‘Big Six’) controlled 85 percent of 
the total record sales through a nexus of many major-owned and major-distributed 
labels. As such, distribution and promotion became key in the majors’ domination of 
the recorded music market347 and potentially cause of their demise. The majors 
restricted the minors’ potential to affect their market share, while offering them 
exposure through financial arrangements and distribution deals at the same time. 
Independent or pseudo-independent labels in this nexus oversee finding, fostering 
and delivering new talent without hindering the majors’ path to dominance. 
 Concluding where this discussion started, the gatekeeping oligonomy of the music 
world had positioned itself strategically in the centre of the nexus, profiting from its 
status from the side of the artist-songwriter, from the side of the minor-
independent, and from the side of the end consumer; a dominance so strong, 
nothing appeared to be able to question it. 
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3.2.4 The oligonomic ‘empire’ of music: a brief look into mergers, acquisitions, and 
integration   
In order to conclude the discussion on the creation of a dominant oligonomy, 
another piece of the puzzle needs to be addressed: the long journey of mergers and 
integration (horizontal, vertical, conglomerate).  
It has become apparent so far that the respective companies and music labels form a 
“shifting piece in the wealthy mosaic of communications and entertainment 
conglomerates”348 and the forthcoming chapters offer a more thorough investigation 
into the treatment of mergers and antitrust investigations in the music industry. 
However, for the time being, a brief commentary on the magnitude of the merging 
activities is provided, to the extent that the ‘making’ of the global music company is 
supported.  
It was presented in the previous chapter that the talking machine industry, even 
during its patent days, was prone to the creation and sustainment of few dominant 
key players-oligopolies. As the ownership of owning patents yielded to the 
ownership of copyright and the (recorded) music industry was created, the 
oligopolistic tendency remained through a series of mergers and acquisitions, the 
motto being “control as much of many things as you possibly can,”  according to 
industry executive Ted Cohen.349 Keeping track of the series of mergers and 
acquisitions throughout the years is quite an exhaustive task of limited importance 
at the present stage; the cases analysed in the subsequent chapters are chosen in 
order to reflect the points in history where the industry faces either disruptive forces 
or undeniable dominance, in order for the comparison to be effective. 
 In any event, consolidation of power in the music industry appears to be in-line with 
the aggregate extent of consolidation in the broader media sector, which has not 
mistakenly been characterised as a “cartel of a magnitude and power the world has 
never seen.”350 Nevertheless, either as part of the broader media industries 
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discourse, or as a stand-alone industry, competition enforcement in the area has 
been limited if it has not failed altogether.351  
A closer look at the history of the majors will find them referred to as the “Big Six” in 
their hiatus, or the ‘Big Four’, following a series of mergers and diversifications, 
depending on the existence of external disruptive factors. Following the break-up of 
EMI in 2012,352 the majors reached their lowest number ever, with only three major 
firms active at the time of writing. 
It was presented that this pattern existed since the patent days of the ‘talking 
machines’ and that it was the same firms that shifted their attention to the supply of 
the software, the record, capitalising on opportunities created via changes in 
copyright law, channelling in essence the parent company’s funds into the music 
business. A prime example was seen in the case of EMI that benefitted from the 
corporate ‘feeding’ hand of Thorn Electrical Industries from 1979 until 2006, the 
year where its financial woes came to the limelight.353 Similarly, the electronics 
colossus Sony, through its American subsidiary, can be found behind one the 
remaining majors (Sony Music Entertainment) and the same pattern is observed 
behind every major company throughout history. Additionally, many major film 
production companies chose to integrate into the music industry, in a strategic 
decision to control ownership of their original soundtracks, as was the case of 
Universal. A similar pattern of conglomeration and integration can be encountered 
in the live music sector in more recent years, starting with the creation of Live 
Nation in 2005 as a spin-off of Clear Channel Communications, a mogul of the mass 
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communications sector.354 Clear Channel’s power and this power’s channelling into 
products for music, is being addressed in the fifth chapter.  
Consolidation is also evidenced in the face of minor firms being “co-opted, coerced, 
swallowed-up, recycled and shoved down the throat of the American public by 
major record companies.”355Smaller and niche firms from a variety of countries 
were ultimately brought under the corporate umbrella, as the majors sought to 
establish regional branches in order to benefit from emerging markets, as “a handful 
of singular firms managed to adapt their strategies and organisational structures 
to the new environment,”356 strengthening the business model through 
globalisation.  
To put things into perspective, mergers and acquisitions are an inherent part of the 
history of the music business and it does come as a surprise that there is not much 
antitrust and competition law evidence to consult on the matter. One of the reasons 
why little attention had been paid was the fact that these mergers were either of 
vertical character (distribution channels) or of horizontal dimensions, albeit with 
smaller and niche firms. As such, they managed to pass below the radar of the 
relevant competition authorities. These points are put to the test in the forthcoming 
chapters, when the primary legal material is analysed.  
To illustrate, one of the instances when such a proposed merger triggered 
governmental intervention in the US, was MCA’s attempt to merge with Decca 
Records (owner of Universal Pictures Inc.). The Robert Kennedy-led Department of 
Justice interfered and forced MCA to divest Universal Picture’s talent agency and 
focus on feature-film production.357 This investigation however, did not concern 
music industry matters, as it would appear that the predominant entertainment 
industry at the time was feature-film production and, as mentioned above, the music 
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industry did not possess powers of similar dimension at that stage. Indeed, for those 
Hollywood mega studios, music production was another instance of vertical 
integration aiming to capture elusive downstream profits (a strategy evident in the 
music industry itself).  
Overall, the music oligonomy’s path to dominance has passed (and is still passing) 
through strategic horizontal and vertical integration. It can be said that the music 
industry is in itself a ‘child’ of the hardware sector’s and the film industry’s vertical 
integration. Further, vertical integration has been at the core of its business model 
calling for the control of distribution, manufacturing, production, promotion, and 
even retailing channels. With respect to horizontal integration, this has become 
easier to ‘monitor’ in the past two decades. However, as the following chapters will 
show, in a world undergoing seismic changes for the first time since its industrial 
establishment, patterns, markets, and consumers are harder to adequately discern.  
Finally, from a horizontal perspective, the more recent occurrence of only three 
majors (Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group, and Warner Music 
Group) succeeded an era of ‘Big Four’ (Vivendi/Universal, Sony BMG, AOL-Time 
Warner, EMI), which succeeded in its turn an era of ‘Big Six’ in the 1980s (MCA, 
CBS, Warner, RCA, Capitol/EMI, PolyGram). It is important to examine how this 
consolidation was sustained, despite the existence of antitrust regimes in place.   
To resume, the corporate overview of the music industry highlights the existence of a 
model of extreme concentration of power, an infinite line of integration, mergers 
and acquisitions on industrial level, and a trend to consolidation. This model is 
sustained by a well-established business model on single firm level; a model that 
calls for strategic alignment around the copyrighted product, the homogeneous hit 
record. Ultimate control equals ultimate power in the case of the majors. This power 
is used to influence legal change and to avoid intervention and regulation, passing 
below the radar of the relevant authorities.  
Further reasons of why this might be the case have been identified above: either the 
majors, as smaller fish in their parent companies’ respective tanks, were divested 
and traded as assets of bigger conglomerates, or more recently, they were treated as 
part of the larger deregulated (in the US) mass communication and media discourse 






follows that no antitrust or competition regime was equipped with the ‘language’ to 
read into these industrial trends either, as the forthcoming chapters show.  
3.2.5 The Business model of the oligonomy and the product for music: assessment  
Attempting a competition evaluation of the oligonomy’s business model 
incorporates considerable constraints, as the industry remained both unregulated 
and under-investigated at the time examined above. A further limitation is 
encountered in the fact that relevant product market definition as perceived 
nowadays, is a result of the 1982 US Merger Guidelines, whereas the earliest 
reference to the concept of a relevant market for merger purposes appears in the 
1948 US Supreme Court Decision United States v. Columbia Steel Co.358 As Werden 
comments: 
 “although the Court used the term ‘relevant market,’ it ‘recognize[d] the difficulty 
of laying down a rule as to what areas or products are competitive, one with 
another’ and made no attempt to lay down such rules.”359 
 From this 1948 decision until the introduction of the hypothetical monopolist test in 
1982, the US courts as well as some US academics,360 have passed through various 
attempts to define a relevant market in competition law. This is relevant to the 
present thesis when the sub-market test of Brown Shoe is utilised to define the sub-
market of records clubs in the Columbia record club investigation. A further 
interesting point to be highlighted is that, even though demand leads the market 
definition investigation in a competition law context, any investigation into the 
product market of the music industries should correctly identify the supply chain for 
music from a vertical perspective, and investigate the consumer separately.  
As stated previously, demand for music has not been addressed as part of the 
broader music industries discourse. This comes as no surprise, as it aligns with the 
rationale that the end consumer for music is the mass market that consumes a 
homogeneous product in a homogeneous manner. This point was further illustrated 
by Burnett when end consumer demand for music was presented as a matter of 
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aesthetics and cultural habits.361  Furthermore, this realisation justifies the lack of 
relevant sources on demand substitution from an end consumer perspective. Hence, 
bringing the investigation closer to a demand-substitution-led competition law 
scenario becomes a broadly theoretical task.362 
In any event, this part of the present chapter sought to establish the relationship 
between the existence of a business model for the music industry and a specific 
product for music, attempting a historical overview of the music industry. Indeed, it 
has been identified that the music industry, in the face of the major record 
companies, was organised around a single business model that prolonged the 
success of a powerful oligonomy performing a gatekeeper function. In this business 
model, the resulting product was identified as the recording of hit or popular music, 
a term that does not necessarily imply a single music genre, but signals the existence 
of a unified process of producing and delivering the product to the mass audience 
through various channels, also controlled by the oligonomy.  
Thus, this oligonomic model is manifested as such: creators of music face an 
oligopsony in the face of a few major record companies, which possess the necessary 
control over the marketing and the distribution channels of the finalised product, 
acting as an oligopoly to the mass audience. This reaffirms their gatekeeper function, 
implying a sellers’ market. Naturally, this chain also represents the copyright 
journey from the creation of music to its embodiment and its commodification into a 
tangible object, the control of which remains in the hands of the same oligonomy.  
Hence, the business reality of the market as presented in the relevant literature, 
coincides with the picture provided by Alexander Osterwalder’s canvas. It was 
reaffirmed that the dominant business model of the oligonomy views hits and 
wannabe hits as the value proposition or offer to the customers (offer being the 
term closer to the marketers’ notion of offering presented above)363 and posits the 
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mass market under customer segments,364 which enables the Building Block of 
customer relationships to be left unattended.365 This finding is in line with the 
absence of the customer from the literature consulted on the business structure of 
the industry and mirrors the competition authorities’ perception of the market, as 
presented in the next chapter (the supply chain mostly ends with the retailer, 
purchaser of the embodiment of music).  
This part of the chapter also dealt with distribution channels and key partnerships 
in order to highlight the long history of mergers and acquisitions in the industry. As 
such, it focused on patterns of ownership and control of the distribution channels, 
which ‘engulfed’ the smaller independent firms in a nexus of bigger and smaller 
players, suggesting that the oligonomy of the few is pertinent to the survival of the 
many.366 
Since the literature on the industry agrees with the business model as described by 
Alexander Osterwalder’s canvas and points to the existence of one mass market and 
one product for music, the research can now turn to the changes brought forward by 
the induction in the digital era. The end consumer of music becomes a vehicle for 
industrial and business model change, and thus becomes relevant to the music 
industry for the first time in history: consumers are no longer passive. Rather, they 
are armed with power to re-allocate disposable income and affect the business 
model status quo in an unprecedented manner. This ability to demand and affect 
changes catches the music industry off guard and forces it to re-invest and re-
configure itself.  
The forthcoming part also focuses on the extent to which the consumer affects 
change in the market for music by adding and removing products from the chain of 
substitution. For example, according to the old business model, live music 
performance was one of the revenue streams of the music industry, supporting the 
marketing of the recording. However, live music as a product has recently been re-
evaluated. Hence, a question that requires attention arises: what is the relationship 
between the concert ticket and the recording (complements or substitutes)? What is 
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the music product in demand from the point of view of the end consumer if not the 
recording of hit music in physical format?  
 
3.3 Innovation beyond the oligonomy  
3.3.1 Dawn of the digital era: gatekeepers in peril  
The impact of the internet (and file-sharing in particular) on the music industry 
has provided industry and academia alike with an unprecedented production of 
relevant research and literature.367 The music industry, despite its expensive and 
exhaustive efforts to battle and address the matter of online copyright infringement, 
found itself unable to deal with the technological developments for the first time in 
history. Even though disruptive forces on the majors’ path were observed before (e.g. 
the cassette as the first carrier of music that can be duplicated domestically), the 
advent of the internet and the induction in the digital era forced the music, as well 
the broader creative, industry to re-invent and re-configure itself or, in other words, 
reconsider its business model.  
As it was examined in the first chapter of the present, the terms ‘business model’ and 
‘business model innovation’ were also introduced very recently in academic circles. 
Nevertheless, they have been attracting interest from affiliated areas and disciplines, 
aiming primarily at filling a gap in the understanding of organisational business 
structures, by addressing developments through a ‘digital versus physical world’ 
perspective.  
It was established that business model literature has become a vehicle for the music 
industries, providing an analysis of the old ‘way of doing business’ and highlighting 
the gaps and mishaps that led to market failure. Alexander Osterwalder provides a 
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comprehensive ‘reading’ of the old business model and makes suggestions for ‘new’ 
business models in the music industries, which correspond to the overall business 
innovation ‘boom’ of the digital era. The struggles of the oligonomy to safeguard its 
gatekeeper function seem to reaffirm the preface of Osterwalder’s book that 
“entirely new industries are forming as old ones crumble. Upstarts are challenging 
the old guard, some of whom are struggling feverishly to reinvent themselves.”368 
In the case of recorded music more specifically, it has been highlighted how the few 
dominant gatekeepers managed to identify not only with a specific business model, 
but also with the whole notion of an industry evolving around them. It could be 
argued that the term ‘industry’ became appropriated by the oligonomy, as this 
narrative seems to best serve the gatekeepers’ interests, when they argued that it was 
the whole ‘music industry’ that suffered due to online copyright infringement.  
As the music industry discourse meets the business model narrative, the formerly 
neglected Building Block of customer segments enters the picture for the first time. 
Indeed, the Business Model Generation recognises that customers “comprise the 
heart of the business model” and that once customer segments have been specified, 
“a business model can be carefully designed around a strong understanding of 
specific customer needs.”369 It was presented that the oligonomy catered for the 
mass market with little interest in providing a more customer-oriented product for 
music. It will be later shown however, that consumer-led changes in consumption 
make the end consumer of music ‘relevant’ in a business context. For this reason, 
and to align with the purpose of this chapter which focuses on supply and demand 
patterns, the remaining of the music industry’s historical overview continues from 
the demand side. By the end of the present section both supply and demand for 
music will have been presented, allowing the investigation into the creation of 
markets for music to conclude.  
It comes as no surprise that limited literature has been encountered on the matter of 
consumer demand for music prior to the digital era, apart from aesthetic and 
cultural trends and patterns: this stems directly from the industry’s oligonomic and 
gatekeeper nature and, as it becomes evident from the cases consulted in the 
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forthcoming chapters, it also mirrors the competition authorities’ interpretation of 
the supply chain for music. In the event of ‘disruptions’, as the ones encountered in 
the 1950s, the industry was able to expand by absorbing the niche into its core 
business model, a move that expedited the era of globalisation in the music industry. 
In the case of digital age however, the change was broader than a change in 
demographics or tastes in music, leading to an ‘adopt or perish’ dilemma for the 
gatekeepers collectively.  
Heated debates and reactions followed the advent of file-sharing and downloading 
music files in MP3 format, which made the availability of music instantaneous 
notwithstanding geographical location. The internet proved itself foe to the 
oligonomy, even though restricting and ‘gagging’ technology had always been in the 
industry’s lobbying agenda.370 By comparison, the oligonomy’s reaction to the 
popularity of the audio cassette was the infamous “Home Taping is Killing Music” 
BPI-led campaign of 1980. Across the Atlantic, the Audio Home Recording Act of 
1992 amended title 17 of the United States Code, introducing the chapter “Digital 
Audio Recording Devices and Media,”371 which constituted the industry’s first 
organised attempt to address the making of digital copies of recordings with 
precision. None of the previous technologies however gained as much popularity as 
the Mp3 did in the beginning of 1997, thanks to the wild fire that was Napster.372 
Sharing music files is simply another facet of the culture that emerged among the 
first generation of internet users, who envisioned free sharing of knowledge and 
ideas, as best addressed by Lawerence Lessig in Free Culture.373 Free knowledge, 
free ideas, and naturally, free music was not something that the oligonomy was 
ready to grasp, even though recorded music had already started losing ‘wallet share’ 
since 1996, according to Will Page (former Chief Economist of PRS for music).374 
Other factors notwithstanding, the oligonomy chose to put the blame of the decline 
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of record sales exclusively on file-sharing, as it had done before in the past when 
faced with the threat of ‘piracy’. According to Cary Sherman President of the RIAA: 
 “there's no minimizing the impact of illegal file-sharing. It robs songwriters and 
recording artists of their livelihoods, and it ultimately undermines the future of 
music itself, not to mention threatening the jobs of tens of thousands.”375  
A comprehensive literature review conducted by Volker Grassmuck in 2010, 
provides a thorough overview of no less than 80 empirical studies on the impact of 
file-sharing on record sales, categorized by methodology. The studies include 
empirical observations of file-sharing, empirical modelling based on industry and 
macroeconomic data, and representative and non-representative surveys.376 In an 
attempt to tackle the issue, the only conclusive result reached by Grassmuck with 
regard to whether P2P file-sharing is responsible for the ‘slump in recorded sales’ or 
a generator of demand, is that “the empirical research literature is inconclusive.”377 
This point is more recently reaffirmed by Chong Hyun Christie Byun, who also 
argued that establishing causation between online ‘piracy’ and the decline in sales of 
the tangible product is impossible.378 
Hence, one tends to agree with the point made above that focusing on the impact 
file-sharing on record sales is quite futile. Additionally, Grassmuck’s claim that 
basing policy decisions, such as stronger copyright enforcement, on such contested 
academic evidence and diverging studies is not (and should not be) permitted, seems 
to hold merit.379  
Furthermore, a point that should be explicitly noted is that most of the empirical 
studies featuring in the review, tend to be biased towards IFPI’s interests, as for 
“piracy rates researchers and government agencies often work with data provided 
by the same industry associations.”380 Indeed, the IFPI itself finds support, and 
frequently quotes, the research conducted by Stan Liebowitz, who claimed in 2008 
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that “file-sharing appears to have caused the entire decline in record sales and 
appears to have vitiated what otherwise would have been growth in the 
industry.”381 On the antipode, the study conducted by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 
in 2007, which Liebowitz sets to refute, concluded that“downloads have an effect on 
sales that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Our estimates are 
inconsistent with claims that file sharing is the primary reason for the decline in 
music sales during our study period.”382  
Among an array of inconclusive studies, it appears that the works of Liebowitz and 
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf remained among the most cited, as the IFPI turned to 
Liebowitz’s work for quotes and support, whereas Oberholzer-Gee’s and Strumpf’s 
work points to the opposite direction.383 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the present is not to provide an elaboration of the 
studies conducted, especially since their inconclusive nature appears to be the only 
proven result. Indeed, the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) further 
acknowledged that “no one knows what the impact of ‘piracy’ on the economy is.”384 
Grassmuck’s literature review is presented to support the argument of 
inconclusiveness regarding file-sharing’s impact and to lead to two further points: 
highlight the rigorousness with which the industry, as represented by the oligonomy, 
focused on the impact of file-sharing, missing the opportunity to engage in 
alternative business model innovation and digital opportunities and further 
highlight the attempts to influence policy based on inconclusive and often 
                                                        
 
381 S Liebowitz, “Testing file-sharing’s impact on music album sales in cities” (2008) 54 (4) 
Management Science, S Liebowitz, “File-sharing: creative destruction or just plain 
destruction” (2006) 49 (1) The Journal of Law and Economics 1-28.  
382 F Oberholzer‐ Gee and K Strumpf (n 375).  
383 Grassmuck remains highly critical of Liebowitz in his review “Liebowitz, whose 2006 
paper IFPI (2010) quotes in their support, has published the largest number of papers on 
the issue. For only one of them (2008) he has conducted original empirical research. All the 
others are based on common sense, informed guesswork, deduction and selective reading of 
his colleagues' empirical work,” (n 367) 17.  
384 Ibid 12. “They interviewed representatives from U.S. government agencies, industry 
associations, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions and a multilateral 
organization (OECD) and conducted a literature search on studies published since 1999. 
The result: we determined that the U.S. government did not systematically collect data and 
perform analysis on the impacts of counterfeiting and piracy on the U.S. economy and, 
based on our review of literature and interviews with experts, we concluded that it was not 
feasible to develop our own estimates or attempt to quantify the economic impact of 






contradictory evidence, instead of introducing what Grassmuck envisions as “facts-
based, social-welfare-oriented policy,” which coincides with that Potts, 
Cunningham, and Hartley et al. had argued.  
According to Grassmuck’s concluding remarks: 
“…the alarmist rhetoric of the IFPI and other industry associations does not hold 
up to scientific scrutiny. Public policy makers should be cautious not to take their 
claims at face value and pass the panic-driven, extremist legislation they are 
demanding… Public policy makers are tasked by society with improving the 
welfare of all citizens. Policy needs to be based on facts and solid knowledge and 
directed at organizing an inclusive public negotiation about the future course of the 
digital revolution.”385  
As the issue of welfare enters the picture, the debate seems to be approaching the 
overall aim of the thesis calling for a competition law evaluation of the industry with 
respect to welfare and the promotion of innovation.  
Grassmuck remains highly dismissive of IFPI’s claims that empirical studies suggest 
the necessity for stronger protection for the creative content in the face of copyright 
reforms and the public’s ‘re-education’. IFPI also recycles intellectual property’s 
justification as a driver of creativity without which not only artists, but also creativity 
per se, and by extension society, will suffer.386  
It is argued herein that it was not piracy per se that the gatekeepers were faced with. 
Rather, it was consumer choice lying at the heart of the matter. It would further 
appear that the consumer, who remains actively engaged in the digital environment, 
opted to move away from the mass consumption of a homogeneous recorded 
product and into a more personalised way of accessing and consuming music.   
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386 Among numerous sources and policy making reports see e.g. USPTO Green paper, 
“Copyright policy, creativity, and innovation in the digital economy” July 2013 “Copyright 
law in the United States is founded on the Constitutional goal of ‘promot[ing] the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts’ by providing exclusive rights to creators. Protection by copyright 
law gives creators incentives to produce new works and distribute them to the public.” On 
the justification of IP among others, E C Hettinger “Justifying intellectual property” (1989) 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 31-52, M A Lemley “Ex ante versus ex post justifications for 
intellectual property” (2004) The University of Chicago Law Review 129-149. It is worth 
contemplating at this point on the contribution of alternative and innovatory business 
models that have emerged thanks, and pursuant, to the technologies the oligonomy 






Taking a closer look at the three hypotheses brought forward by the aggregation of 
studies in Grassmuck, it has been argued that direct copying harms and completely 
substitutes sales, that copying intensifies network or sampling effects, and that 
sharing might represent a completely differentiated cultural activity with no effect 
on sales at all.387   
Even though the three hypotheses remain to some extent conceptual, they all point 
to the direction of differentiated consumer habits outside the reach of the majors. 
Direct copying was not controlled by the industry (file-sharing sites and platforms 
are independent of the majors’ organisations) and the cultural habits of the mass 
audience with regard to file-sharing did not attract quantifiable interest by the 
majors as such. Furthermore, it was pointed out in the previous part of this chapter 
that sampling or network effects were associated with the radio, a medium the 
industry remained in close connection with, even via the employment of illegal 
means such as payola. Another promotional medium or ally was later found in the 
face of television via the MTV.388 Hence, the choice of engaging in sharing activities 
online remained outside the control of a ‘crumbling’ industry, as per Osterwalder.  
Thus, the pre-emptive and threatening measures of past encounters with disruptive 
technologies, did not seem adequate enough to address a full scale ‘disappearance’ of 
consumer base. The oligonomy’s reaction this time was representative of its 
dominant (or event arrogant) nature, with lawsuits filed against individual users,389  
legal battles against the file-sharing sites that emerged,390 expensive and extensive 
re-education campaigns, and even more lobbying.391 It could be argued that none of 
                                                        
 
387 Grassmuck draws evidence from RIAA v. Napster, 1999, and A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 2000.  
388 See e.g. R Burnett "The implications of ownership changes on concentration and diversity 
in the phonogram industry" (1992) 19 (6) Communication Research 749-769. 
389 Grassmuck referring to the IFPI "Since 2003, the industry has taken more than 100,000 
civil and criminal legal actions against individual illegal high volume file-sharers in 22 
countries," (n 367) 43.  
390 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001), MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), Sweden v Neij et al., being the most famous.  
391 Grassmuck (n 367) as above "Consumer education campaigns which include video-clips 
insulting to every reasonable viewer but also mass-criminalization (IFPI actually lists 
under ‘Consumer Education’, and law making like the ‘Three Strikes’ legislation as a ‘social 
deterrent’, depicted as creating ‘a perception of risk’ which is ‘comparable to speeding 






the above aimed to fully comprehend consumer behavior, even though the industry 
was indeed faced with a serious decline in sales of recordings in physical format in 
the past decade. 
It became evident that consumers had migrated to other practices and that re-
capturing them would necessitate more than legal threats and traditional lobbying 
activities for rigid copyright protection and enforcement in Europe, in the US, or at 
the WTO.392 The end consumers of music had ‘voted with their feet’ and ‘shunned’ 
an industry offering them a homogeneous product through top-down exposure 
means. It soon followed that other industries and markets associated with the 
provision and production of ‘music’ in the broader sense, were now ripe for 
investigation and academic and industrial attention. The first sector to attract such 
interest was the live music industry.393 
It has been established so far, and it is worth emphasising, that the oligonomy as 
supported by its business model, became almost synonymous to the notion of the 
‘music industry’, excluding ancillary industries (e.g. live music promotion) from this 
narrative. As we enter the digital era, and following the changes in the consumption 
of music, we encounter not only a nascent interest in the investigation of these 
industries, but also new and innovative entrepreneurial activities in music, 
characterised by new and innovative business models. Hence, the music industry 
unbundles into the ‘music industries’ as per Cloonan,394 in order to encompass 
ancillary ways of generating profit related to the provision of music, including 
alternative business models and by-passing the nexus of the majors, to the extent 
possible.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
citizens from the Internet for up to one year are down-played as ‘speed bumps’ and 
‘speeding fines’: IFPI treats the global society like a teenager learning to drive." 
392 Note e.g. the imposing of TRIPS upon developing members of the WTO, tying intellectual 
property rights with trade and development opportunities. Further, see e.g. G Dutfield and U 
Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law (2008).  
393 J H Mortimer, C Nosko, and A Sorensen, "Supply responses to digital distribution: 
recorded music and live performances" (2012) 24 (1) Information Economics and Policy 3-
14, Huygen et al., “Ups and downs. Economic and cultural effects of file sharing on music, 
film and games” (2009), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1350451, D Bahanovich and D 
Collopy, “Music experience and behaviour in young people” (2009) University of 
Hertfordshire, available at  http://i.content-
review.com/s/ebf223550adb6d7c64fa176200d66ec8.pdf, for UK Music.  






Referring to the music industries in plural, enables the ‘music industry’ discourse to 
de facto accommodate the business models that these ancillary industries 
incorporate. Therefore, accepting and broadening the perception of what the 
industry consists of, signals the introduction of ‘alternative’ (to the oligonomic) 
business models into the debate. Hence, the business model of live music promotion 
now becomes a business model relevant to the music industries discourse, similarly 
to online streaming and distribution models. Consequently, unbundling the music 
industry means accepting other business models as business models of the music 
industries. This is further supported by the fact that Alexander Osterwalder’s canvas 
presents the business model of Spotify as a juxtaposition to the old business model 
of the record company.395 It can be deduced that what has actually changed, is the 
very definition of the music industry, which now enables more business models to be 
accommodated, including both innovative (e.g. Spotify) and more standardised (live 
music) ones. 
Therefore, in order to bridge the gap between business model innovation and 
consumer demand and identify product markets for music in a competition law 
context, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to understanding consumer 
choices in consumption. By following this methodology, the subsequent part comes 
closer to the product market in competition law as measured by demand 
substitutability.396 
Since the oligonomic music industry was concentrated around one business model 
and one product, does it follow that the music industries are characterised by many 
business models and by many products, following changes in consumer demand? To 
address this question, the live music industry, as well as online distribution and 
streaming models are examined below. These represent alternative consumer 
consumption patterns, corresponding to new and innovative business models in a 
music industries context.  
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3.3.2 Live Music Industry: where is the consumer going?  
The first ancillary music industry to be investigated is the live music industry, as it 
has been proposed that the ‘disappearing’ customer of recorded music is migrating 
to the attendance of live music events.397 Live music promotion hardly qualifies as a 
new industry, as concerts have been promoted long before the invention of recorded 
music. However, and as explained previously, it is the unbundling of the music 
industry into the music industries that allows for the exploration of the live music 
sector and its business model.  
The reason why live music promotion features herein, is the need to examine its 
relationship with the consumer of recorded music. This relationship is vital in a 
competition law context in terms of researching substitutability. For instance, this 
substitutability could enable the placement of the recording and the concert ticket in 
the same relevant product market, which should be taken into consideration at 
competition assessment stage. Further, the examination of live music promotion 
leads to the observation that live music has been acquiring corporate interest and 
has been experimenting with business models (pointing to business model 
innovation), making live music promotion a music industry prone to the 
establishment of more gatekeepers. Ultimately, the merger between Live Nation and 
Ticketmaster is addressed in the fifth chapter and illustrates how these music 
industries and their business models are perceived by the competition authorities. 
Attention is paid to the perception of a market for music based on demand 
substitutability, building on the relationship between the recording and the live 
music ticket. The studies below help address this exact point.  
The year 1996 was mentioned as the year when the record industry started losing 
‘wallet share’, earlier in the present. Additionally, the year 1996 signals the 
establishment of the first concert ticket internet sales by Ticketmaster. It is also the 
year when concert ticket prices started growing faster than inflation.398 Moreover, 
the live music sector (or industry) starts attracting corporate attention in terms of 
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ownership. Live concert promotion starts demonstrating the first signs of high 
consolidation in the face of SFX Entertainment, a company spun off SFX 
Broadcasting Inc. In 2000, SFX became a wholly owned subsidiary of Clear Channel 
Communications, Inc.399 In 2005, Clear Channel span off its live entertainment 
sector into what was to become Live Nation, creating the world’s largest music 
company, second, at the time, only to Universal.400  
Comparing a live music promoter to a record company in terms of size comes to 
highlight the nascent importance of the sector, an unprecedented occurrence in the 
history of the industry. With the creation of Live Nation, the live music industry 
enters a phase of significant corporate presence. This presence, combined with the 
decline in sales of recordings in physical format, left room for new dynamics to be 
shaped in the relationship between the recorded music industry and the live music 
industry, or otherwise, between the business model of the music industry and the 
business models of the music industries.   
Another indicator of power consolidation in the live music industry is that tour 
promoters start expanding vertically, yet another similarity with the traditional 
oligonomy. Live Nation stated in its 2010 Annual Report401 that its mission was: 
 “to maximize the live concert experience. Our core business is producing, 
marketing and selling live concerts via our global concert pipe. Live Nation 
is…annually producing over 22,000 concerts for 1,500 artists in 57 countries. Live 
Nation is transforming the concert business by expanding its concert platform into 
ticketing and building the industry’s first artist-to-fan vertically integrated concert 
platform.”402 
This quote reveals Live Nation Entertainment’s unprecedented (for the live music 
industry) business model. Live Nation, even before the merger with Ticketmaster, 
did showcase innovation in its business model by creating a multi-sided platform 
                                                        
 
399 In 1996, SFX Broadcasting bought concert promoter Delsener/Slater. In 1998, SFX 
Entertainment, Inc. is spun off, and an exclusive deal with Ticketmaster is signed. In 2000 
Clear Channel Communications agrees to buy company, available at 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/sfx-entertainment-inc-history/.  
400 M Brennan, “Constructing a rough account of British concert promotion history” (2010) 1 
(1) IASPM Journal 4-13. 
401 The first annual report produced after the merger with Ticketmaster.  








combining all revenue generating activities around an artist’s name: concert 
promotion, ticketing (post-merger), sponsorship and advertising, and artists’ 
management (including selling merchandise).403 Engaging in all of these activities 
simultaneously and requesting a part of both the artists’ and the consumers’ income 
signals the existence of a multi-sided platform. In business model terms, this is 
characterised by multiple customer segments, each with its corresponding value 
proposition and revenue stream.404 As such, Live Nation Entertainment (hereafter 
LNE) offers fans to artists, artists to fans, and target audience to advertisers, whilst 
generating income from various revenue streams including both copyright-related 
and trademark related profits e.g. merchandise.  
It appears that the live music industry is facing innovation in terms of business 
modelling, almost reminiscent of the first days of the recorded industry, which 
created a business model sustainable of gatekeepers. However, it would be 
interesting to consider and question whether the existence of LNE, with its 
unprecedented portfolio of artists and activities, managed to monopolise the market 
for the ‘all around artist experience’ before the creation of an oligonomy was 
possible. This point is furthered when the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger case is 
reviewed, as the author argues that the definition of an accurate relevant product 
market for the activities of LNE was not possible, given that the market for its 
product was nascent at the time of the merger.405 However, in order to reach this 
point, it is crucial to investigate the financial importance of the live music industry 
in terms of consumer demand.  
As this section aims to identify whether there exists a product market whereby music 
related products are interchangeable form the consumers’ point of view, the issue of 
consumer choice comes again to the limelight. For instance, in 2014 Nielsen reports 
                                                        
 
403 Live Nation Annual Reports, http://investors.livenationentertainment.com/investor-
relations/. Live Nation first tested the 360 degree deals waters with Korn in 2005 “Live 
Nation paid Korn $3m, plus a share of concessions and parking fees at Live Nation venues, 
in return for a 6 percent share of Korn’s income from touring, licensing, publishing, 
merchandising and record sales” in L Marshall, “The 360 deal and the ‘new’ music industry” 
(2013) 16 (1) European Journal of Cultural Studies 77-99.  
404 Business Model Generation (n 21) 87. The digital economy seems to favour multi-sided 
platforms such as iTunes and Spotify.  
405 Which raises the issue of whether the creative industries bear similarities with the 
technological innovation sector, where competition takes place for the market rather than in 






indicated that consumers allocate 35 percent of their total music related spending in 
live concerts, whereas twelve percent are purchasing CDs, and fifteen percent are 
purchasing digital tracks and albums (combined), with music subscriptions 
following at nine percent.406 
A logical question follows suit: is the consumer leaving the record store to attend a 
concert? Has the consumption of music changed to such a degree that a concert 
ticket obtains the record’s lost ‘wallet share’? What is the relationship between the 
record and the concert ticket, or more pointedly, between recorded music consumed 
in any format and the concert ticket? 
 From the point of view of the artist, a loss of income in recording royalties would 
signal the need to supplement any income lost through touring activities, 
corroborating the complementarity of the record and the concert ticket and 
justifying the existence of 360 degree deals.  
Creatively enough, the theory on complementarity was named after a quote by the 
late David Bowie: 
“I’m fully confident that copyright will no longer exist in 10 years, and authorship 
and intellectual property is in for such a bashing. Music is going to become like 
running water or electricity…. You’d better be prepared for doing a lot of touring 
because that’s really the only unique situation that’s going to be left.”407 
Alan Kruger coined the ‘Bowie Theory’ in 2005, arguing that concerts are 
complementary products to records and therefore a decline in the artists’ income 
from recordings accelerates an increase in ticket prices. Connolly and Krueger see 
the acceleration of ticket prices as “the problem of a firm with two complementary 
outputs, concert seats and record albums and monopoly power in both markets.”408 
If greater concert attendance has a positive effect on the income generated by record 
royalties, the artist will retain ticket prices below the single monopoly price. 
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Complementarity between concerts and recorded music has been further supported 
by the sampling effect listening to music has on gaining familiarity with an artist 
before attending their live performance. Further, it has been supported by the 
existence of 360 degrees and other multiple right deals that allow music industry 
companies a share of an artist’s all potential revenue streams.409 The existence of 
such deals generates substantial room for thought on the complementary between 
several music products and on the unpredictability in consumption. Since 
consumers allocate their wallet share differently than in the past, the music 
industries should be in position to capture it through expanding their offers across a 
spectrum of products consumers can switch to. Indeed, recent studies conclude that 
an integrated business model combining several revenue streams is preferred, 
should legal alternatives to file-sharing become sufficiently unimportant, indicating 
positive indirect network effects from the record to the concert and vice versa.410 
More recent studies and economic theory consider the perfect substitution between 
digital files and physical copies of music and reaffirm that concerts, merchandise, 
specialty box sets, and vinyl editions of recordings, constitute perfect complements 
generating the majority of the artists’ income.411 However, it is important to note 
that substitution effects towards live music from the consumers’ point of view have 
also been observed within a household production level, an observation that further 
attests the rationale towards a single firm controlling both outputs.412 
Moreover, substitution effects from a consumer’s perspective will be more evident 
when several products for music compete for an individual’s wallet share; 
researchers have observed that for more frequent consumers of music, or ‘music 
lovers’, the need for music is in effect a need for information, which can be satisfied 
by various means, whether by listening to music as a leisure activity or by attending 
a concert.413 In the case of illegal file-sharing, whereby the consumption of recorded 
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Cult Econ 1-12. 
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music does not require an allocation of the consumer’s income, an increase of 
average live concert attendance can be estimated, albeit to a limited extent and only 
for average consumers of music (exposition effect).414  
In terms of empirical research, the live music industry appeared in studies as early 
as 2003, with Liebowitz finding a real increase in concert revenues in the US 
between 2000 and 2001.415 Additionally, one of the first studies to explicitly deal 
with the impact of file-sharing on the live music industry was conducted by 
Mortimer and Sorensen in 2005, who concluded that “for artists, the decline in 
revenues from recorded music after 1998 is striking, but appears to have been 
more than offset by a concomitant increase in concert revenues.”416 
Furthermore, in 2011 Montoro-Pons and Cuadrado-Garcia noted the existence of 
complementarities between the two markets, however only from pre-recorded music 
towards live concert attendance, since the latter does not seem to influence the 
former in their research.417 Their research segments frequent and averages users 
(consumers) of music and the results in the two groups present differentiations, 
especially with regard to the inclination towards recorded music consumption. A 
more frequent ‘music lover’s’ needs will be satisfied by both pre-recorded and live 
music, whereas an average user will opt for either the one or the other, depending on 
additional variables such as social motivation.418  
Overall, these researchers reaffirm the Bowie theory and conclude by providing an 
economic rationale for the live music sector to subsidise the recorded music one, an 
observation that is also supported by the existence of multiple rights or 360 degrees 
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deals419 and by the plethora of streaming services and similar business models 
currently on offer. The complementary between live and recorded music 
consumption highlights a relationship between the sectors that was not researched 
during the ‘old business model’ days of the oligonomy, at least not to an extent that 
would justify subsidisation or would suggest the existence of network effects.  
However, further research should be conducted as regards the substitution effect 
that views music as a need to be satisfied, or as a unified concept. In a “world that 
loves their artists more than it loves buying their records”420 offering an 
‘experience’ the way that Live Nation described in its annual statement, can be 
viewed as offering a new product in the consumption of music: 
It was explained earlier in the present that the oligonomy operated a successful 
business model around the provision of a homogeneous product to a mass audience 
and that success was established through integration and consolidation. Now that 
new business models appear to be operating in the music industries, offering new 
opportunities for integration and consolidation among a series of substitute and 
complementary products, it is worth considering if the resulting product of these 
business models is ‘the music experience’, the value of which gets encapsulated 
through patterns like the 360 degree deals or similar industrial practices of 
subsidisation.   
Similar observations have been made by Leyshon et al. at the beginning of the so-
defined ‘crisis’ of the recorded music industry. The authors argued that music has 
infiltrated the capitalistic paradigm, which demands and fosters alternative patters 
of consumption, similar to the emergence of the club culture in the early 1990s.  
Traits and characteristics of this are the provision of a musical experience that 
cannot be duplicated in private, the cross-selling of music on adjacent media 
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platforms often belonging to the same conglomerate at the expense of content, and 
the competition listening to music faces in the face of other leisure activities (e.g. 
leisure time spent on the internet).421 Even though the specific research focuses on 
the survival of the industry’s old business model, these observations with regard to 
the consumption of music also provide an insight into changes in consumer 
perception and choice: consumer mobility is evidenced towards seeking a music 
‘experience’, like in the case of the dance club, the festival, or as a spin-off of leisure 
time spent on the internet.   
In emerging business models, as the ones seeking to internalise the external effects 
described above, consumer demand appears to drive and affect change, making it 
financially viable for a single firm to control multiple outputs. Competition law can 
‘get involved’ depending on the end consumer’s appreciation of this evolving market.  
If consumers have the ability to substitute between products in order to consume the 
musical experience ‘no matter how’, then substitution effects prevail. If, on the other 
hand, consumers need to be exposed to the recording prior to attending a concert, or 
allocate their income to collectors’ items, box sets, and other memorabilia, then 
complementarity is supported. Both scenarios appear to hold merit and further 
empirical research is recommended in both fields, despite the limitations previous 
studies seem to have faced.  
Nevertheless, for single firms in the music industries controlling the consumers’ 
music-related budget is an issue of priority. Since it was consumer behaviour that 
drove physical copies’ prices close to zero (either directly as a result of file-sharing or 
as a consequence of alternative consumption patterns), being able to offer diverse 
music products and ‘listen’ to consumer demands, is the way forward. Thus, being in 
position to provide a music offering to the consumer, requires an all-inclusive 
industrial activity, able to accommodate alternating patterns of value creation, 
delivery, and capture, or in other words, alternating business models.422 
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It is hereby posited that these effects and patterns merit further attention, as we 
move towards a competition law narrative and an investigation into a demand-side 
chain of substitutability in competition law-defined relevant product markets. In any 
event, the existence of network effects, complementarity, and substitution effects, as 
well as the unpredictability of the shape the market for music can take following 
business models such as LNE’s, should already act as a red flag for competition 
authorities, wishing to investigate anticompetitive practices or mergers in the music 
industries.  
Indeed, from a competition law perspective, we are moving past the market where 
the product is considered homogeneous, to an industry where differentiated 
products can be considered interchangeable from the point of view of the end 
consumer. Moreover, in the past fifteen years the oligonomy managed to reduce its 
size considerably, following yet another series of mergers and divestiture, whereas 
other important players arose through mergers and acquisitions and via the 
hardware sector (e.g. Live Nation, Apple’s iTunes). However, for the first time this 
series of changes in the music world is met with the maturity of competition regimes 
in both the US and the EU. Hence, the change in consumption patterns presented 
above is key in understanding and investigating the cases that follow in the next 
chapters, where the relevant authorities seek to describe immense industrial and 
business model change, while making use of the pre-existing product market 
definition and competitive assessment toolkits.  
Thus, before proceeding with an overall estimation of creativity and innovation in 
the music industries, it is worth repeating that this overview of consumption 
identified more business models that are relevant to the music industries discourse 
and signaled a departure from the homogeneous product of hit music towards a 
more holistic music experience. The market for music is therefore characterised by 
dynamic consumption patterns, permitting the investigation of the music industries 
from a competition law perspective in a manner similar to other dynamic industries, 
where the market worth monopolising is a product of innovation. Indeed, the 
existence of multiple business models means that the old music business model of 






By extension, this realisation should feature in the competitive analysis of the music 
industries of today. It follows that the absence of such an analysis means that a 
change in competition policy is required.  
 
3.4 Conclusions on business models in the music industries: an assessment of 
creativity and innovation  
To summarise, it is important to identify and highlight once more the existence and 
importance of alternative business models in the field of the music industries, as per 
the first chapter of the thesis. The emergence and existence of various business 
models seeking to capture and deliver value to consumer segments is vital in 
identifying creativity and innovation in a business context. 
As such, it was deemed important to identify first and foremost, how the music 
industry switched to a music industries narrative, which further signals the existence 
of multiple business models associated with music in industrial terms. The live 
music industry was presented as an industry that gained substantial academic and 
corporate interest and displayed innovative business modelling e.g. in the face of 
Live Nation Entertainment. Moreover, the existence of 360 degree deals was 
mentioned as an example of the need to capture the consumer’s wallet share by re-
shaping the relevant business models. This example also pointed to the 
interchangeability between various products of the music industries as perceived by 
the end consumer. Nevertheless, these deals were included in the research as an 
example of industrial response to demand change, in other words as evidence of 
business model innovation.423 
360 degree deals aside, business model innovation is more often than not associated 
with the emergence of new players in content delivery, such as iTunes and Spotify,424 
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as also presented by the Business Model Generation authors.425  Both Apple, 
through iTunes, and Spotify were able to capture the consumer of music by 
appreciating the choice of listening to music online, and more recently ‘accessing 
content online’; a practice which, according to Keith Negus, characterises the new 
consumer of music. According to the author:  
“the new music consumer is ambivalent about the plight of musicians and seeks 
access to their recordings rather than wishing to own them.”426  
Even though Keith Negus’ perception of the modern consumer appears paradoxical 
compared to the consumer who “loves the artists more than their records,” one 
thing remains clear: the end consumer has devaluated the purchase of the CD and 
has turned to alternative methods of consumption. Keith Negus describes content 
access to some extent, commenting on the unbundling of albums into singles, the 
practice of skipping through songs that do not attract immediate attention, and the 
enlarged consumer involvement through user-generated content (parodies, mash-
ups etc.).427 All of the above correspond with the digital culture of participation, 
signalling that consuming a product as in the analogue age is no longer preferred 
and that the firms to survive are the ones tailoring their business model around this 
realisation. The internet, as the largest bottom-up tool in history, came to highlight 
the role of the end consumer of various creative and media industries, either by 
exemplifying pre-existing patterns, or by providing new and de-centralised ways of 
participation in the creative process.  
The traditional oligonomy with its immense power and influence, controlled the 
cultural output for music unilaterally, demonstrating a corporate top-down 
approach to the production and distribution of music. Traditionally, there was 
limited if any communication between end consumer and industry, since “audiences 
have historically been separated or disclosed from most of the sites of musical 
production.”428 Only the 1950s were discussed as an era when consumer choices did 
not align directly with the majors’ product on offer. However, the majors’ ability to 
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internalise and satisfy demand led to the reinforcement of their corporate structures. 
This meant that they continued being delineated from their customer base, offering 
their homogeneous and generic product top-down.  
Direct interaction between consumers and producers of music remains absent until 
the digital era, which offers unprecedented opportunities for communication 
between fans, artists, and the music industries. Firstly, with the widespread 
popularity of file-sharing and the alternative patters of consumption, consumers 
indicated that the desired method of consuming a product for music was no longer 
the purchase of physical recordings. Even though this led to aggressive reactions 
from the part of the oligonomy, others saw an early opportunity to capture several 
customer segments and offer them value propositions.429  
It is important to note how Ostewalder in his keynote speech, presents “young 
connected music fans” as one of Spotify’s customer segments.430 ‘Connected’ is 
employed to point to the overall behaviour of the consumer online (since the days of 
the first P2P networks) and to the digital culture of direct participation and sharing. 
Hence, no longer a homogeneous mass-marketed product, music is being re-
evaluated as a holistic experience the value of which depends on consumer 
perception and involvement, implying network effects. In the aggregate, social 
network effects have been observed in the broader creative industries by Potts, 
Cunningham et al., since 2008.431 
Thus, a pattern can be observed in the face of consumer-generated changes in 
business models. Consumers either demand an enhanced musical ‘experience’ and 
blur the lines between product substitutability and complementarity. It appears that 
the most neglected segment of a traditional top-down industry has been equipped 
with the unprecedented power to demand and generate value, or demand and 
generate new and alternative business models. Indeed, in the creative industries 
discourse it has been acknowledged that such value co-creation in the broader digital 
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platforms of the digital era, namely iTunes and Spotify. He suggests that multiple customer 
segments, offers, and revenue streams require connections through the platform. 
430 Ibid (n 52). Advertisers constitute a customer segment as well. 
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environment and in online social network platforms, blurs production and 
consumption relationships, since consumers are reconfigured as: 
“drivers of wealth production and innovative creativity. No longer at the end of the 
value chain, consuming what is offered up by professionals, consumers now 
generate value with their activities actively pursued and harnessed” by corporate 
interests.432  
As the broader creative sector has been found to operate with the experimental use 
of technology, the development of new content, and the creation of new business 
models, the active role of the consumer therein asserts what Hartley et al. call ‘public 
investment in innovation’ approach, which they juxtapose against the old business 
model, designed top-down.433 They argue that ‘public investment in innovation’ 
marks a shift from a traditional cultural and industrial perspective, towards an 
innovation and competition policy, based on an evolutionary growth rhetoric. “An 
innovation is not an innovation,” they argue, unless it is “widely adopted into a 
social order, such as it changes the underlying market and even industrial 
order.”434 
As the present chapter attempted to address this point, it was shown that the music 
industry moved from a traditional old model and industrial order to an era of 
consumer-led change, innovation, and evolution, which demands the design of new 
policies. Until now, the change in the underlying market structure was presented 
alongside the theoretical need to re-address innovation and competition in the 
music industries, as part of the broader creative sector. 
Nevertheless, in order to provide an insightful and analytical overview of the 
changes in the music sector and attest the role competition law is called to play, the 
thesis examines the appreciation of the music industries by the competition 
authorities called to assess both the old business model and the emerging ones. 
Thus, having established the need for competition policy in theory through the 
relevant literature, the thesis turns to the view of the authorities called to implement 
competition law per se. This way, the gap between the business reality and the legal 
reality gets noticed and the main question of the thesis can get answered: is there a 
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role for competition law and policy in the music industries? The answer is 
affirmative, as confirmed by both the preceding and the two forthcoming chapters.  
In practice, the next two chapters examine the way that the industry has been 
perceived by the relevant competition authorities and ask whether this perception 
has changed in the new business environment. In other words: do legislation and 










Pursuant to the presentation of business model evolution in the music industries 
and the signalling of potential competition law concerns that may arise, the second 
part proceeds with the examination of the business model(s) from the point of view 
of the competition authorities in the relevant cases and investigations. In this sense, 
the third chapter of the thesis acted as the background against which the authorities’ 
appreciation of the industries can be measured.  
It was presented in the previous chapter that the recorded music industry acted as 
an oligonomy with strong gatekeepers, who controlled the provision and the 
distribution of the musical product to the mass audience, the consumer. This in turn 
reflected a business model that remained unchanged and only started to alter at its 
core following the emergence of stronger consumer choice in consumption in the 
digital era. The consumer patterns identified in the previous chapter signalled the 
existence of various business models in the music industries, as per the narrative 
employed in the relevant research of the music sector. Furthermore, they signalled 
the existence of blurred lines of substitutability and complementarity from the point 
of view of the end consumer, whose role is being re-configured in the digital era, 
moving past the impression of the mass audience, meaning past the perception of a 
passive recipient of a cultural product designed top-down. 
It is therefore suggested that these patterns of complementarity and substitutability 
in consumption are relevant in a competition law discussion of the music industries, 
as they signal product markets for music distinct from those traditionally defined 
under the old business model. As per the rationale of the thesis, a change from a 
business model narrative to business models one, translates into a change in the 
product offered. This product should be taken into consideration by the relevant 
competition authorities and policy makers.  
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Since the previous chapter was designed to examine and analyse the business reality 
of the music industries past and present, the proceeding ones continue with the 
examination and the analysis of both the ex post (Chapter 4) and the ex ante 
(Chapter 5) attempts of competition and regulatory authorities to define markets 
and assess competition in the music industries. Consequently, this part of the 
research aims to examine how the dominant business model of the music industry 
has been perceived by the competition authorities and the courts (US and EU) in the 
relevant market investigations (UK) and merger cases (EU and US). It is shown that 
the authorities have failed to identify the bottleneck created around the provision of 
the music product, which has left the end consumer disenfranchised, even though 
this issue only became apparent rather recently, namely after the induction in the 
digital era; an era marked by market failure.  
Firstly, as stated in the third chapter of the thesis, the recorded music industry 
received little ex post attention by the competition authorities compared to its 
consolidated power and oligonomic nature. This chapter turns to the few 
occurrences, when the nature of the oligonomy was scrutinised by the authorities of 
the US and the UK, with the EU following in the fifth chapter.436 
In this vein, the fourth chapter commences with a closer look at the infamous payola 
scandals, a topic introduced in terms of its antitrust dimensions. The fourth chapter 
addresses the issue of payola on the radio, as this offers a regulatory perspective into 
the business model itself: the history of the radio is tied to the history of the 
recorded music industry, since the licensing of new stations in 1947437 was found to 
provide the oligonomy with a strong key channel and partnership, as per 
Osterlwader. The existence of payola sheds further light into this key channel and 
assesses the dynamics of this established practice. Therefore, examining instances of 
regulation and deregulation in the US radio, means assessing regulation in the 
business model, where the radio strongly features. As such, the analysis reveals how 
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the radio reconfigures the importance of reaching and addressing the mass audience 
and justifies the business model that Osterwalder presents. It appears that the 
world’s most mature antitrust jurisdiction (the US) through its policy reconfigures 
the dominant traits and characteristics of the old business model as designed top-
down for the mass audience and as subject to ‘oligonomisation’ by few key players. 
Hence, any regulatory or deregulatory intervention in the radio has consequences in 
consumption of music, as established in the third chapter.   
Furthermore, focusing on the power of the deregulated radio in the US following the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, enables the emergence of an additional key player 
in the music industries: the former parent of Live Nation Entertainment, Clear 
Channel Communications.438 This way, the live music industry is presented as an 
industry also subject to gatekeepers and prone to vertical integration. Thus, 
examining the regulation/deregulation and the American radio, addresses the way 
the authorities reconfigure the business model directly (channels) and helps identify 
the bottleneck created around the music product and explain further trends to 
consolidation. Hence, this examination offers a vital introduction into the 
competitive assessment of the business model, by considering its most (or only) 
regulated part.  
Leaving the payola investigations, the fourth chapter proceeds with the evaluation of 
the recorded industry per se. It was concluded in the previous chapter that, inter 
alia, the structure of the market for recorded music and the supply of the tangible 
product (the recording) is designed top-down towards mass consumption and that 
the product is identified as homogeneous. Naturally, the business model built 
around the provision of this homogeneous product, as well the power of the firms 
supplying it, did not go completely ‘unnoticed’ by the competition authorities, as the 
cases and investigations analysed attest. 
Chapter four looks at the first full-length investigation into the provision of recorded 
music by the FTC that lasted from 1962 until 1969, when Columbia’s appeal was 
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heard.439 This investigation coincides with a point in history when the business 
model of the recorded music industry entered a phase of growth and establishment 
per se. It is therefore crucial for the present thesis to evaluate how the business 
model is perceived, by focusing on the way that the relevant product market is 
defined in this first occurrence.440 
Leaving the US, the thesis proceeds with the investigation carried out by the UK 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (hereafter MMC) in 1994.441 The investigation 
produced a report into the anticompetitive behaviour of the oligonomy with respect 
to the provision of pre-recorded music. This report can be compared against the 
findings of the MMC’s American counterparts, in order to analyse the understanding 
of the business model and the resulting product in both jurisdictions.442 This 
investigation enables the evaluation of both sides of the oligonomy, as it addresses 
not only the supply of the recordings to the mass market, but also the oligopsony 
towards artists (exclusivity in artists’ contracts is also part of the investigation). 
Therefore, MMC’s attempts to appreciate the business model around the supply of 
the recorded music, allow for a thorough examination of the UK competition 
framework’s ability to deal with the oligonomy at that time. As such, it answers the 
question of whether the competition authorities have been able to ‘read’ through the 
industry and identify the bottleneck around the music product from a UK 
perspective.  
To conclude, the assessment of the anticompetitive investigation in the recorded 
music industry (and the radio) sheds light into the intervention attempts of the US 
                                                        
 
439 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., and Columbia Recordclub, Inc., Petitioners, v. 
Federal Trade Commission, Respondent, 414 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1969). 
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441 Monopolies and Mergers Commission The supply of recorded music London HMSO (Cm 
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442 The FTC has more recently (2000) investigated price-fixing in CDs, FTC Press release, 
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Pitofsky et al., “In the Matter of Time Warner; Sony Music Entertainment; Capitol Records; 
d.b.a EMI Music Distribution; Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp. and UMG 
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and the UK authorities. The ex post investigations into these anticompetitive 
practices reconfigure the oligonomic nature of the recorded music industry, as both 
a seller’s (oligonomy) and a buyer’s (oligopsony)443 market is observed. Thus, the 
aim is to identify and support the creation of a bottleneck around the supply of the 
music product, which leads to a market failure significant enough to justify 
intervention, as per the aim of the thesis. The ex post chapter tries to assess exactly 
this: did the authorities realise and highlight this arising problem as such? 
A further point that this chapter aims to highlight, is the stated aim behind 
competition policy that each investigation reveals. Thus, it is important to assess not 
only how the competition authorities have intervened in the past but also why. Since 
the purpose of the thesis is to assess the need for apt competition policy, this chapter 
attempts to look for the intentions behind the intervention in conjunction with the 
prevailing rationale for competition policy each time (and in each jurisdiction).  
Lastly, when it comes to the ex post investigations, the thesis further attempts a 
slight leap forward in time, in order to offer a holistic appreciation of the topic, as IP 
licensing is discussed with regard to the Columbia investigation. Further, 
anticompetitive concerns with respect to artists’ contracts that are still relevant 
today, are being introduced to illustrate how these compelling issues were by-passed 
when the investigations took place.  
Moving forward from the ex post investigations, the fifth chapter is dedicated to the 
evaluation of the major merger cases examined by the competition authorities in the 
US and the EU. The merger cases are being treated separately in order to highlight 
their predictive ex ante nature444 and in order to focus on relevant product market 
definition in more detail. Emphasis is placed on both merger cases that follow 
business model innovation, allowing for the assessment of new relevant product 
markets, and on mergers addressing the traditional business model operating top-
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highlighted by the case of George Michael in Panayiotou and Others v Sony Music 
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down. Pursuant to the third chapter of the thesis, where consumer behaviour 
identified substitution and complementarity patterns, it becomes crucial to 
investigate and assess how the relevant product market has been defined in the 
merger case of the music industries in the past (under the dominant business 
model), as well as more recently.  
When examining the merger cases, the fifth chapter adopts the following structure: 
firstly, the rationale behind merger control is introduced and is subsequently applied 
to the case in hand, secondly, the nature of the merger is identified with a focus on 
the affected market; and thirdly, the analysis proceeds with the evaluation of the 
competitive assessment. The competitive assessment is examined in line with the 
purpose of the overall thesis, which is to appreciate the business model investigated 
each time and, subsequently, to assess how the competition authorities envision a 
competitive market for music. In other words, the aim is to highlight what makes a 
competitive music industry according to the authorities and evaluate if the end 
consumers’ interests are served.  
Thus, the forthcoming chapters address the following: to what extent have the 
competition authorities in the jurisdictions under investigation managed to assess 
changes in business models accurately? It is argued that if the competition 
authorities have not been accurate in their appreciation of the business model and 
consequently, of the resulting relevant product market, then inevitable errors in 
competition assessment can follow.  
At this point, the thesis evaluates this hypothesis consulting primary and secondary 
material from the jurisdictions identified above and aims to shed light into the 
following points by the end of the fifth chapter: the regulatory attempts into the key 
channel of the music industries, the radio, and the outcomes of the payola scandals 
for both the radio and the music industries, the previous ex post attempts to 
intervene in the music industries, their rationale and their outcomes, the markets for 
music as identified in the relevant cases, the alignment of product markets to 
business models in the historical timeline; and lastly, the accuracy of competition, 
regulatory authorities and lawmakers in their attempts to evaluate the business 






The purpose of these chapters is to provide the evidence needed for the thesis to 
reach its conclusion and addresses the main research question asking whether a 
need for intervention does actually exist, by evaluating the relationship between 
competition law, business models, and the music industries. Have the intervention 
attempts been ‘fit’ for an industry of such an oligonomic nature? Has the absence or 
the failure of interference been consistent with the industry’s growth and its 
innovation patterns? And, after all, what is the ‘music industry’ and what is the role 










4 ‘The Spirit of Radio’: Assessing the Business Models of the Music Industries 
from the Perspective of the Competition Authorities ex post 
 
“One likes to believe in the freedom of music, but glittering prizes 
and endless compromises 
shatter the illusion 
of integrity” 
Rush, 1980  
 
 
4.1 Oligonomy and the radio: intervention by proxy?  
4.1.1 ‘Pay me my money down’  
Examining payola enables the present chapter to commence with the evaluation of 
the old business model from the authorities’ and the lawmakers’ perspective, 
starting with the radio that Alexander Osterwalder places under channels on his 
canvas. The relationship between the recorded music industry and the radio was 
introduced in the previous chapter; however, this section offers an insight into this 
relationship from a legal perspective, expanding on the payola scandals. A brief 
introduction to payola was offered in the previous chapters in anticipation of its 
‘unfolding’ in a competition law context. Thus, the discussion is now ready to delve 
into the more substantial issues surrounding payola.   
 As per the previous chapter, payola had been a well-established practice in the 
music industries since the days of Gilbert and Sullivan and later of Tin Pan Alley. 
Various big bands and other artists would perform songwriters’ music live in 
exchange for money, which in turn would boost the sales of sheet music. Hence, it 






when the publishers controlled the music business,445 inevitably acting as a 
significant barrier to entry.  
With the advent of the radio came the realisation that this mass medium can offer 
unprecedented exposure opportunities not only to the publishers of sheet music, but 
also to the recorded music industry as a direct result of the first wave of radio 
deregulation.446 Adding to this key relationship, the role of the disc jockey (the DJ) 
was highlighted as a worth-bribing gatekeeper, who could control the musical output 
towards the audience. Of equal importance was the introduction of the predominant 
airplay format in the 1950s, namely the playlist consisting of the Top 40 most 
popular hits.447  
The economic rationale behind pay-for-play or, more commonly payola,448 has been 
accurately summarised by Patryk Galuzska and can be easily deduced from the 
above: reasons include the scarcity of radio time as further intensified by practices 
such as the Top 40 format, the risk assumed in breaking and promoting new hits 
that the listeners were unfamiliar with, and the win-win situation for both the record 
company and the radio station, when audience and costumers get attracted thanks 
to the repetition of popular music.449 It becomes clear that the record company 
needs the radio in order to break and promote hit songs, since music, as a cultural 
product, is an experience good that requires sampling by the prospective customer.  
All of these reasons made payola not only a popular but also a sustainable practice in 
the recorded music industry, necessary for the survival of both the radio station and 
the record company.  
As Ronald Coase explained in 1979, payola practices were initially more popular 
among smaller labels, who found a more direct way to compete with the majors in 
the 1950s.450 It was presented in the previous chapter that the majors in the years 
that followed the Second World War, refused to cater for the fans of niche genres 
such as rhythm and blues and rock’n’roll and that consequently, the market was 
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ready for the emergence of smaller labels dedicated to the promotion of the new 
sounds. The latter often followed practices guaranteed to generate radio exposure, 
such as payola.451 Coase suggests that the investigations into payola practices were 
partly triggered by the majors, who in an attempt to re-gain their market shares, 
complained against these ‘immoral’ business practices from the part of labels 
affiliated with the ‘vile’ rock’n’roll sound.452 Coupled with the respective ‘war’ 
between the collecting societies at the time,453 the matter led to an official series of 
investigations in the late 1950s, as introduced in the previous chapter.  
The scandals of the bribed DJs in the 1950s were revealed pursuant to investigations 
by the US Congress and the FCC. As a result, Section 317 of the Communications Act 
1934 was amended in 1960,454 specifying under which conditions the receipt of 
consideration with the requirement to make a relevant announcement on the radio 
was legal and making the disclosure of consideration received by radio station 
employees (the DJs) obligatory.455 These requirements however, became 
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454 It is reminded that the third chapter also discussed the adoption of the relevant Trade 
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that time (n 323 & n 324).  
455 47 U.S.C. § 317. (a)  Disclosure of person furnishing   
(1)   All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money, service or other 
valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted 
by, the station so broadcasting, from any person, shall, at the time the same is so 
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Provided, That “service or other valuable consideration” shall not include any service or 
property furnished without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, 
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reasonably related to the use of such service or property on the broadcast.  
(2)   Nothing in this Section shall preclude the Commission from requiring that an 
appropriate announcement shall be made at the time of the broadcast in the case of any 
political program or any program involving the discussion of any controversial issue for 
which any films, records, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other material or service of any 
kind have been furnished, without charge or at a nominal charge, directly or indirectly, as 
an inducement to the broadcast of such program.  
(b)  Disclosure to station of payments   
In any case where a report has been made to a radio station, as required by Section 508 of 
this title, of circumstances which would have required an announcement under this Section 
had the consideration been received by such radio station, an appropriate announcement 
shall be made by such radio station. 
(c)  Acquiring information from station employees   
The licensee of each radio station shall exercise reasonable diligence to obtain from its 






considerably relaxed in the following years through the FCC’s administrative 
hearings, resulting in the infamous ‘friendship exception’, under which social 
exchanges among friends do not constitute payola,456 leaving outsourced 
independent promotion by ‘hit brokers’ virtually untouched by the law.457 It follows 
that pay-for-play was not eliminated from the radio, as the anti-payola legislation 
was not rigorously enforced and the practice itself was not illegal. In any event, the 
US authorities appeared more concerned with payola when it was accompanied by 
tax evasion, a finding revealed by the initial investigations in 1959.458  
In the same vein, the role of the independent promoter became even more important 
in the 1970s, pursuant to the enactment of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) Act in 1971.459 Record companies could potentially be 
prosecuted by the US government and face criminal liability “if found to aid, abet, 
counsel, command, induce or procure acts of payola; or if found to have wilfully 
caused an act of payola.”460 Thus, record companies chose to contract the services of 
independent promoters that would sign purposely vague contracts in order for the 
former to avoid knowledge and consequently, liability.461  
This new triadic relationship came under investigation in the 1980s, with the second 
wave of ‘payola scandals’ triggered by the role of the independent promoters.462 The 
rekindled interest in payola highlighted not only that the practice had not been 
abandoned, but also that it had moved to the highest levels of the corporate 
hierarchy in record companies and radio stations, taking the form of extensive 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
program or program matter for broadcast, information to enable such licensee to make the 
announcement required by this Section. 
(d)  Waiver of announcement   
The Commission may waive the requirement of an announcement as provided in this 
Section in any case or class of cases with respect to which it determines that the public 
interest, convenience, or necessity does not require the broadcasting of such announcement. 
456 In re Applications of Kaye-Smith Enter., 71 F.C.C. 2d 1402, 1408 (1979).  
457 J G Sidak and D E Kronemyer, “The ‘new payola’ and the American record industry: 
transaction costs and precautionary ignorance in contracts for illicit services” (1987) 10 Harv 
LJ & Pub Pol’y 521.  
458 K L Repyneck, “The ghost of Alan Freed: an analysis of the merit and purpose of anti-
payola laws in today's music industry” (2006) 51 The VillLRev 695. 
459 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 
(1970) [at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2005)].  
460 See Sidak and Kronemyer (n 457) 537-538 in Repyneck (n 458) 709.  
461 Ibid.  






nation-wide promotional campaigns: independent middlemen were even 
distributing drugs and cash in exchange for airplay, whether this paid-for airplay 
was actual or just on paper.463 If anything, being able to offer bribes of this nature, 
suggests that the barrier to entry became progressively higher.  
It seems that the recorded music industry would indeed go into great lengths to 
guarantee the promotion and the exposure necessary for the making of new hit 
music. It follows that a lot of money was invested, or even lost, in the process of 
‘breaking’ hit singles. Even though RIAA attempted to tackle payola by launching an 
investigation between 1985 and 1986, no single record company would appear eager 
to singlehandedly oppose payola and abandon it, as this would result in the other 
players of the oligonomy gaining the advantage, should they choose to continue the 
practice.464 Hence, the vicious circle of quasi-blackmailing continued throughout the 
1980s, the 1990s, and in the 2000s, with the so-called ‘Sony scandals’.465  
Further, the business model of the recorded music industry itself appears to have 
paved the way for the sustainability of payola, as it is based on the promotion and 
the distribution of music products the success of which ‘nobody knows.’466 Since less 
than fifteen percent of all records recoup and become successful,467 promoting music 
via the radio eliminates the uncertainty factor substantially, adding to the 
indispensability of the radio for the business model. Moreover, once the successful 
album has recouped its initial cost, the marginal cost of production of additional 
units falls dramatically, guaranteeing immense profits for the record company. 
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Therefore, even if the expenses of paid promotion appear ‘extortionate’, the prospect 
of a ‘superstar’ makes the costs worth assuming.  
Lastly, the high concentration of the majors gives them almost exclusive access to 
radio promotion,468 a realisation that prevented them from forgoing payola in the 
past, for fear that a minor label with access to funds could ‘step in’ and threaten their 
market share.469 It was indeed argued in the previous chapter, as well as by Bishop 
who discussed concentration and the oligonomy’s gatekeeper function,470 that 
competition among the majors for the ‘lion’s share’ is fierce, even if they do operate 
as a tight oligonomy. Payola practices further point to that direction and highlight 
the majors’ coordination in promoting their common interests.  
This was also evident in the investigations launched in 2004 into all the majors at 
the time by the Attorney General of the State of New York Eliot Spitzer,471 who 
sought Assurance of Discontinuance for commercial bribery,472 even though the 
balance of liability had shifted towards the independent promoters since the 
1970s.473 Indeed, the Attorney General actually noted in the first paragraph of the 
Sony BMG investigation that “the practices…are pervasive within the music 
industry and by no means unique” to a single firm.474 Under these investigations it 
was made clear that both independent and direct radio payola never ceased to occur. 
The majors finally settled with the Attorney General, agreeing to revise their 
guidelines and to eliminate payola practices in the future.475  
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The FCC followed suit, launching its own investigations in 2007, focusing this time 
on the radio and communication giants Entercom Communications, CBS Radio, 
Citadel Broadcasting, and Clear Channel Communications.476 As both parties to 
payola are being investigated, their relationship comes to the foreground. However, 
it is of interest to note how the oligonomy’s prosecution for commercial bribery 
signals that the power in this relationship lies with the radio stations. Furthermore, 
even though the radio stations appear to have the upper hand in this key 
partnership, their role strengthened substantially with every deregulatory initiative 
the US government would take. As a matter of fact, the radio landscape in the US 
entered an era of formidable concentration following the deregulation of broadcast 
ownership, pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. This move led to the 
dominance of the US radio markets by a handful of companies, the most prominent 
example being Clear Channel Communications, Inc. This deregulation of ownership 
allowed Clear Channel and its former competitor AMFM to merge, creating the 
“world’s largest radio company with 830 stations in small, medium, and large 
cities around the United States and reaching more than 100 million listeners 
weekly.”477  
It follows that Clear Channel-owned radio stations were in position to leverage their 
incredible power and create an environment where the record companies were left 
with fewer opportunities to negotiate access to airwaves for their music. This 
consolidation of power made the role of the independent promoter further 
redundant. “Clear Channel began using the clout of over 1,200 stations to go 
directly to the labels for contests, promotions, and marketing,”478 a move 
characterised as considerably bold, since Sections 317 and 508 of the 
Telecommunications Act that necessitated the existence of middlemen at the first 
place, had not been abolished. 
Consequently, the investigations opened by Eliot Spitzer and the FCC crackdown on 
payola that followed, were hardly anticipated by a company the size of Clear 
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Channel. On the other hand, the time for the investigation was ripe, as according to 
Galuszka “communication between radio stations and record labels has now been 
easier to prove… parties exchanged emails and text messages.”479  
Furthermore, radio stations grew so much in power that they had much more to lose 
(e.g. their FCC licences). As a result, the investigations above coupled with the 
subsequent promises of both radio stations and record companies to tackle payola 
by implementing relevant codes of conduct, had a deterrent effect on the practice.  
However, another issue had emerged by the time the investigations came to an end, 
as the oligonomy and its business model were challenged by both the internet and 
the end consumer. By 2007, the oligonomy was already facing the problem of its 
customer base migrating to other means of consumption and one is left to speculate 
to what extent continuing with payola practices on terrestrial radio would make 
economic and business sense in the internet era.480 In addition, terrestrial radio had 
been facing competition from internet radio services such as Pandora, in addition to 
the emergence of streaming services.481 The business model of the oligonomy had 
always been heavily reliant on promotion via the airwaves; however, consuming (or 
even sampling) music online challenged the foundations of this key relationship.  
Nevertheless, discussing the relationship between anti-payola legislation and the 
radio per se, falls outside the scope of the present bar from the instances identified 
above: the emergence of Clear Channel Communications as a stronghold of the 
deregulated American radio following the Telecommunications Act 1996 and its 
integration into complementary markets, namely live music production.  In 2000, 
Clear Channel created Clear Channel Entertainment with the acquisition of SFX 
Entertainment, a network of formerly competing live music promoters. Given the 
power consolidated by Clear Channel, this decision comes hardly as a surprise. With 
live music promotion being another traditional means of promoting an album and 
with radio airplay being the other one, Clear Channel attempted to create a solid 
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bottleneck around the exposure of music to the end consumer, inarguably with the 
ability to negatively affect consumer welfare. Indeed, a class action lawsuit followed 
in 2002, claiming that Clear Channel restricted airplay for artists that were booked 
with competitors of Clear Channel’s promotion leg.482 Ultimately, Clear Channel was 
forced to spin off its live music promotion leg in 2005, in what was to become Live 
Nation. 
In a nutshell, Clear Channel emerged as a firm with leveraging capabilities towards 
the wider spectrum of the provision of the musical product. It is not only its ability 
to blackmail payola from the recorded music industry that attracts attention; Clear 
Channel was able to foresee the importance of controlling several channels for the 
enjoyment of music and was able to position itself strategically between the recorded 
music industry and the consumer. This practice reconfigures the nature of the 
provision and the distribution of music to the mass market to the potential 
detriment of the end consumer, who is surrounded by even more gatekeepers. 
Further, the importance of the live music sector comes into the limelight via the 
practices of Clear Channel, which further highlights how controlling all outputs in 
the music industries does make strategic sense, a realisation further emphasised in 
the studies consulted in the previous chapter. The thesis explores this concept 
further in the fifth chapter, when merger control is being introduced. 
Additionally, the examination of payola as a significant barrier to entry brings the 
practices of the oligonomic recorded music industry as close to a regulatory 
framework as they would ever get, thanks to the FCC’s oversight of the radio. Even 
though the communications regulator touches upon the music industry indirectly, 
the payola investigations still afford us with an instance of regulatory oversight of 
the industry’s practices. Consequently, the business model is also assessed to reveal 
that indeed the product is directed to the mass audience, that the oligonomy, even 
though in fierce competition on firm level, remains virtually impenetrable by 
potential competitors, and that it acts in a coordinated manner to promote its 
interests. This coordination has been observed throughout the present thesis with 
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regard to lobbying, payola, and the ‘similar’ practices of securing exclusivity with 
artists, as the UK investigation will reveal.  
4.1.2 Thoughts beyond payola  
Ultimately, as payola discussions enter the digital era, academic literature seems to 
focus on the impact of the digital radio on the terrestrial one, as well as on the 
changing dynamics between the radio and the recorded music industry, if any. 
Traditional terrestrial radio provided a sampling effect to the prospective consumers 
of the tangible music product, a basis on which this key relationship was built. Is the 
digital radio able to duplicate this effect given that the consumption of music has 
turned to alternative models altogether?  
As the relationship between the radio and the recorded music industry entered the 
digital era, it is worth contemplating on the future of this key relationship and on 
what it can reveal about methods of consumption and the end consumer. As access 
to the product of recorded music has gradually become an activity concentrated in 
the online environment, it is possible to envision a new type of payola ‘fit’ for the 
digital era; one that prioritises access to online content rather than one designed for 
push models of broadcast communications. This type of payola could mirror the 
‘decentralised’ consumer’s access and consumption patterns. 
However, another example that proves the perplexity of apprehending the role of the 
end consumer in the present era of consumption, can be observed in the field of 
digital copyright. Even though the end consumer can access the recorded music 
product online either via internet radio services (Pandora, Last.fm) or via interactive 
streaming services (e.g. Spotify), the legal framework governing these practices 
mirrors distinctions made for the analogue era here as well. When the US Congress 
extended the compulsory licensing system to streaming services for the first time in 
1995,483 a distinction was made between ‘interactive’ and ‘non-interactive’ services 
with respect to the rights of songwriters. Thus, whereas compulsory licensing for 
public performances of compositions applies to all streaming services equally, 
compulsory licensing for sound recordings and performers covers only ‘non-
                                                        
 






interactive’ services, excluding services like Spotify.484 As a result, songwriters 
cannot pull their compositions off of any type of streaming service, even though the 
opposite is applicable for owners of copyright in sound recordings, another example 
of the oligonomy’s power consolidation that can affect consumer welfare by 
controlling (here limiting) access. Further, as explained in the previous chapters, 
compulsory licenses are administered by collecting societies and the rate is set by 
Congress. The flat rate has attracted criticism as being too low, leaving the 
songwriters disadvantaged.485 Here, the argument that academic commentators 
raise is that the rate is set at low levels, since Congress had envisioned all streaming 
services to substitute the act of listening to the radio, rather than become the actual 
distribution system for recorded music,486 highlighting the inability of the law to 
appreciate the business or the commercial reality as such.  
What the above comes to prove in relation to the present chapter is that it is not only 
the relationship between the radio and the record company that is changing, 
compared to the time when payola was prevalent; it is once again the role of the end 
consumer that needs to be accommodated in these matters as a driver of change in 
the music industries. Indeed, it is consumer choice in consumption that can either 
make payola on terrestrial radio redundant or transfer it to adjacent digital fields, 
something that should be borne in mind by both regulators and legislators.  
As a result, this first section set to examine how authorities and legislators 
appreciate the business model of the oligonomy using the key relationship with the 
radio as a proxy. The relationship between the radio and the oligonomy of the 
majors reflects the reality of the old business model, with the regulator’s 
intervention reaffirming the push model of communication towards the mass 
audience, recipient of the homogeneous product. Moreover, in the case of 
compulsory licences in the digital environment, it is further highlighted how the 
legislator perceives this relationship between communication media and the 
recorded music industry and of course, the role of the end consumer therein.  
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From a regulatory perspective, the examination above provided an insight into the 
music industry from the point of view of the telecommunications regulator with 
respect to the radio. As the radio was progressively left to the open market, any 
developments in this sector have had consequences the music industries, such as the 
emergence of Clear Channel Communications. It would have of course been 
impossible for the regulator to envision the aftermath of radio deregulation with 
regard to the music industry, let alone the live music one. However, and as a 
concluding remark to the present section, it is exactly this unpredictability alongside 
the nexus of interwoven affiliations that calls for extra attention when dealing with 
the music industries.  
This becomes clearer as the chapter moves closer to intervention into matters of the 
recorded music industry per se. Having presented a first occurrence of intervention 
into the music industries and their key relationships, the following section is 
dedicated to the first full length antitrust investigation into the business model of the 
majors per se.  
 
4.2 Intervention and appreciation of industry’s business model ex post: US and 
UK perspectives 
4.2.1 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., and Columbia Record club, Inc., Petitioners, v. 
Federal Trade Commission, Respondent, 414 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1969)  
4.2.1.1 The case in brief  
With the examination of the first major intervention of a competition authority into 
the majors, the thesis simultaneously examines another piece of Osterwalder’s old 
business model canvas: the key partnership of distribution. Distribution was indeed 
presented in the previous chapter as a key partner worth expanding into vertically, 
allowing the oligonomy to reaffirm its strong gatekeeping function. It was stablished 
that the oligonomic business model seeks to control distribution to the mass market 







As far as the present investigation is concerned, emphasis is placed on two elements: 
on the attempts of a key participant of the oligonomy to foreclose competitors 
downstream and engage in unlawful restraint of trade487 and on the relevant product 
market identified for the purposes of this investigation. A further point raised is the 
struggle that the competition authorities faced in approaching the music industries, 
as far back as the 1950s and the 1960s.  
The analysis follows the case from the initial investigation in 1959 until Columbia’s 
appeal in 1969, showing how stalling of the case raised administrative issues in the 
US courts.488 However, in the present context it is also important to assess the 
treatment of the case as to its business model dimensions; as the first point of entry 
into the investigation of the anticompetitive practices of the oligonomy. Thus, this 
section examines the extent to which the legal framework (and the competition 
policy) in the US, was in position to successfully interfere with one of the majors at 
the time.  
In 1959 and at the time of the payola hiatus, the Federal Trade Commission 
launched an investigation into Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and its 
subsidiary, Columbia Record Club (hereafter CRC) for alleged use of unfair licensing 
and royalty agreements in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.489 The investigations focused on the distribution of Columbia’s records via its 
own record club, a subscription method of delivering the finalised product directly to 
the end consumer, by-passing the retailer.  
Columbia had entered the direct or record club sales in 1955 “in response to a threat 
of competition from other companies.”490 Initially, the club would offer only 
recordings from the Columbia catalogue; however, this did not prove sustainable 
due to consumer demand for diversified genres and sounds. Consequently, 
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Columbia entered in explicit licensing agreements with smaller manufacturers 
providing more diversified sounds, such as teenager-oriented popular music 
including rock’n’roll and later twist, jazz, folk, spoken word, and novelty acts.491 The 
contracts under investigation prevented the licensor from selling its catalogue to 
another club; however, selling to wholesalers was still permitted. In return, 
Columbia would guarantee the sale of a prescribed number of records. Thus, 
effective competition between CRC and its competitors would be suppressed, as any 
other record club wishing to offer their members the same recordings, would have to 
purchase them at the open market, where the price would be substantially higher.492 
Additionally, the agreements in question made provisions so that the licensors 
would reduce recording artists’ royalties to 50 percent for records sold via the club 
and that any difference in royalties above that level would be assumed by the 
licensor alone.493 Based on this, the FTC alleged that by fixing and depressing artists’ 
royalties the agreements “operated to restrict free and open competitive bidding for 
the artists’ services.”494 
As a result, a complaint was issued in 1962 alleging unlawful restraint of trade as 
regards record club sales. This was however dismissed by the hearing examiner two 
years later, in 1964.495 Three years after that in 1967, the FTC reversed the 
examiner’s findings, which led CBS to appeal the decision. The Court of Appeals 
finally reversed the 1967 decision, Kiley J dissenting, and remanded the case to the 
FTC for further proceedings as to the structure of the record club market.496 
The latter comes as no surprise, given that the FTC’s investigations started in 1959 
and the hearing examiner’s findings were reversed in 1967. Further, it also comes as 
no surprise that one of the bases of CBS’s appeal was that the 1967 decision was 
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based on a stale record.497 The petitioners further contended (among other 
arguments advanced)498 that the agency’s findings were lacking substantial 
evidence499 and, coming closer to the aims of the present thesis, that the FTC had 
not succeeded in defining the relevant market as the basis for its findings.500 
The specific case has not attracted much commentary. Nevertheless, it comes to 
highlight some very important aspects of the dominant business model and about its 
oligopolistic nature (referring to the oligonomy in a competition law context this 
time).  The points that require further elaboration include the relevant market 
definition and the basis of staleness itself, both of which can be particularly 
revealing about the industry as it entered an era of major consolidation. 
Even though the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded 
the case on the basis of a stale record, it should be clarified that the FTC’s relevant 
market was approved, and that further, substantial evidence of anticompetitive 
practices were found to exist.501 These however need to be viewed with extra 
consideration, as the approval of the relevant product market as defined at the time 
of the investigation in conjunction with the reversal based on staleness, come to 
show that the market had changed in the interim course of almost a decade.  
4.2.1.2 Addressing the key points  
Starting from the relevant market definition part of the Columbia saga, it is 
important to compare and contrast the attempts to define the market in both the 
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1962 initial complaint and in the hearing examiner’s dismissal of 1964,502 since this 
provided one of the contested points in the appeal that followed. 
Initially, in the 1962 complaint the FTC accused CBS of monopolising or attempting 
to monopolise four separate markets or lines of commerce: 
 “a. the manufacture, sale and distribution of phonographs records generally… b. 
the manufacture, sale and distribution of LPs generally… c. the retail sale and 
distribution of LPs, and d. the manufacture, sale and distribution of LPs sold 
through the ‘subscription method’ – in other words, the so-called record club 
market.” 503  
Therefore, the FTC looked for anticompetitive effects in two further submarkets 
inside the broader LP market: retail sales and sales via subscription clubs. Important 
to also note that the initial complaint stipulates that additionally, each record 
constitutes its own separate market since each record is “unique, distinctive and 
non-substitutable.”504  
Setting to refute the above, the hearing examiner in the 1964 dismissal reached the 
exact opposite conclusion, rejecting the notion that each record constitutes its own 
market for antitrust purposes and that LPs belong in a separate market than all 
other records in general.505 In examining whether LPs constitute a well-defined 
submarket within the market for all records, the examiner looked at the 
differentiation between LPs and singles (45s) and found that apart from physical 
differences, the two do not bear other distinct characteristics, since it is the same 
music that is being recorded on them, either broadly in terms of genre or literally, 
thanks to the compulsory licensing system.506 The hearing examiner further 
highlighted that both formats are manufactured, distributed, and marketed via the 
same channels by the same companies, whereas with regard to the end consumer, 
the examiner agreed with CBS in that “the purchasing public for records cannot be 
classified into rigid and distinctive age groups. All age groups purchase records on 
all speeds.”507 Finally, the examiner referred to the opinion of the only economic 
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expert to testify that “in any meaningful analysis of the effectiveness of competition 
in the record industry, LPs and singles should be included in the same market.”508 
More intriguing was the conclusion that individual records do not constitute 
separate markets, even though each commodified artistic performance on a record is 
unique. The examiner did acknowledge that each performance is a “little monopoly 
in the sense that there is only one like it, it is made by a particular artist, it is made 
in a particular arrangement.” However, he did not perceive this to amount to a 
monopoly in the legal sense for antitrust purposes.509 
The FTC had aimed to show in the original complaint that each recording 
constituted a separate market susceptible to monopolisation by the majors, since 
every recording is “unique, distinctive, and nonsbustitutable.”510 Whilst 
acknowledging that this is so, the hearing examiner went on to distinguish the 
market for antitrust purposes by noting how recordings compete with each other for 
the ‘consumer’s dollar’, despite their uniqueness. Referring to covers and renditions 
of hit songs and music, the examiner noted that they are in competition with each 
other, even though they are not identical. Thus, the examiner reaffirmed the 
reasoning behind the existence of the compulsory licensing system, which as seen 
earlier, was to promote competition by avoiding the monopolisation of potentially 
hit music, creating the possibility for record companies to offer several competing 
versions of the same music; similar enough, yet not the same. According to the 
examiner’s reasoning, records compete between them through “the practice of 
imitation and copying,” not just literally as in the case of covers of music, but also 
on genre level (speaking of music “fads”).511 By referring to an example of costumers 
who refused to purchase a different bossa nova recording in lieu of a recording by 
Stan Getz that was out of stock, the examiner highlighted both the nonsubstitutable 
nature of the recordings, and the competition that exists between them.512  
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According to the examiner’s reasoning, since all individual recordings compete for 
the end consumer’s income allocation, they remain in competition with each other513 
and therefore, the market should be perceived as one overall market comprising of 
all recordings. Here of course, the examiner also treated the end consumer as the 
mass audience that would purchase either an LP or a single containing an edition of 
a popular song in general, through all retail channels available.514 
Hence, the first complications in relevant product market definition in the music 
industries can be observed; pointing to opposite directions, both the FTC and the 
hearing examiner in his dismissal attempted to reach contradicting conclusions, 
starting from the same point of nonsubstitutability. However, this first attempt to 
define a relevant product market for the music in the antitrust sense needs to be 
read in conjunction with its era, since the events took place twenty years before the 
hypothetical monopolist test was introduced in the US. Following a post-Merger 
Guidelines reading into the matter of substitutability, close substitutes and 
interchangeable items would most likely form part of the same market for relevant 
product market definition purposes. Here, the market for all records seems to 
consist of unique, nonsbustitutable and non-interchangeable items that remain in 
competition with each other for the consumer’s disposable income.  
In a nutshell, the examiner concluded that the only market that the evidence pointed 
to, was the market encompassing not only all phonograph records (LPs and singles), 
but also all channels of distribution as well, since record clubs were not found to 
constitute a separate line of commerce either. The arguments advanced by the 
examiner sound familiar here as well, as he builds his argumentation on the 
homogeneity of the recordings as products,515 adding that consumers regard these 
methods of distribution as comparable, since “market research reports further 
demonstrate that consumers regard clubs and stores as comparable distribution 
channels."516 Further, the economic expert for the respondents provided that indeed 
“record clubs are not a separate market but merely a part of a single retail market 
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that embraces all types of retail outlets selling records to the consumer,”517 an 
opinion also shared by the examiner.  
Consequently, in a market of such broad nature, monopolisation or attempts to 
monopolisation are harder to discern and justify. As per the examiner’s words “in 
weighing charges of monopolization…and also a claimed ‘dangerous tendency to 
create in respondents a monopoly,’ the examiner will look primarily to the 
structure of the total record industry, not just the segments…urged by the 
Government.”518 A narrower market definition is traditionally attempted by the 
authorities, given that therein anticompetitive effects are easier to establish, whereas 
it is in the best interest of the firms to argue for as broad a market definition as 
possible. 
Thus, the market for all records supplied and distributed through all means was 
found to be substantially dynamic and competitive overall, experiencing dynamic 
growth on industrial level519 and “high and effective rate of entry at every level,”520 
which resulted in price competition with low and declining prices. Further, other 
dealers and manufacturers of recordings were not found to be threatened, thanks to 
the existence of this procompetitive environment enabling other labels to access 
customers either via clubs, or by strengthening their retailing channels indirectly.521 
Here of course, it is highlighted how the key element examined is the producers’ 
access to consumers (the mass market), rather than vice versa.  
Lastly, considering the agreements from the royalties’ perspective, the examiner 
noted that the FTC had presented only suggestive and speculative evidence to 
support that the reduced royalty rates constituted any reliable proof of 
anticompetitive injury, actual or potential.522 Such rates did appear to be the norm 
or the tradition in the industry, but in any event, the examiner highlighted the lack 
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of substantial evidence from the part of the FTC throughout his reasoning.523 Hence, 
not much evidence was provided from either side to assess the oligopsony side of 
things, meaning foreclosing musical compositions and creating a bottleneck around 
the music product. As discussed in the previous chapter, the oligonomy of the 
majors represented in this case by CBS, acts as a gatekeeper towards both the side of 
the consumer and the side of the initial copyright owners. This function of CBS came 
into investigation in this specific case; however, the lack of proper evidence from the 
part of the FTC was heavily criticised.   
On the contrary, addressing the issue of benefits to both the industry and the public 
that CBS and CRC’s practices (the agreements) afforded, the hearing examiner went 
as far as to declare that the FTC’s order would have an adversary effect “on the 
record industry as a whole, particularly the smaller manufacturers, songwriters, 
music publishers, musicians and artists… record buyers, especially record club 
members.”524 Securing access to a vast variety of recordings benefits the public as 
well as the copyright owners and the performers, whereas competition thrives on 
manufacture and distribution level.  It seems that according to this line of reasoning, 
the very existence of an oligonomy as a business model is in position to create 
positive effects, exactly because this nexus of channels and partnerships exists. This 
in turn, comes to prove just how far from envisioning a market failure the examiner 
was.  
Finally, in the memorandum opinion, and whilst repeating the ambivalence 
surrounding the evidence provided and the tendency of the government to stretch 
the facts in a procrustean manner in order to fit the allegations, the hearing 
examiner made this interesting remark that highlights many of the industry’s 
peculiarities: “with such a melange of charges…there is a strong temptation to say 
that there must be an antitrust violation here.”525 The specific investigation 
notwithstanding, this statement appears to be at the core of the oligonomy’s nature. 
Hence, on a broader level it is of interest to consider whether this lack of an antitrust 
violation when such a “melange of charges” is being evoked, reveals more than the 
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absence of illegal activities (or of a practice not worthy of antitrust attention) and 
points to the inefficiency of the legal framework to address the industry instead.  
To further illustrate and consider this point, the importance of defining a relevant 
product market came into the limelight once again in the memorandum opinion. 
The examiner notes the importance of an accurate product definition in order to find 
an antitrust violation as per du Pont526 and also states that the defined market for 
testing a merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act might differ from the market 
defined to assess anticompetitive effects, or even from the market as defined by an 
economist.527 However, he proceeds to describe these distinctions as purely 
“academic” and of little importance in the case of the music industry, which he 
qualifies as “uncomplicated”.  Interestingly enough, in his very next sentence the 
examiner makes a note of how both parties to the investigation relied on the 
submarket approach as per Brown Shoe to support their opposing contentions, even 
“disagreeing violently”528 on the matter; a statement which seems to bring the 
examiner in contradiction with himself.  
The examiner characterised his approach to defining the market as pragmatic and 
realistic; his view resulted in a broader definition, relying on actual competing 
products and examining economic realities,529 where neither LPs nor record clubs 
constitute substantial markets on their own, even though and in line with what was 
presented above, “the Government wants the breakdown because the ‘sub-market’ 
statistics tend to show greater concentration and give Columbia a greater market 
share.”530  
A market defined as consisting of all recordings (or all products on offer through all 
available channels) is a market that consists of all competing versions of largely the 
same product (same genre or covers of same compositions),531 where no submarkets 
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as per Brown Shoe can be discerned. What the examiner actually singled out by this 
reasoning, is the homogeneity of the product also in an antitrust context, as 
evidenced in the previous chapter of the present.  
Ultimately, having established what the market is, the examiner contested both its 
monopolisation and the probability of substantial lessening competition or 
attempting to create a monopoly. When considering the competitive effects of the 
agreements as such, the examiner reached the optimal point of examining industrial 
concentration: are the agreements CBS and CRC entered into anticompetitive 
because of the concentration levels in the industry?  This provided a closer look at 
the practices of the majors in the aggregate for the first time in antitrust history.  
When addressing the issue of concentration in the record industry, the examiner 
relied on the FTC and the 1963 case of Procter & Gamble,532 in order to apply to the 
agreements in question the tests of legality under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.533 The 
effect of Procter & Gamble that the examiner ‘capitalised’ on was the examination of 
conglomerate mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act for the first time. The 
opinion in the said case laid down the “basic principles for the application and the 
interpretation of Section 7 – principles that may govern, at least to a degree, the 
instant case. First, ‘All mergers are within the reach of the amended §7,534 whether 
they be classified as horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate, and all are to be tested 
by the same standard’… whether its effect may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly.”535 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
singles are not submarkets that in themselves constitute appropriate product markets for 
antitrust purposes, as “the boundaries of the product market are determined by reasonable 
interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand between the LPs and singles.”  
532 The Procter & Gamble Co., Docket 6901, 63 F.T.C. 1465 (1963).  
533  15 U.S.C. § 18.  
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This approach allowed the examiner to view the licensing agreements as a horizontal 
merger, assessed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.536 The temporality of the 
horizontal merger situation was also noted, given that the assets are acquired by 
Columbia temporarily pursuant to the agreements. As such, and pursuant to the 
Celler-Kefauver amendments, the standard of Section 7 applies, which calls for 
assessment of the probability of a substantial anticompetitive effect, with the 
burden of proof lying with the complainant. The standard of proof for 
anticompetitive effects under this Section, as well as in all merger cases and in 
monopolisation and monopolisation attempts, requires a Rule of Reason 
approach,537 which in essence leaves the factual basis to be argued by the 
complainant, or the FTC in the present case. Nevertheless, according to the 
examiner the FTC had failed to provide the necessary evidence, as stated above.  
However, a closer examination of the cases and the literature of the time reveals that 
the FTC engaged in a ‘free’ use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
with the blessings of the Supreme Court,538 in the pursuit of creating Per Se antitrust 
violations, which it could adequately enforce, in order precisely to rely on Section 5’s 
rationale.  
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As David Alan Leipziger argued in 1966, commenting on the application of the 
several antitrust statutes: 
 “if the other statute is not applicable for technical reasons, it is consonant with the 
purposes of Section 5 to use it to fill the gap. The terms of the other statute may 
require a finding of probable injury to competition, a requirement which can be 
avoided under Section 5 by invoking the incipiency rationale.”539  
In context, Section 5 can examine the case in a nascent light as opposed to the 
Clayton Act. However, the intention behind a Section 5 application would be 
restrictive of a more inclusive assessment, which would otherwise allow pro-
competitive effects to be taken into consideration, something that the examiner 
proceeded to do in this present case.  
Following from this, and continuing the examination under Section 7 and in the 
spirit of the Rule of Reason, the examiner considered the ‘problem of oligopoly’ via 
the levels of industrial concentration, acknowledging that in an oligopolistic market 
tacit collusion is more likely.540 Dispelling the ‘symptoms of oligopoly’ in the overall 
industry, the examiner noted evidence of vigorous competition including price 
competition, ease to entry, and other forms of rivalry, despite “the sameness of 
prices.”541 Overall the industry was praised as one where the “role and the 
dominance of the big-business factors have been eroded.”542 The paradox of 
attesting both price competition and sameness in prices, eluded the examiner at that 
time. Further, it constitutes a pattern followed in all subsequent evaluations 
attempted across jurisdictions.  
The examiner lists a significant number of factors pointing to a competitive and 
innovative environment for the record industry, including the growth of new and 
smaller in size companies, the high degree of dispersion in retail outlets, an increase 
in the number of manufacturers, innovation in the face of A&R activities (talent 
acquisition and new music genera), product and marketing innovation, and 
innovation and competition in distribution channels. In a quasi-paternalistic tone, 
the examiner adds that in such a thriving environment having the size of Columbia 
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should not be attracting scrutiny per se, as bigness in itself is not to be 
condemned.543 He suggests that in a realistic and reasonable viewing of the industry, 
all the aforementioned efficiencies should be considered.  
Furthermore, the examiner contends that: 
 “Columbia’s growth has been internally generated and not the result of a merger 
or acquisition. The competitive innovation of the LP gave Columbia a temporary 
jump on the industry, but… it now faces vigorous competition.”544  
This is an interesting point to consider, as it was shown in the second chapter of the 
present thesis that the music industry came about as a patent-centred industry 
switched to a copyright-centred one and was subsequently met by the vertical 
integration interests of Hollywood mega studios. 
 At the forefront of this wave, Columbia was among the pioneers in the competition 
of sound recording and remained a strong contestant on the technical front with the 
introduction of the LP on the 21st of June 1948.545 However, it is an exaggeration if 
not a factual error to suggest that Columbia has not profited from an income stream 
generated by a series of mergers and acquisitions, when in fact the past of CBS and 
Columbia Records (ex-American Graphophone Company) consists of a complex 
nexus of mergers and acquisitions: in 1928 the record company was separated from 
the broadcasting leg and in 1931 the merger of Columbia Gramophone Ltd., the 
Columbia operation in England, with the RCA Victor-owned HMV Gramophone 
Ltd., formed the largest record conglomerate in the world, Electrical and Musical 
Industries Ltd. (EMI), making RCA Victor part-owner of American Columbia. In 
1934 Columbia was bought by ARC (American Record Company).546 A few year later 
in 1938, Columbia Broadcasting System acquired ARC, re-unifying the two formerly 
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separated entities.547 If anything, the dynamic and fierce wave of mergers and 
acquisitions in the music industries is as strong as it can get in the face of these 
companies, contrary to the examiner’s assessment.    
The conclusions of the examiner in 1964 offered a highly detailed (304 pages) 
viewing of the industry as a whole and painted the picture of a pro-competitive and 
innovative environment, where no competition concerns arise, despite the existence 
of few major dominant players and despite the aforementioned “sameness in 
prices”, a matter which was otherwise not addressed to a greater extent. 
Interestingly enough, the price of recordings is an issue that the FTC did not 
abandon. 36 years later, the FTC found that the majors were forcing retailers to keep 
prices artificially high on a collective level, in exchange for substantial cooperative 
advertising payments. According to the FTC, this constituted a form of Section 5-
triggering price-fixing practices, which increase the risk of collusion or 
interdependent conduct by the market participants. As mentioned briefly earlier, in 
2003 a lawsuit was filed on behalf of compact disc (this time) club members, 
alleging inflated prices following a price-fixing conspiracy.548  
More recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) launched investigations into the 
price-fixing practices of digital downloads, a wave of investigations that also reached 
the EU.549 All of the above come to show that the “sameness in prices” observed by 
the examiner as far back as 1964, depicts a well-established practice that never 
ceased to feature at the core of the oligonomy’s control of the distribution channels. 
Ironically, at the time of the investigation the FTC was highly criticised in its 
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inability to appreciate the vibe and the nature of the industry as a whole in its 
pursuit of ‘big businesses’ to punish, by stretching the facts to fit the legal provisions.  
Resuming the analysis of the 1964 dismissal, and price- fixing aide, another issue 
came to the forefront of this parley between the examiner and the FTC, which is 
investigated by the present thesis: the relevant market for music and its competitive 
assessment. Is there a relevant product market for all music products delivered via 
all channels and enjoyed by all consumers in the aggregate, or is the market 
essentially broken down to unlimited nods of commercial activity, as per the FTC’s 
appreciation of the case in hand? It is noted later as the chapter unfolds, that this 
narrative has not become obsolete over the years and that similarly contradicting 
observations can still be made. 
4.2.1.3 The FTC fights back  
As explained earlier in the chapter, the FTC declared the dismissal erroneous and 
decided it should be set aside three years later, in 1967. Reiterating the initial 
argument that sales through record clubs constitute a defined submarket in which 
the anticompetitive effects of the licensing agreements should be evaluated, the FTC 
emphasised the distinct characteristics of the end consumers who are more likely to 
shop via this method. These were the younger demographic “interested in having 
someone else select for them the most ‘popular’ or ‘hit’ records at lower prices that 
can be secured in the conventional record dealers’ stores,”550 thus alleging a price 
sensitive, yet still passive end consumer of the ‘popular’ product. In essence, the 
mass market design is evidenced here as well: the end consumer would undeniably 
buy recordings, and most importantly ‘hit’ recordings, the real question being how. 
This realisation becomes relevant in the assessment of new business models in the 
music industries further on, when the undeniable element of purchasing recordings 
disappears altogether. For the time being, it becomes clearer that the premise of the 
old business model as designed top-down to deliver hit music to the mass consumer 
can indeed be affirmed in a competition context as well.  
The clubs therefore, allegedly met the demand of this category of consumers by 
offering a ‘limited variety of hits’ at lower prices than those offered at dealer level, 
                                                        
 






thanks to the reduced costs resulting from the royalty-fixing agreements with several 
competing manufacturers and producers, to the ultimate detriment of the artists. 
 “Different prices and different costs in the two channels of distribution clearly 
indicate that different conditions of supply and demand prevail in each and that 
they therefore belong to separate and distinct markets,” repeated the FTC.551 
These agreements are found to be posing barriers to potential entrants, since 
Columbia (here the FTC broadens the narrative and mentions the practice as 
characteristic of the ‘Big Three’ dominating the industry at the time) has achieved 
exclusionary for its competitors terms. The result as per the FTC is that “a 
competitive industry structure has never been allowed to develop in that market… 
together the ‘big three’ controlled 90,6 percent of all phonograph record sales 
through clubs.”552 Overall, a pro-competitive environment could have been created if 
more players had access to the club market with similar prices to those that the 
majors enjoyed, allowing the end consumers to benefit from the lower prices that a 
competitive environment offers. A violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act was once again found in the market for club sales. Based on the 
above, it is of interest to consider the attempt made by the FTC to ‘cry wolf’, 
evidenced by its appeal to the practices of the oligonomy as a whole via its CBS 
investigation. However sympathetic to the FTC’s concerns one might be, the specific 
agreements of a specific firm were under investigation at that time.  
Nevertheless, since the examiner did take a closer look at industrial concentration, it 
should be repeated that the popular music industry as a cultural industry, moves in 
cycles of prolonged concentration interrupted by sharp short bursts of competition 
and product diversity, only to return to the concentration patterns once the 
diversified and innovative products (and practices) have been ‘absorbed’. An 
empirical study conducted by Richard Peterson and David Berger for the American 
Sociological Review in 1975, looks at the recording industry over a period which 
engulfs the period of the investigation (1948-1973), examining concentration and 
competition patterns.553 Reaffirming the oligopolistic nature of the industry in 
principle and highlighting its reliance on vertical downstream integration into the 
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control of distribution and manufacturing, they find the industry highly consolidated 
overall, but for the advent of  jazz and the rock’n’roll revolution, the latter spanning 
from 1955 to 1959, the year the investigation began. As stated in the previous 
chapter, rock’n’roll as a niche sound allowed for the emergence of smaller versatile 
firms, who challenged the shares of the majors. The industry would gradually return 
to its cycle of consolidation between then and 1963, only to experience a new cycle of 
growth and diversity in 1964 with ‘Beatlemania’ and the British Invasion.554  
What is actually revealed by the authors is that from the time of the initial 
investigation until the time the appeal was heard, the concentration levels in the 
industry had already changed from initial concentration, to competition, to 
consolidation, and da capo. Thus, the initial investigation started at a time of 
industrial growth and competition with many smaller independent players. The 
Order coincided with a renewed wave of concentration and the 1964 dismissal with 
the establishment of the British sound.  Inevitably, providing an accurate and 
precise assessment of the industry in order to assess anticompetitive behaviour 
would soon turn into a game of ‘hide and seek’ or, even worse, into a fool’s errand.  
4.2.1.4 Too little too late?  
By the time of the Appeal to the 1967 Order, 8 years had passed since the initial 
investigation, and further 4 by the time the parties settled in 1971.555 This means that 
the case lasted for an astonishing 12 years, during which the face of the industry had 
already changed more than once. This was indeed acknowledged by the Court of 
Appeals which stated: 
“the market itself has undergone a significant change since the hearing examiner 
completed his hearings and entered his findings… Too, consumer tastes have 
undergone a substantial change and with this, the entire record industry.”556  
As stated earlier, and as it has become evident thus far, the Court reversed and 
remanded on the basis of a stale record, an issue the US administrative agencies 
were well familiar with. As Kiley J stated in CBS dissenting, “the evils of the delays 
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inhere in the nature of our legal system and economy, and are ‘fleas that come with 
the dog’.”557 Similar concerns had been expressed by the Supreme Court in ICC v. 
City of Jersey City in 1944.558  
Stating that he would affirm the FTC’s order, Kiley J continues to say: 
 “if petitioners thereafter wish to achieve a modification, they should have the 
burden of showing before the Commission that justice requires modification in 
view of the changed market conditions.”559  
From the above it can be observed that not only is the legal framework unable to 
deal with the industry, but also that the basis of staleness highly favours the 
petitioner as opposed to the agency. Had the Court decided to affirm the order, the 
burden of proof would have rested with CBS, which would have had to argue for a 
change in market conditions before the FTC rather than at court. Overall, the 
bitterness that characterises Kiley J’s dissent aligns with the question posed by the 
present thesis of whether more apt competition policy might be required (or if it 
were ever in place).  
The above notwithstanding, it is worth repeating here that the Court of Appeals 
agreed with the market definition provided by the FTC. Indeed, the Court 
acknowledged that “all record sales constitute an industry-wide product market,” 
since the boundaries of a product market are determined by reasonable 
interchangeability of use. Since CBS had provided for the complete 
interchangeability between LPs and singles, the Court further delineated the record 
clubs’ submarket as per Brown Shoe and Philadelphia National Bank,560 noting that 
submarkets for antitrust purposes can be defined by examining more practical 
indicia. In the present case, the relevant factors were: “1) Columbia by its own acts 
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treated the club market as being separate; 2) differences in demand; and 3) 
differences in cost.”561  
In this defined submarket, a violation of Section 5 was found to exist in the face of 
the exclusivity agreements, which the Court agreed should be evaluated primarily on 
merger standards. As stated earlier in the present albeit briefly, CBS contested the 
Per Se horizontal merger standard, arguing for a Rule of Reason approach to the 
agreements, stating that their exclusivity provisions performed an ancillary function, 
which should be sustained if found to be reasonable.562 The Court of Appeals 
however, categorised the relation between Columbia and its licensors as “in the 
nature of a horizontal merger with the effects of a vertical merger,”563 in order to 
look into foreclosure effects in relation to the market structure. The Court held that 
even though in vertical mergers the standard of legality is determined by the degree 
of market foreclosure,564 the percentage of the market foreclosed by the vertical 
arrangement cannot be a decisive factor in situations where foreclosure is either of 
monopoly or of de minimis proportions, as per Brown Shoe. Thus, a closer look at 
the market structure itself is required. This however, was not provided by the FTC 
not only due to the Per Se approach that the agency had traditionally taken, as 
presented with regard to the examiner’s comments of 1964, but further due to the 
changes in market structure that occurred over the same period of time.  
Ultimately, what this saga reveals with respect to rationale of the thesis is that the 
FTC was faced with many hurdles, even though it sought to address potential and 
actual anticompetitive concerns in the oligonomy as such. This of course, justifies 
intervention should the history of the music industry be viewed holistically, as a 
market failure waiting to happen (if it had not already happened at the time of the 
investigation). It was highlighted how the end consumer remained absent from the 
debate per se and was even found to profit from the exclusive agreements, offering 
more products through a major’s channels: products that the consumer could not 
have access to otherwise, exactly because of the very same majors controlling the 
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relevant distribution channels. It appeared that, based on for the hearing examiner’s 
view, if Columbia was both the problem, then Columbia was also the remedy. 
Ultimately, it was shown that by the time the saga reached the stage of appeal, the 
‘record’ was already stale.  
4.2.1.5 Connecting the dots  
Nevertheless, an evaluation of the case would be incomplete without a big leap 
forward in time and the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the licencing of intellectual 
property issued jointly by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission.565 The guidelines do affirm IP licensing as generally pro-competitive 
for the advancement of the aim shared by intellectual property and competition law, 
meaning the promotion of innovation and the enhancement of consumer welfare. 
However, they also stretch that anticompetitive effects can arise on a both horizontal 
(when the licensing parties are actual or potential competitors) and vertical level, 
which can consequently trigger the relevant merger laws.566  
In this light, licensing agreements are to be viewed under a Rule of Reason approach 
and they are generally favoured, unless they go beyond their legitimate aim to 
conceal price-fixing, market allocation, or other anticompetitive practices the courts 
are strongly antipathetic to. As per the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in A&E 
Plastik Pak Co.: 
“the critical question in an antitrust context is whether the restriction may fairly be 
said to be ancillary to a commercially supportable licensing arrangement, or 
whether the licensing scheme is a sham set up for the purpose of controlling 
competition while avoiding the consequences of the antitrust laws.”567  
As per the guidelines, IP licensing agreements will most of the times fall into the so 
described ‘safety zones’ and an investigation will not be triggered unless a restraint 
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on trade is ‘facially’ anticompetitive and if one the additional criteria set forth is met, 
depending on the nature of the market (goods, technology, or innovation). In this 
vein, the guidelines note that an exclusive licence may raise antitrust concerns only 
if the licensees themselves, or the licensor and its licensees, are in a horizontal 
relationship. However, the Rule of Reason will still be applied to evaluate the 
purposes and the effects of the licence “in light of the licensing party’s market 
power.”568 Hence, antitrust concerns will arise when the exclusivity aims to sustain 
or affect monopolisation.569 
Based on the above, and following the argumentation provided by the examiner in 
1964, who noted the procompetitive effects of the agreements as allowing for smaller 
competitors to reach the market, it is harder to imagine a more critical treatment of 
the case pursuant to the licensing guidelines. However, as stated earlier, the market 
is harder to reach because of the existence and the business model of the ‘bigger’ 
competitors. It cannot become clearer that the oligonomy has the utmost discretion 
to control what passes through its channels and what reaches the end consumer, 
meaning both music that the oligonomy represents through own labels and music 
licensed by smaller players.  
However, as intellectual property and competition law share the common aim of 
promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare, a more tolerant 
environment seems to be created, which can let cases such as the one described 
herein pass more easily below the radar. Thus, inserting intellectual property 
rationale into competition law and policy, as justified by the relevant policy 
concerns, leads to a de facto broadening of what constitutes an antitrust violation, to 
allow for the inherent monopoly that intellectual property affords. Thus, potential 
anticompetitive concerns can get overlooked, in the hope that this common aim will 
see the consumer benefit from the products of innovation. However, it should not be 
forgotten that the process of innovation is in need of own policies to guarantee that 
its fruits reach the end consumer after all.  
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All of these concerns become scrutinised in the following part, dealing with the long-
lasting debate of “sameness in prices”, albeit from a UK perspective. It was stated 
that the “sameness in prices” is more than a mere coincidence and that is has 
attracted much interest over the years. As it will be shown, “sameness in prices” is 
actually invited by the oligonomy’s own business model, due to practices such as the 
ones described above (licensing, exclusivity, and subsidisation of less successful 
artists). It is therefore vital to see how the authorities have dealt with copyright’s 
tangible embodiment, the price of which is in essence the price of not just one, but 
several IP afforded monopolies at the same time (sound recording, music, and 
lyrics).  
4.2.2 MMC Report into the price of CDs, 1994 
It is reminded that this report provides a closer look at the matters of the oligonomy 
from a UK perspective. It addresses the ‘practices’ of the oligonomy regarding the 
supply of recordings and elaborates on the ‘practices’ of the majors vis-à-vis the 
artists (exclusivity in artists’ contracts). This section places the UK competition 
regime, as it stood at the time of the investigation, under scrutiny and comments on 
the MMC’s inability to ‘see through’ the oligonomy’s business model and promote 
effective competition for the benefit of the end consumer.  
The former UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) launched its own 
investigation into the recorded music industry in 1994 “prompted by a concern 
about the prices of compact discs (CDs), and particularly the fact that prices 
appeared to be significantly higher in the UK than in the US,”570 pursuant to a 
referral by the Director General of Fair Trading.571 The resulting report (hereafter 
the MMC Report) of 406 pages constitutes the longest report in the matters of the 
recorded music industry and its retail conducted on UK soil at that time. It afforded 
a first thorough look into the UK market for pre-recorded music, the retail market, 
the prices of recordings, and the legal framework in place (UK copyright and 
competition regime), supplemented by an abundance of evidence from various 
stakeholders, including interested organisations and members of the public, 
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industry bodies, both the independent and the major record companies at the time, 
as well as distributors and record clubs. This Report, along with the subsequent 
investigation of the MMC into performing rights in 1996,572 offered a wealth of 
institutional description and data. Further, it opened the door for researching the 
dialectic between the cultural industries and their legal and economic aspects,573 
despite the long-standing history and presence of the majors in the UK and the 
acknowledgment that the “UK has a large and internationally important recorded 
music industry.”574 
For the purposes of the present, this investigation allows for a closer look at the 
competition authorities of the UK at the time and the appreciation of the business 
model from their point of view. This part of the thesis examines the extent to which 
similar concerns to those arising in the US exist and evaluates their treatment 
compared to the US authorities’ attempts to investigate the same industry and in 
essence the same handful of companies. Hence, this part of the thesis examines the 
way that the UK Competition Authorities perceived the operating business model of 
the music industry in the past. Was the competition framework at the time able to 
provide a thorough investigation of the competitive status of the industry?  Were 
there any market failures encountered and if so, how were they addressed? As such, 
this investigation offers an evaluation of the UK Competition framework with regard 
to monopolies575 and their alleged anticompetitive practices under the Fair Trading 
Act 1973, which also corresponds to the old business model.  
At the time of the investigation, section 6 of the Fair Trading Act 1973 provided for 
the investigation of scale and complex monopoly situations.576 In relation to goods, 
pursuant to section 6(1)(a) or (b) of the Act, a scale monopoly would exist when “at 
least one-quarter of all goods of a particular description which are supplied in the 
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574 MMC Report 7 at 2.4.  
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superseded by the market investigation provisions in the Enterprise Act 2002.  
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UK are supplied by or to the same person, or by or to members of the same group 
of interconnected bodies corporate.”  
A complex monopoly situation would arise under section 6(1)(c) and (2), when “at 
least one-quarter of all the goods of a particular description which are supplied in 
the UK are supplied by or to members of the same group consisting of two or more 
persons (not being a group of interconnected bodies corporate) who, either 
voluntarily or not and whether by agreement or not, so conduct their respective 
affairs as in any way to prevent, restrict or distort competition in connection with 
the production or supply of goods of that description.” 
Here, it should be noted that the purpose of the UK competition regime is not to 
proscribe monopoly situations, but to investigate whether the identified monopoly 
operates against the public interest, meaning that not all monopoly situations would 
be referred. In this sense, the now defunct Office of Trade Trading established with 
the 1973 Act, was in charge of monitoring industries and firms concentrating on 
those with larger market shares, where monopoly situations and abuses thereof 
could be identified. It would further receive complaints from consumer bodies and 
other stakeholders, also having the potential to trigger investigations. 577 Following 
an initial assessment form the OFT, its Director had the power to refer a particular 
monopoly situation to the MMC, which would investigate whether the referred 
monopoly operated or not against the public interest.578 The public interest test itself 
was further explained in section 84 of the Act, maintaining in essence the case-
specificity of each investigation and the desirability of “maintaining and promoting 
effective competition between persons supplying goods and services in the United 
Kingdom”579 among other considerations; as such its ambiguity was acknowledged 
and criticised.580  
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Thus, it is important to elaborate briefly on the public interest test, which is served 
by the notion of effective competition and the general interest of consumers in a 
procompetitive environment. For the purposes of this Act, it was not only the public 
interest test that lacked proper definition and backing; furthermore, the notion of 
effective competition itself is something that has attracted much commentary due to 
its vagueness.581 The above leave substantial conceptual gaps behind the rationale 
and the application of this Act and the investigations deriving from it. Coupled with 
the inability of the MMC to fine or impose sanctions, it would come as no surprise 
that very few market conditions were found to operate against the public interest 
under the 1973 Act.582 Besides, this is reflective of the overall stance of UK 
competition law, which traditionally has a broad purpose of determining effective 
competition in a market as a whole, rather than asserting legality or illegality of a 
certain industrial practice.583 
In the present case, the recorded music industry was referred for assessment to the 
MMC, following a report by the National Heritage Select Committee, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
the desirability— (a) of maintaining and promoting effective competition between persons 
supplying goods and services in the United Kingdom; (b) of promoting the interests of 
consumers, purchasers and other users of goods and services in the United Kingdom in 
respect of the prices charged for them and in respect of their quality and the variety of 
goods and services supplied; (c) of promoting, through competition, the reduction of costs 
and the development and use of new techniques and new products, and of facilitating the 
entry of new competitors into existing markets; (d) of maintaining and promoting the 
balanced distribution of industry and employment in the United Kingdom; and (e) of 
maintaining and promoting competitive activity in markets outside the United Kingdom on 
the part of producers of goods, and of suppliers of goods and services, in the United 
Kingdom. 
580 Furse (n 576) 4 point 20 “The DFGT defined the public interest as ‘consumer well-being’ 
but admitted that ‘I do not think anybody could possibly pretend that they could sit down 
and do some sums and have an answer they can defend against all comers at the end of the 
day.’ The Chairman of the MMC said that it was impossible to define the public interest in a 
general context, and the Minister simply referred to the criteria set out in the Act.” 
Referring to HC249 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth report: UK policy on monopolies 
London HMSO 1995. 
581 R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law (2015), S Bishop and M Walker, The Economics 
of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, 3rd edn, (2010) ch 2. 
582 B J Rodger and A MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EU and UK, 5th edn, 
(2015) 154.  






indicated substantial differences in the prices of recordings between the UK and the 
US.584 The MMC was asked to indicate: 
 “a. whether a monopoly situation exists, and if so, in favour of what person or 
persons; b. whether any steps are being taken… to exploit that monopoly; and c. 
whether any facts found by the MMC operate or may be expected to operate 
against the public interest.”585 
 
4.2.2.1 The complex monopoly of the majors: anticompetitive conduct and the public 
interest test  
Starting with the first question and the existence of a monopoly situation as per the 
Act, three separate monopolies were found to exist in the industry: a scale monopoly 
in retail (W.H. Smith group) and two complex ones, one on retail level (with respect 
to the group consisting of W.H. Smith, Our Price, HMV, and Woolworths), and one 
among the majors, which were five at the time of the investigation (BMG, EMI, 
Polygram, Sony, Warner).586  
Focusing on the majors themselves, it was identified that they did supply one-
quarter of the market between them (combined market share of 72 percent),587 even 
though no single firm reached a 25 percent market share.588 The majors contested 
the existence of a complex monopoly situation pointing out that the practices they 
were accused of “were common throughout the industry” (emphasis added), 
and hence the MMC “should not single out the five majors as members of a group 
constituting a complex monopoly situation.”589  
The practices able to restrict competition identified were: similar pricing policies, 
the restriction of parallel imports (it was suggested that allowing parallel imports 
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587 Ibid 8 at 2.8. 
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from the US would reduce prices), and the exclusive contractual relationships that 
artists enter with the record companies.  
The MMC insisted in that since, even within the members of the industry, these 
companies were characterised as the ‘majors’, this alone signalled the existence of a 
group for the purposes of the Act. As the reports states: 
 “the evidence of market share and the way they are regarded by others in the 
industry as well as outside it leads us to conclude that the commercial reality is 
that if these five companies were to act in a similar fashion, they could 
influence the practices of the whole industry”590 (emphasis added).  
Therefore, it would be of interest to examine the extent to which these practices that 
are common throughout the industry, are in effect the result of the similar fashion 
the majors operate, which creates the industrial practice canvas for the whole the 
industry; a realisation that could carry significant anticompetitive weight. This 
observation should be measured against the outcome of the investigation that the 
identified monopolies do not operate against the public interest, in that “the 
companies in whose favour they [the monopolies] operate are not able to exercise 
market power in a way which enables them to exploit their monopoly positions,”591 
since they were found to compete with each other rigorously.  
Hence, the extent to which these companies did act in a similar fashion and did 
influence the whole industry was unfortunately not addressed per se, since the 
definition of a complex monopoly in the Act does not necessitate such an evaluation. 
Nevertheless, a significant amount of though-provoking evidence is to be found in 
the views of independent record companies in the Report: e.g. MCA admitted being 
a “price follower”592 and another anonymous respondent provided that “the major 
companies and the major retailer chains had an affinity of interest to maintain CD 
prices at their current levels.”593 The same anonymous respondent further 
suggested that the majors divest their acquisitions in both recording and publishing, 
demerge in order to allow for more competition, and reduce their shares in 
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engineering and manufacturing in order to liberate the production process,594 
hinting at the undeniable role and position the majors hold in the industry.  
The evidence provided above, describe and point at the same dominant business 
model that the oligonomy had been maintaining for decades, at the very core of 
which the bottleneck around the provision of the creative output is encountered. It 
is the structure of the industry itself that seems to be restricting or preventing 
competition; it was seen that the oligonomy is positioned at its core, in a way that 
forces minor players to either deal or get absorbed by the majors, proving a highly 
consolidated environment. It was established in the previous chapter that the minor 
players are acting as a risk evaluation mechanism for the oligonomy, which 
proceeds to engulf them and their niche genres, should they become successful 
enough,595 even though they set out to ‘disturb’ their dominant presence.596 In brief, 
the minors are a ‘feeding hand’ for the oligonomy.  
Indeed, all the independent record companies that responded, admitted that 
competition with the majors was rigorous; however, this observation on its own 
does not necessarily evaluate the nature of the competitive process.  It might be the 
case that the competitive process need not be fair or even considerate of 
competitors.597 However, it needs to be somehow considered how competition in a 
market where the lengthy history of commercial reality views the minors as unable 
to operate outside the reach of the oligonomy, can actually be effective,598 given that 
it might have never functioned properly at the first place. Hence, it comes as no 
surprise that out of the four independent respondents in the Report, two are 
currently part of Universal (MCA and Pickwick), one went bankrupt in 2004 
(Telstar), whereas only the third one remains one of the few prominent independent 
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‘activists’ in the music world and has built its own network of connections, the 
“Beggars Group”.    
Again, this might hold merit should one consider the particular history of the 
industry and the oligonomic business model, which surrounds the provision of 
music by creating the bottleneck often referred to in the present, marking the 
necessity of ‘passing through’ the majors’ channels, either as a competitor or as the 
end consumer.599  Indeed, in order for the discussion to reach the competition law 
framework, the focus should be on the consumer rather than on the competitor. 
This was hard to achieve under the specific legislative framework, since no direct 
evidence of consumer harm could be provided against the vague wording of the Act. 
Furthermore, bottlenecking the content was not something the authorities were 
‘watching out’ for in a complaint around the pricing of CDs: in the top-down 
designed business model, the mass market would be served.  
Nevertheless, it is not overlooked at the current stage that the market investigations 
brought under the Act were not aimed at safeguarding the position of competitors 
and that generally, competition policy is aimed at promoting and protecting the 
competitive process for the ultimate benefit of consumers.600 In this light, the 
existence of minors or independents competing with the majors can always be 
attested at every point in the history of the industry and across jurisdictions, even 
though their individual success and presence in the market is notoriously short-
lived, something which was raised during the present investigation601 and was also 
evidenced in the previous chapters of the thesis. Hence, when investigating the 
existence of constraints upon the majors and a fast-paced rigorously competitive 
environment, these will always be evidenced. A closer and more thorough look into 
the industry itself is required, in order to appreciate its dynamics and evaluate the 
fate of competition, even if the fate of the competitor is not an advocated aim.  
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In this vein, it is important to repeat that when evaluating the group of majors or the 
oligonomy described herein, it is not simply a matter of ‘trend setting’ or influencing 
industrial conduct. For instance, with respect to the specific Act, a complex 
monopoly is described as one that does engage in activity that distorts, restricts or 
prevents competition; however, it further needs to operate against the vaguely 
described ‘public interest’, as the Act prescribes. It follows that for as long as a 
degree of effective competition is maintained, the public interest will broadly be 
served. All the evidence in the Report reveals the existence of “vigorous 
competition” as per the interviewees,602 which allows for the public interest test to 
be easily satisfied. One should be particular critical at this point however, as the 
existence of a competitive framework appears to be tipped in favour of the 
oligonomy, given that minor or independent players are either being completely 
absorbed by the majors or forced to collaborate closely with them, creating the nexus 
examined earlier.603 
Even though in Columbia for instance, the examiner was seen repeating that 
‘bigness’ itself is not an alarming issue and that one should look out for efficiencies 
in a market,604 it should be contemplated whether the mere existence of 
independents and minors when taking snap-shots of the industry suffices and 
whether there are deficiencies in the competitive process, even when the authorities 
can characterise a competitive framework as effective overall. Ultimately, it was 
presented in the second chapter of the thesis that the majors, as they stemmed out 
of the hardware era, in fact predate rather than simply influence the business model 
of the recorded music industry. This calls for a more holistic macro-perception of 
the industrial framework. It follows that focusing on compartmentalised 
investigations and their accompanying legal provisions, will have the effect of 
focusing on a tree rather than the forest.  
This observation should also be viewed in conjunction with FTC’s attempts to tackle 
the majors’ practices several decades prior in the US, by focusing on one 
representative (Columbia):  in the US, a similar pro-competitive environment was 
observed, consisting of the same few majors and a nexus of minors engaging in 
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comparable practices, which are apparently able to attract antitrust and 
investigatory scrutiny under very different competition regimes and at very different 
points in history. Nevertheless, the examiner in that case referred to the overall 
picture of the industry where the oligonomy operates as a vigorously competitive 
environment, with low barriers to entry, where innovation is allowed to thrive (even 
though minor players are not).  
Staying at Columbia, it should be borne in mind that the hearing examiner attested 
the ‘temptation’ to find antitrust violations in such perplex industrial setting like the 
record music industry, under a “melange of charges”.605 At that point, the thesis 
commented that perhaps it is the absence of a framework capable of addressing a 
“melange of charges” that should be reconsidered. The observations raised by the 
MMC Report attest that this was even more so the case on this side of the Atlantic, 
at least at the time of the investigation.606 
One could say that the UK market investigation scheme which “embodies the 
traditional UK approach to competition law,”607 by exactly attempting a broader 
look into whole markets for corrective rather than punitive causes, offers an 
opportunity to appreciate the majors in a manner that the FTC was not able to do. 
This further offers the opportunity to view how different competition regimes and 
policies approach the same companies and the same business model. Consequently, 
this approach aligns with the overall aim of the thesis as repeated earlier in 
Columbia: whether these similar tactics and practices operating on (market) 
industrial608 level across and multiple jurisdictions, are in need of more apt 
understanding and solutions in the first place. Based on the evaluation above, it 
would appear that this is the case.  
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In this framework, the inability of the market investigations under the Fair Trading 
Act to offer a more thorough look at the industry is again highlighted. If the public 
interest test allowed for more elaboration in the present case for instance, there 
could have been an opportunity to by-pass any vagueness in wording, assessing 
access to content per se. However, 1994 was not the time and the MMC was not the 
authority to evaluate this, especially under the FTA 1973, which asked if the 
exploitation of a practice that prima facie restricts, distorts, or prevents competition 
operated against the public interest, served by the notion of effective competition.   
Proceeding with the present investigation, and complex monopoly aside, the 
difference in the prices of CDs between the two countries was ultimately found to 
also reflect broader reasons behind price differentials “such as the much larger size 
of the US market… and the generally lower US retailing costs,”609 arguments which 
applied not only to CDs, but also to a wider range of manufactured goods.610 
Nevertheless, many interesting points were made in relation to the industry, the 
majors, and the copyright regime of the UK for the first time. For instance, it is of 
interest to note how the nature of copyright exploitation and its legal framework was 
addressed directly by the MMC, which consequently unfolds the competition 
authority’s understanding of the business model built around it.  
4.2.2.2 Control of parallel imports  
Firstly, the MMC looked at the right to control parallel imports, following a claim by 
the Consumers’ Association that “if retailers were free to import records from the 
US they would do so and this would force the UK record companies to lower their 
prices.”611  However, the control of parallel imports falls under section 22 of the 
CPDA 1988, 612 as the UK, even before the introduction of Directive 92/100/EEC, 
provided for the control of imports of copyrighted material. In the case of music 
recordings, the permission of both the owner of the copyright in music and the 
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owner of the copyright in the sound recording was required for records to be 
imported into the country.613 The Act however, did not oblige the copyright owner to 
control or restrict imports and indeed, licensing schemes were in place,614 should the 
rightsholders choose to use them. 
Furthermore, section 144 of the CDPA 1988 provided for the Secretary of State to 
order compulsory licences, pursuant to an MMC report finding adverse effect on the 
public interest. Hence, the exercise of the rights provided under the CDPA could be 
done compatibly with the purposes of the Fair Trading Act. The majors’ practices of 
prohibiting all imports in certain circumstances and charging the same fees when 
imports were allowed, was considered by the MMC as a practice “capable of forming 
the basis of a complex monopoly situation.”615  
Ultimately, the claim of the Consumers’ Association to remove this control was 
dismissed both as unfound and as opposing the EC Rental Directive, which was 
about to be introduced. Under the Directive all members states would be required to 
control parallel imports from outside the EC (at the time), something the CDPA 
already provided for.616  
Controlling parallel imports from outside the EC was deemed integral to the 
“international developments in the protection of intellectual property”617 and vital 
to affording strong territorial-based protection for the copyright owner, an intrinsic 
part of intellectual property policy. The ability to control parallel imports, 
strengthens the rightsholder’s position in that among other things, it becomes more 
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616 Art 9 Directive 92/100/EEC provided that “Member States shall provide — for 
performers, in respect of fixations of their performances, — for phonogram producers, in 
respect of their phonograms, — for producers of the first fixations of films, in respect of the 
original and copies of their films, — for broadcasting organizations, in respect of fixations 
of their broadcast as set out in Article 6 (2), the exclusive right to make available these 
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difficult to confine piracy in its absence.618 In other words, the absence of any 
anticompetitive dimension of the practice, even though initially relevant to the 
provisions of the FTA, was to be found in the essence of copyright law. Even though 
the MMC did not refer to the public interest per se in this part of the Report, it 
appeals to the broader premise that the nature of copyright protection is such that 
eradicates competition concerns in most circumstances. It follows that the 
protection of intellectual property is in the public interest per se.619 
With regard to the other two practices however (similar pricing policies and artists’ 
contracts), a closer look into the market for the supply of recorded music as 
identified, is permitted.620 Even though it is the same business model investigated in 
both countries, the UK competition landscape allowed for groups of firms to be 
investigated together as per the wording of the Fair Trading Act and less attention 
was paid to the definition of a relevant product market. This is different from the US, 
where the FTC had to operate on single firm level and where hurdles in defining the 
product market were observed.  Interesting to repeat here again how, regardless of 
the broader or narrower approach, the result is favourable to the oligononomy’s 
members in both countries, even when the similar issue of supply and distribution is 
in question, both as a result of ‘looser’ legal provisions (UK) and as a result of more 
rigorous enforcement (US).  
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619 Before leaving the discussion on import control, it should be emphasised that the issue re-
appeared in an anticompetitive context following the UK competition reforms (Competition 
Act 1998 and Enterprise Act 2002). A new investigation followed at the Office of Trading in 
2002, for hope that the new agency would perhaps offer an updated reading of the oligonomy 
and the issue of controlling imports from within the EEA (this time) that resulted in higher 
prices for the consumers. The OFT received allegations about vertical agreements to control 
imports, which would trigger an investigation as per Chapter I of the CA 98. Nevertheless, 
since the agreements complained of had concluded prior to the investigation, the OFT could 
not take any action. In any event, the OFT promised to “keep the CD market under review” 
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Office of Trading, Wholesale supply of compact discs September 2002 OFT 391 1. This 
promise notwithstanding, it is argued herein that keeping an eye on the future of the CD 
market in 2002 would hold little merit given its immediate future.  
620 Indeed, and contrary to the lengthy Columbia conundrum in the US, the MMC believed 
that “the supply of recorded music as defined in our terms of reference is the relevant 
economic market in which to consider these questions,” and no argument to the contrary 






4.2.2.3 Similar prices  
On the matter of similar pricing, it was found that the similarities in prices 
constituted a practice and that “since price is an important component of 
competition… competition is restricted by the similarity of pricing policies between 
the companies.”621 The restriction, prevention or distortion on competition resulting 
from the practice however, needs to be operating against the public interest for the 
purposes of the Act and this was not ultimately sustained by the MMC, thanks to the 
existence of rigorous competition in the industry (on firm level), as also advanced 
earlier in the US.622 
According to the majors, the sameness in prices was a result of “a competitive 
market and did not reflect any dominance of the major record companies or 
collusion between them.”623An issue featuring in the authorities’ vocabulary since 
the time of Columbia, “sameness in prices” features here once again as an aspect of 
the concentrated industry, which remains dictated by the few major players’ 
practices. It was shown how the issue of “sameness in prices” was not paid great 
attention during Columbia, since the overall industrial environment was described 
as highly competitive and innovative. In the present case, the MMC agreed with the 
majors’ contentions that the prices of CDs were a result of inherent unpredictability 
of demand (which prevents dissimilar pricing at the first place), consumer 
insensitivity to price changes as whole, format specific pricing mechanisms, and the 
retailers’ own pricing conduct.624 
                                                        
 
621 Report 12 at 2.35.   
622 (n 543).  
623 Report 26 at 2.113. However, it should be borne in mind that more recent literature 
suggests that there exist more categories of horizontal relationships between competitors 
than competition or collusion. See for instance the case of ‘coopetition’. As such “a firm can 
live in symbiosis by coexisting with other relationships, or being involved in a relationship 
simultaneously containing elements of both cooperation and competition,” in M Bengtsson 
and S Kock, “Cooperation and competition in relationships between competitors in business 
networks” (1999) 14 (3) Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 178-194. Without 
wishing to analyse or provide the reasons behind the sameness in prices at this instance, it is 
important to draw the reader’s attention to alternative literature on the topic to highlight 
how relationships such as the one described herein have not caught the attention of the 
legislator, despite their potential relevance and impact.  






The majors argued that aiming to maximise the value of their investment in 
copyright, they did charge higher for CDs, a practice reflective of the end consumers’ 
willingness to “pay for the higher sound quality, durability and user-
friendliness,”625 even though the manufacturing costs did not vary greatly between 
formats. Price differentials across formats are common practice across the copyright 
exploitation sector (books, films etc.) and they correspond to consumer demand, 
since the product (copyrighted material) can be accessed in a “range in terms of 
price and quality to suit different consumers’ needs.”626 This constituted one of the 
reasons behind the segregated market definition advocated by the FTC in the US. 
Even though the UK competition regime had found a way to accommodate both a 
broader market reading (concentrating on groups) and the concern in question 
without compartmentalising the market for the sake of definition, it needs to be 
reaffirmed that in both cases, price differentiation by format (CDs and cassettes in 
the UK, LPs and singles in the US) corresponds to end consumer demand 
preferences. 
As a matter of fact, the report itself dedicates almost twenty pages to the analysis of 
pricing mechanisms, including price comparisons with the US.627 The detailed 
analysis provides a thorough look into formats and price categories (full price for 
new and potentially successful releases, mid-price for slower-selling re-releases, 
budget-price for releases with generally low brand image) and addresses the reasons 
behind the categorisations.628 Again, the rationale reflects the unpredictability of 
success, the inability to price per unit based on manufacturing cost, as well as the 
general perception that price reflects quality from the point of view of artists, 
retailers, and consumers.629 Competition exists on firm level thanks to promotional 
campaigns and discounts offered, aiming to achieve sales. The record companies 
claimed that these prices had been established over time through competition 
between them and through “interaction between record companies, on the one 
hand, and retailers on the other, to become ‘standard’ form of pricing in the 
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626 Report 26 at 2.118.  
627 Report 140 onwards Part 7. 
628 Report 142 at 7.7.   






industry in the UK and in other countries.”630 Is it the case that since these price 
differentials are invited by similar policies and similar practices, the advocated 
‘fierce competition’ is hardly any competition at all, as judged by the point of view of 
the end consumer?  
Furthermore, prices were differentiated by format, with the CD being priced 
differently reflecting this format’s higher quality, a common feature in the copyright-
based industries. Record companies normally release all formats at the same time, 
providing a variety of choice for the end consumer, who would purchase the same 
music according to personal budget or sound quality requirements. They argued that 
this resulted in increased demand for recorded music, greater sales, lower unit costs, 
greater product variety, and lower prices, or in other words, in an environment that 
does not leave the consumer worse off, allowing for the public interest test to be 
met.631  
A standardised form of pricing restrictive of competition as it may be, needs to be 
evaluated as to its operation against the public interest, as explained with respect to 
the Act. Nevertheless, making sense of the public interest test also means looking 
out for effective competition in a market. It seems however, that the reasoning 
behind the standardised pricing as provided above, does not leave any room for the 
evaluation of a competitive environment, let alone an effective one, even they 
though the majors did claim that one existed and that these prices constituted its 
reflection.632  
Making sense of the above requires a closer look into the UK regime yet again, as it 
should be noted that “at no point has the objective of UK competition law been 
clearly stated and defined,”633 leaving this open to political interpretation, especially 
with regard to the 1973 Act (which introduced the public interest test).634 The Act’s 
flexibility and purposely broad catchment area allowed for a plethora of market 
                                                        
 
630 Report 143 at 7.15. 
631 Report 147 at 7.28. 
632 Report 26 at 2.113. Sameness in prices was a result of “a competitive market and did not 
reflect any dominance of the major record companies or collusion between them.” 
633 Rodger and MacCulloch (n 582) 26.  
634 This politically influenced landscape for UK competition laws altered with the enactment 
of the Competition Act 1998, the Enterprise Act 2002 (under which market investigations 






investigations on the one hand, but also for the majority of them to be found 
‘healthy’ on the other. In past, the MMC had been characterised as ‘toothless’ and its 
investigations had caused concern among consumers and consumer groups.635 
Hence, making use of effective competition should require a clearer interpretation of 
what aims and objectives competition is working towards, otherwise a lot of 
ambiguity can remain in the market under examination.  
With respect to the prices of CDs in the present investigation, the pricing 
mechanisms presented above, were found to be ultimately effective since the 
“similarity in pricing policies of the major companies does not appear to be the 
result of any lack of competition. Rather it is a reflection that competitive pressures 
have forced them to act in broadly similar ways.”636 In this sense, effective 
competition becomes (roughly) any non-objectionable competition, for lack of a 
predefined benchmark.637  
Nevertheless, assuming or suggesting that the oligonomy operates in a competitive 
environment because competition is not absent, requires caution. The history of the 
members of this complex monopoly (or oligonomy) is one of a constant series of 
mergers, acquisitions and serious cooperation on industrial level, suggesting 
orchestrated conduct (e.g. payola). In such a consolidated environment, asserting 
that since prices are set in an analogous manner because competition is not absent, 
should not imply that the environment is procompetitive instead, even if such 
competition is described as effective in the Act.  
Given that the purpose of this part of the thesis is to evaluate the efficiency of the Act 
employed to investigate the business model of the industry, it can be deduced that 
                                                        
 
635 T Usher (n 577). 
636 Report 27 at 2.121. 
637 According to Whish and Bailey (n 581) 18, “the idea of effective competition does not 
appear to be the product of any particular theory or model of competition – perfect, 
workable, contestable or any other… Effective competition does connote the idea, however, 
that firms should be subject to a reasonable degree of competitive constraint, from actual 
and potential competitors and from customers, and that the role of a competition authority 
is to see that constraints are present on the market.” However, definitions of effective 
competition have been attempted in the US from early on see e.g. B Smith, 1951, “Effective 
competition: hypothesis for modernizing the antitrust laws” (1951) 26 NYUL Rev 405. 
Further, the term has been used as closely synonymous to workable competition in M A 
Adelman, “Effective competition and the antitrust laws” (1948) 61 (8) HarvLRev 1289-1350. 






its vagueness (relying on the public interest and the notion of effective competition) 
does not serve a welfare-enhancing purpose. Further, it fails to elaborate on the 
aggregate conduct of the members of the identified monopoly group by focusing on 
the issue of prices, which appears to be a resulting symptom of the oligonomy’s 
business model and of its overall industrial structure. 
Indeed, not much can be learned by focusing on the matter of prices per se over the 
years and across jurisdictions, as first evidenced in Columbia, where the prices just 
‘happened’ to be the same. In the UK, sameness was treated as a competition-
restricting practice, relevant to the investigation of a complex monopoly, which 
however, did not result in any consumer-harming conduct. This comes as no 
surprise, since this sameness was seen as a result of ‘competitive pressures’. 
Naturally, the paradox of describing a practice as both able to restrict or distort 
competition and as being the result of competitive pressures, should not be 
overlooked.  
Another important point with regard to the prices, is the differentiation by format 
and the role of the end consumer. In Columbia, it was argued inter alia that, since 
the different formats (LPs and singles) were priced differently and consumer 
demand reflected that difference, then separate submarkets should be defined. In 
the UK, pricing was investigated as a practice of anticompetitive concern, without 
the need for an elaborate and technical market definition. Even though flexibility 
from the part of the UK investigation scheme was noted, the end result does not 
differ greatly: in neither case did the “sameness in prices” raise concern, since it was 
the direct result of a (so-called) procompetitive environment, characterised by great 
unpredictability in product success, which alone justifies sameness. 
However, in both investigations the end consumer was also found to appreciate 
different formats differently. Subsequently, it can be said that different formats 
compete for “the consumer’s dollar” in the UK as well.638 This realisation becomes 
even more important in the digital age, when the majors neglect to cater for the end 
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consumer’s preferred format altogether (digital consumption),639 or seek to control 
alternative methods of consumption broadly defined (live music). With the 
treatment of the market as mass, as repeated throughout the present, access to 
content was never an issue or at least an issue that the competition authorities were 
worried about. Nevertheless, it was access to content that was being engulfed and 
bottlenecked by the members of the oligonomy. Insisting on its symptoms (e.g. 
pricing) or compartmentalising the oligonomy’s conduct, did not allow for this main 
anticompetitive concern and market failure to come forward, as one directly tied to 
consumer welfare or the public interest. Even if the MMC was ready to investigate 
both sides of the oligonomy and address the bottleneck around the music product 
itself, the Act at its disposal did not allow for conduct that operated against the 
public interest to be found.  
Therefore, with the MMC asserting that the prices are a result of effective or non-
objectionable competition, the next practice that was found to prevent, restrict or 
distort competition and that was subsequently evaluated, was the practice of signing 
exclusive recording contracts with the artists.640 The following section allows the 
thesis to assess both the distribution and the key resource of the old business model, 
or in other terms, the bottleneck and the accompanying gatekeeper function. In that 
respect, the MMC’s investigation is broader than the one conducted by the FTC, as it 
touches on the explicit matter of securing artists access to the public (end 
consumers), focusing on the distribution chain of recorded music as a whole. The 
thesis examines whether these issues were actually ‘picked up’ by the UK 
competition authority.  
                                                        
 
639 When the consumer protection organisation “Which?” turned to the price of digital 
downloads and their higher UK prices, the matter was referred to the European Commission 
by the OFT and it focused around Apple’s anticompetitive conduct “the Commission’s 
antitrust proceedings have also clarified that it is not agreements between Apple and the 
major record companies which determine how the iTunes store is organised in Europe. 
Consequently, the Commission does not intend to take further action in this case.” European 
Commission Press release, “Antitrust: European Commission welcomes Apple's 
announcement to equalise prices for music downloads from iTunes in Europe” January 9 
2008, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-22_en.htm.  






4.2.2.4 Exclusive contractual relationships between recording artists and record 
companies 641 
The investigation proceeded with considering the practice of “entering into 
recording contracts with artists which include terms that restrict the artists’ ability 
to exploit their talent fully and restrict competition in the supply of recorded 
music”.642 As with pricing and import control, this practice was found to prevent, 
distort, or restrict competition by the complex monopoly of the majors who whether 
voluntarily or not and whether by agreement or not so conducted their affairs. 
Nevertheless, the Act is satisfied if the restriction operates against the public 
interest, which was the basis of the MMC’s evaluation here as well. 
Before proceeding with the specifics, it should be repeated that this part of the 
investigation offers a more thorough look at the business model and its evolution, 
since it deals specifically with key resources, cost structures, key activities, and 
revenue streams. Further, it offers the possibility to assess how unreasonable 
restraint of trade643 operates in this context. As such, it allows for a broader legal 
evaluation of the Building Blocks of the business model canvas. Additionally, the 
investigation coincides with the time when the late George Michael brought an 
unsuccessful action against his record company on the basis of unreasonable 
restraint of trade and infringement of (former) Article 85(1) EC Treaty, which 
prohibits agreements affecting trade between member states and restricting 
competition.644 Thus, a clearer evaluation of the oligopsony towards artists and of 
the majors’ gatekeeper function, follows in the current section of the chapter.  
                                                        
 
641 CDPA 1988 s185 defines an exclusive recording contract as “a contract between a 
performer and another person, under which that person is entitled to the exclusion of all 
other persons (including the performer) to make recordings of one or more of his 
performances with a view to their commercial exploitation.”   
642 Report 10 at 2.23. It is worth repeating here that the artist is encountered in the following 
Building Blocks of the old business model: key resource (portfolio of artists and copyrighted 
content), cost structure (royalty payments and subsidising unsuccessful artists), key 
activities (in A& R), and revenue streams (huge sales from a few superstars).   
643 Restraint of trade with respect to the relationship between musicians and intermediaries 
(publishers and record companies) has been encountered sine the case of Schroder Music 
Publishing v Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308, [1974] 3 All ER 616, and Elton John v James 
(1983) [1991] FSR 397.  
644 Panayiotou and others v Sony Music Entertainment [1994] EMLR 229. The case took 






At first, with regard to establishing a practice, the majors argued that the 
agreements are drafted as to allow the artists to fully develop and exploit their 
talents and as such, they do not restrict, prevent, or distort competition.645 If 
anything, they added, exclusivity with regard to the assignment of copyright coupled 
with a prolonged contractual period is essential for the industry to function at all.646 
The MMC concluded that the artists are indeed restricted. However, this did not 
imply that the way the oligonomy conducts its affairs is good or bad, or that this 
operates against the public interest. At that part of the investigation it sufficed to 
establish that restrictive contractual clauses in e.g. financial matters, as well as the 
uniform, standardised contracts across all members of the oligonomy, constituted a 
practice pursued by the five companies investigated.647  
This is not far from the truth and, had the investigation allowed for a more in-depth 
evaluation, it would have become obvious that this uniform practice of signing 
exclusive contracts with artists, relates to the time when patent holders sought to 
secure the services of performing artists, and most importantly of the most famous 
performers, in order to showcase their sound recording technological 
advancements.648 It further constitutes a practice born out of the majors themselves, 
as it was conceived by Eldridge Johnson of Victor.649 Thus, it forms an intrinsic part 
of the business model and it does lie at the core of the oligonomy and the industry 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, which provides for block 
exemptions for vertical agreements unless the primary object of the agreement concerns 
intellectual property. Further, in 2004, Art 101(3) became directly applicable by competition 
authorities and domestic courts, which could potentially justify a different treatment of a 
similar case, should one arise. Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 OJ L1/1 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. As 
Bently and Sherman suggest, domestic courts could have relied on the Panayiotou ruling to 
avoid referral to the Commission, which is no longer the case. In L Bently and B Sherman, 
Intellectual Property, 4th edn, (2015) 318.  
645 Report 13-14 at 2.41.  
646 Ibid.  
647 Report 13-14 at 2.42.  
648 (n 134).  
649 Victor appears in the genealogical tree of many of the majors. It became RCA Victor in 






from the time when copyright in sound recordings remained under the provisions of 
state law in the US.650  
History attests that exclusivity in securing the services of recording artists and 
composers is indeed a practice initiated by the forefathers of the oligonomy and its 
initial purpose was to boost the sales of ‘talking machines’ and player pianos and to 
secure return on investment in music copyright. This refers to the relationships 
between composers and the big publishing houses of Tin Pan Alley (who were the 
most powerful people in the music industry at the time).651 Later it was shown how 
Aeolian’s attempted to sign long-term exclusivity contracts with the leading 
publishers in order to control the reproduction of all the music they represented, led 
to the introduction of the compulsory licensing system in the US. It is very 
interesting therefore to observe how the business model transcends jurisdictions in 
order to form an established industrial practice (especially considering, yet again, 
that it the same handful of companies constituting the oligonomy). 
Thus, exclusivity remains at the core of the recording (and the publishing to a 
smaller extent) activity, since before the oligonomy attained its dominant traits and 
business model; if anything, it could be deduced that securing these exclusive 
relationships constitutes the business model itself. Hence, as a relevant practice that 
predates the industry and the business model even, its value to the artists and its 
effect on competition had not been investigated much, bar from the statutory 
compulsory licensing scheme under US copyright laws which, as introduced, 
                                                        
 
650 See ch 2 of the present. According to §101 of the 1976 Copyright Act “material objects in 
which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.” Section 301(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act specified that federal law 
covered only recordings made after February 15, 1972; all those made prior to that date 
remained under state law, which in some time cases even meant common law, as illustrated 
in the 2005 case of Capitol v. Naxos. The New York State Court of Appeals declared that 
since the New York State had not passed explicit statutes dealing with copyright in 
recordings, they were in fact governed by common law, and thus protection was absolute and 
perpetual. In T Brooks, "Only in America: the unique status of sound recordings under US 
copyright law and how it threatens our audio heritage" (2009) 27 (2) American Music 125-
137. 
651 See also in D Passman (n 48) 232. Songwriters would transfer ownership of the copyright 
in music and lyrics (one copyright per song under US laws) to the publishers, who would 
control the first use of the music by deciding which performing artist (and record company) 






suggested that competition should exist at musical composition level (avoidance of 
monopoly in hit or popular songs). Since musical compositions can be recorded by 
various artists, exclusivity is required to secure the most popular performer whose 
version of a recording would be the most successful in the market.652  
It would not be an exaggeration to make this connection at this stage, since this 
practice is rooted deep in the industry’s history. As the huge sales from a few 
superstars became the main revenue stream of the oligonomy’s business model,653 it 
becomes evident that securing maximum return on investment in making and 
breaking a superstar requires monopolisation, which can only be secured 
contractually through exclusivity agreements, with or without covering the same 
music.654 
Indeed, exclusive contractual relationships do make sense in a business context first 
in publishing and then in recording; however, it was observed that the US Congress 
interfered to ‘break’ the monopolisation of musical compositions, when a hardware 
manufacturer (Aeolian) sought exclusivity over the mechanical reproduction: since 
the music was not be monopolised, why should the artist be in a reversed scenario? 
This shows that a similar relevant practice was rectified as bad rather than good 
over a century ago in the US655 and acknowledged in the Berne convention.656 
Nevertheless, at this stage the investigation does not allow for a more qualitative (or 
comparative as a matter of fact) approach and so the matter is to be evaluated 
further on in the Report, when the exploitation of the practice is discussed regarding 
its operation against the public interest.657 
                                                        
 
652 See e.g. Elvis Presley’s career started with the cover of “That’s alright” first written and 
recorded by Arthur Crudup. http://www.allmusic.com/album/thats-all-right-mama-
bluebird-mw0000678956.  
653 Osterwalder’s presentation (n52).  
654Currently the compulsory licensing scheme is hardly ever used due its to burdensome 
administration, in Passman 227.  
655 See e.g. A Packard, Digital Media Law, 2nd edn, (2014)195-196, whereby the US 
Congress’s interventions to deter monopolistic behaviour in sound recordings and music 
compositions is laid out.  
656 Berne, Arts 11bis (2), 13. 
657 It should be repeated here that the UK system has not introduced the compulsory 
licensing scheme, as first presented in the second chapter.  In a UK context, compulsory 
licenses in copyright are granted in respect of conditions whereby the copyright owner’s 
position is unduly strengthened e.g. in the Broadcasting Act 1990 ss175, 176, and Sch17, 






4.2.2.5  Exploitation of the practice against the public interest 
The exclusive contracts were investigated in relation to their operation against the 
public interest in three features, as highlighted by artists’ managers. These were the 
ownership of copyright, their standardised format, and their exclusivity per se.  
The artists, as represented by their managers, claimed that the inequitable contracts 
they were called to sign restricted the full exploitation of their talent, leading to 
reduced competition and high prices through these three practices. They argued that 
the negotiating power lied with the majors, resulting in ‘take it or leave’ it deals, 
especially for non-established acts.  In that, the MMC responded that it is inevitable 
for the majors to seek the maximisation of their control over copyrights (return on 
investment).658 In any event, they agreed that the contracts were not inequitable, 
since artists were prompted to seek professional legal advice and since the record 
companies would rather safeguard themselves from getting sued for restraint of 
trade.659  
Interestingly enough, the MMC highlighted the existence of the restraint of trade 
doctrine as being enough of a safeguard and justified the necessity of securing 
exclusive contractual relationships, even though they constituted: 
 “the most restrictive aspect of contracts – on the face of them such clauses restrict 
competition because they prevent an artist performing for a competing record 
label. However... the company would have no way of securing a return on its 
investment if the artist were free to make records for another company. We accept 
therefore that in general a degree of exclusivity is necessary.”660 
Unsurprisingly, this was the rationale of Parker J, when considering whether George 
Michael’s agreement with Sony could amount to unreasonable restraint of trade. 
Even though restraint of trade was prima facie evident, it was not unreasonable, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
rectified following an MMC report. The British Broadcasting Commission and Independent 
Television publications: a report on the policies and practices of the BBC and ITP of limiting 
the publication of advance programme information (Cmnd 9614: 1995). Similarly, in an EU 
context see RTE and Independent Television Publications v Commission [1991] ECR II-485, 
[1991] 4 CLMR 586, where abuse of dominant position was found (Article 102 TFEU).  
658 Report 28 at 2.130.  
659 Report 28 at 2.133. Lack of independent legal advice has been found to justify restraint of 
trade even more recently in Proactive Sports Management v Rooney [2011] EWCA Civ 1444, 
a case regarding exclusivity in image rights.  






since the record company’s investment and assumption of risk in breaking new 
artists should be accounted for.661 Thus, the ability to secure independent advice 
coupled with the possibility to bring an action for restraint of trade were enough to 
justify that the ‘most restrictive’ practice of the oligonomy did not operate against 
the public interest. 
Regarding the case of George Michael as anticompetitive under EU law, not much 
can be learned, as Parker J could not justify an application of Article 85 (now Article 
101).662 Nevertheless, according to Lionel Bently, “the Commission would have been 
required to consider a deluge of individual applications under Article 101 (3).”663 
However, and following the developments in vertical agreements regarding IP and 
the ability to apply Article 101(3) domestically, there might still be the case of finding 
similar agreements anticompetitive today, especially should one consider the 
infamous 360 deals.664 
Indeed, it was shown that norm has become for contractual relationships between 
artists and record companies or promoters such as Live Nation, to encompass some 
form of multiple rights deals, where the company tries to secure a share of the 
artist’s all potential income streams.665 Such deals were introduced to subsidise for 
the record companies’ lost earnings in record sales and to ensure that “significant 
innovation was taking place in the music industry”.666 A sign of our times, they do 
represent the industry’s attempts to foresee where consumer demand and 
consumption lies in order to profit off the several channels, as it was presented in 
the previous chapter with regard to complementarity patterns. Furthermore, they 
signal the experimentation with several business models and business model 
innovation, as the quote above demonstrates. Nevertheless, for the current stage of 
                                                        
 
661 Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment [1994] EMLR 361. The specifics of the case fall 
outside the scope of the present due to the parties’ long history. However, for more 
information see Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, 4th edn, (2015) 315-316.  
662 Parker J further noted that the agreement did not affect trade between member states as 
the contract (as most recording contracts) operated ‘worldwide’, that it did not have an effect 
on trade at all, and that it did not restrict competition [1994] EMLR, 416, 420, 425.  
663 Bently and Sherman (n 644) 317. 
664 In Passman 102-108. See more at S Karubian, “360 deals: An industry reaction to the 
devaluation of recorded music" (2008) 18 S Cal Interdisc LJ 395. 
665 T Anderson, “The origins and pitfalls of 360 degree contracts for musicians” (2014) 25 (2) 
EntLR 35-40. 






the chapter, they are mentioned to suggest that the anticompetitive nature of the 
artists’ contracts has not subsided, but it has evolved and adjusted, however to the 
detriment of the artists. Hence, competition law still has a role to play in rectifying 
any unbalances between artists and intermediaries, for the ultimate benefit of the 
consumer.  
Lastly, turning to the issue of the copyright ownership, the artists’ claims and the 
majors’ counterclaims come as no surprise: the artists claimed that their copyrights 
should be licensed for limited periods rather than transferred to the record 
companies and that the benefits from such a shortened period of exclusivity would 
be securing competition and efficiency in the open market.667 On the contrary, the 
record companies counterclaimed that most of the artists preferred securing royalty 
sharing agreements in lengthy contracts over copyright ownership.668 They also 
highlighted: 
 “even where successful artists have acquired control of the copyright, there is no 
benefit to the public interest. An artist’s only avenue for protecting and exploiting 
his copyright is to license it to a record company and this is achieved by auctioning 
it to the highest bidder.”669  
The MMC agreed that there existed ‘free bargaining’ and that artists were free to 
“have the possibility of negotiating a different type of contract with an 
independent.”670 Nevertheless, it remains arguable whether an independent could 
‘bid’ successfully. Additionally, the existence of a ‘bidding’ war seems to emerge as a 
practice with the potential to raise the copyright-monopoly price substantially, 
should one think of stars the size of the late George Michael, for instance.  
                                                        
 
667 Report 29 at 2.135. At evidence stage (Report 212), the International Managers’ Forum 
suggested that Minimum Term Agreements should be introduced industry-wide, securing 
that ownership of copyright remains with the artist or reverts to the artist when the recording 
costs had been recouped or a given number of years had passed post recoupment/release, or 
the artist had moved to a new label; or the record company had become insolvent. It should 
be highlighted that the most problematic issues in the industry, refer to the instances where 
artists transferred ownership of the copyright in the master recording to the record company, 
rather than when the record company financed the recording at the first place. The latest 
trend in by-passing the record company and gaining control of the copyright in the sound 
recording has found many older bands re-recoding and self-releasing their own material e.g. 
Def Leppard, see http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/def-leppard-universal-
recording-hits-356397.  
668 Report 29 at 2.136.  
669 Report 29-30 at 2.137.  






The MMC further acknowledged that the prolonged ownership of copyright was 
justified by the risk assumed in breaking a successful artist and in subsidising those 
who did not ‘make it’.671 In other words, the prolonged ownership was justified by 
the business model per se. It was repeated that record companies benefit from 
extensive back catalogues that can be re-released, even when the artists were no 
longer contractually affiliated with a given company, despite the fact that superstars 
like the late David Bowie and the Rolling Stones, and more recently the late Prince, 
had been able to negotiate rights in previous recordings, thanks to the incredible 
leverage their names carried.672  
The special status of superstars the size of Bowie and the Rolling Stones, was further 
evident in their negotiating powers, as it was “common for the term of a contract, in 
particular the size of the advance and the royalty rate, to be renegotiated in the 
artist’s favour if he becomes successful.”673 It is no secret that artists with successful 
careers will get the better side of the deal, as they are called to subsidise for the 
expenditure lost in promoting least successful acts. Naturally, securing the most 
famous artists via exclusive agreements rests in the heart of the oligonomy’s 
activities. Competition or a ‘bidding war’ can commence once the artist’s contract 
with a given record company expires, a practice which has been attested as 
constituting the so-called fierce, if not the only, competition for the ‘lion’s share.’674  
It is this competition within the oligonomy that suggests that the public interest is 
found to be served, even though competition for the very few names appears rather 
restricted. Additionally, the existence of this so-called ‘fierce’ level of competition 
should also be viewed in context, since it is aimed at restricting access to the artist 
from the point of view of the end consumer (turning to the oligopsony side of 
things). Had the investigation allowed for the matter of access to content to be 
evaluated, it would have been more obvious how restriction to artists’ services via 
exclusivity is relevant to the public interest, despite the majors’ and the MMC’s 
contestations. 
                                                        
 
671 Report 30 at 2.140.  
672 Report 92-100. Here, the Report describes to some extent the structure of the market for 
recorded music.  
673 Report 99 at 5.138.  






It was claimed that freeing the artists from the restrictive contracts would be of no 
relevance to the public, as it was the artist that would benefit directly and that in any 
event, the mere existence of competition is enough to satisfy the public interest test. 
It is argued that this narrow perception of what constitutes both the public interest 
and the double-sided nature of the oligonomic model, did not allow for an extensive 
evaluation of the real issue that would emerge a few years later, that of alternative 
consumption and access to the artist and to content per se. As it turned out to be the 
case, the oligonomy found itself in position to engulf the artists as a product through 
multiple rights deals unrestrained, when the time was ripe.  
Further, it seems to emerge that exclusivity plays a significant role in inviting price 
coordination among catalogues and categories of products, exactly due to the long-
standing practice of attaching a premium fee to a successful artist, in order to 
subsidise the rest. Since the success of each artist cannot be known in advance, the 
focus switches to the few established acts, for which the oligonomy can engage in a 
so-called ‘fierce competition’. This practice, far from being welfare-enhancing, is 
inviting price coordination across catalogues and among substitutable artists, 
leaving the end consumer with similar, and arguably higher, prices. It follows that 
such a practice can justify consumer welfare-oriented policy as a remedy.  
Moreover, it is important to repeat that in this practice of ‘bottlenecking’ and 
‘engulfing’, the traditional oligonomy is not alone, but it is now met with powerful 
oligonomic players such as Live Nation, the by-product of the deregulated radio 
industry. And indeed, even if just focusing on the price of a CD or digital download 
did not raise concerns, concerns can and should be raised at the point where these 
powers meet.  
4.2.3 Concluding thoughts  
To conclude, the MMC investigation into the prices of CDs allowed for a more 
elaborate and thorough discussion on both sides of the oligonomic model. It was 
shown how restrictive practices across the business model’s spectrum were not 
found to be alarming, due to the vagueness of the provisions at the MMC’s disposal. 
This allowed the oligonomic model to be described as competitive in the UK as well. 
Further, this investigation was employed at this stage of the thesis to provide a 






UK. It was shown how, despite differences in the legal framework, the practices and 
the history of the oligonomy’s business model dictate the industry standard and how 
both jurisdictions were unable to employ competition laws successfully to avoid the 
foreclosure of the music product. This was partly due to the fact that the effects of 
foreclosure were to be found elsewhere…  
Indeed, consumer access was yet again not addressed. To make things ‘worse’, the 
public interest was actually found to be served by the ‘fierce’ levels of competition 
between the majors, a realisation that does not seem to change with the passing of 
time across jurisdictions. However, the provisions and the legal framework at the 
MMC’s disposal were proven rather weak and vague, as opposed to their US 
counterparts. In summary, it appears that in both jurisdictions the authorities could 
not interfere successfully, albeit for very different reasons: the FTC wanted but could 
not, whereas the MMC lacked the necessary legal ‘backing’ to do so.  
Finally, when faced with the ‘practices’ of the oligonomy, the MMC described a pro-
competitive environment that was in position to serve the public interest. However, 
as this thesis sets out to prove, the public interest might be found to be served, yet 
the public itself is not. Whilst focusing on the issue of prices and trying to justify 
their sameness does not seem to bear fruit, the ‘business model’ analysis attempted 
by the thesis has shown that issues of foreclosure and access could and should have 
been ‘picked up’ by the authorities.  
These issues culminate in the matter of exclusive contracts, a matter which was 
ultimately not of the ‘public’s concern’, as per the MMC. It is also reminded that the 
issue of exclusivity featured in the US as well, in the face of the licensing agreements 
that Columbia had entered into. There, it was observed that such exclusive 
agreements can also serve the public by exposing consumers to music represented 
by minor players. Therefore, it was also taken for granted that passing by the 
oligonomy one way or another, is a one-way street in the music industry and that it 
is not something competition authorities should worry about.  
To conclude, the issues examined in the present chapter are also referred to in the 
fifth one, which is dedicated to merger control. The penultimate chapter shows that 
it is not only the relevant investigations that have been ‘struggling’ with the business 






impediment on competition have been equally difficult to assess in merger cases. It 
will be examined how a business model reading of the music industries can bring the 











5 ‘Counterparts’: Investigating Business Models and Merger Control in the US 
and the EU 
“Bad times are comin'  
and I reap what I don't sow 
hey hey 
well let me tell you somethin' 
 all that glitters ain't gold” 
Aloe Blacc, 2010  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter deals with merger control in the music industries. It is dedicated to the 
ex ante evaluation of the business model and it introduces in more depth the world’s 
second most prominent competition jurisdiction, the EU. This adds a wealth of cases 
and materials for consultation and elaboration in the field of merger control. 
Additionally, the US merger control regime also features herein, offering a 
diversified viewing of the relevant issues.   
Further, the chapter allows for a closer look at consumer consumption patterns as 
promised in the third chapter; as such, it addresses the issue of relevant product 
marketing definition more closely. Does the market as resulting from a specific 
business model relate to the relevant product market identified for competition law 
purposes? It is reminded that the third chapter of the thesis introduced the business 
or commercial reality under old and emerging business models in the music 
industry and the music industries respectively, focusing on the issues most relevant 
in a competition law context, namely supply and demand patterns, including 
complementarity and substitutability. Thus, towards the end of that chapter it was 
posited that these patterns of consumption should be taken into consideration in a 
relevant competition law scenario. Nevertheless, as this part of the chapter attests, 
this is something not possible to occur, since the relevant product market definition 
toolkits employed, examine relationships between producers and their direct 
customers higher up in the supply chain, leaving the end consumer mostly outside 
the evaluation.   
In order to provide a most accurate examination at this crucial part of the thesis, the 






constitutes the marketers’ offering (or offer as per the old business model) has been 
identified as a relevant product market in a merger control scenario, how and why 
the end consumer of the musical product (or the mass market in business model 
terms) remains mostly neglected in the cases examined; and how several Building 
Blocks of the business model such as key activities (A&R), key resources 
(copyrighted content), key partners (manufacturing and distribution), and several 
revenue streams (tours and concerts), were identified as distinct relevant product 
markets in similar merger cases.  
Indeed, turning to EU merger control, it has been established in Coca-Cola Co v 
Commission675 that the Commission’s relevant product market definition cannot be 
binding in a subsequent case, and hence each case will be treated on an individual 
basis.676 It follows that such a compartmentalised approach to relevant product 
market definition has the power to alienate the competition law market from the 
business reality even further,677 especially since empirical studies suggest consumer 
migration to alternative consumption patterns and products for music.678 However, 
the analysis shows how the Commission acquired a rather repetitive stance towards 
relevant product market definition in the music industry, and only altered its 
approach once online music distribution patterns had emerged, a time that coincides 
with the major reforms that the EU merger regime faced.679  
Thus, it is important to examine the concept of relevant product market definition 
for merger control more closely, as it allows for this gap to come to foreground, and 
provide the evidence necessary for the purposes of this thesis: the market deriving 
from the business model in the music industry of the past and in the music 
                                                        
 
675 Cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 [2000] ECR II-1733, [2000] 5 CMLR 467.  
676 As per Whish and Bailey (n581) 864 “it follows that the notifying parties should not 
expect that the Commission will define a relevant market in the way it did in a previous 
decision,” referring to the cases of Case T-151/05 Nederlandse Vakbond Varkenshouders v 
Commission [2009] ECR II-1219, (2009) 5 CMLR 1613, at 136-140.  
677 Of course, and as it was stated at the very beginning of the third chapter, the relevant 
product market defined in a competition analysis is materially different from a market in an 
economics context, as per P Massey (n 230) 309-328. Nevertheless, the present thesis 
remains critical of this point exactly.  
678 (n 413), (n 378), (n 393).  
679 Moving from the old ECMR, Regulation 4046/89 OJ 1990 L257/13 to the new EUMR 
139/2004 2004 OJ L24/1, via the famous ‘merger trio’: Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric SA 
v Comm'n [2002] ECR 11-4071, Case T-5/02 Tetra-Laval BV v Commission [2002] ECR 11-






industries of today, as shaped by the decisive role that the end consumer plays, is 
not always able to obtain a legal ‘reading’ in the world’s most mature jurisdictions, 
due to their legal framework. Of course, it should be repeated that relevant product 
market definition in competition law can be a rather contested area,680 which has 
attracted elaborate commentary over the years and among jurisdictions.681 However, 
in law, a relevant product market definition is a prerequisite under both the EUMR 
(and the ECMR before it),682 and the US Merger Guidelines, since 1982.683  This 
chapter furthers the argument that the competition authorities have not been 
successful in their encounters with the business models operating in the music 
industries. Hence, relevant product market definition and the resulting competitive 
assessment in merger control are both necessary pieces of the puzzle.  
Relevant product market definition aside, it is also vital to pay closer attention to the 
forward-looking scope of merger control, as its role is to evaluate forthcoming, 
potential harmful effects on competition. Assessing the future of this highly 
concentrated landscape, which nevertheless was found to thrive in innovation and 
competition (as seen both in the US and the UK), is certainly a task with many 
hurdles. This is further observed in the Sony/BMG merger conundrum. This 
realisation adds to the inability of merger control regimes to deal with concentration 
issues in the music industries, since the very essence of merger control is to assess 
the near future with the present as the departing point, as per the European 
                                                        
 
680 E.g. (n 230).  
681 See e.g. A Ten Kate and G Niels, “The relevant market: a concept still in search of a 
definition” (2008) 5 (2) JCLaw & E 297-333, M B Coate and J J Simons, “In defense of 
market definition” (2012) 57 (4) The Antitrust Bulletin 667, J Farrell and C Shapiro, 
“Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: an economic alternative to market definition” 
(2010) 10 BEJ Theoretical Econ 1, L Kaplow, “Why (ever) define markets?” (2010) 124 
HarvLRev 437-517.  
682 France v Commission, Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 etc [1998] ECR I-1375, [1998] 4 
CMLR 829, at 143. 
683 See inter alia G J Werden, “Market definition under the merger guidelines: a tenth 
anniversary retrospective” (1993) 38 Antitrust Bull 517, and “The 1982 merger guidelines and 
the ascent of the hypothetical monopolist paradigm” (2003) 71 Antitrust LJ 253, US 
Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines 1968, 1982, 1984, 1992, 1997, and 2010. Note in 
the 1968 Merger Guidelines at 3 “A rational appraisal of the probable competitive effects of 
a merger normally requires definition of one or more relevant markets,” which changed to 
“the Department will define and measure the market for each product or service 
("product") of each of the merging firms” in 1982. The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 







Horizontal Merger Guidelines.684 Finally, substantial indications that the very 
essence of merger control is not in position to provide an accurate competitive 
assessment of the music industries emerge, in the face of the attempts to establish 
collective dominance in the case of Sony/BMG.  
To summarise, the research conducted has identified three major indicators that the 
merger control regimes are not ‘fit’ for an ex ante competitive assessment of these 
industries: the by definition forward thinking nature of merger control, the issues 
with defining an accurate relevant product market apt for accommodating end 
consumer consumption patterns, and the inability to address issues with 
concentration, coordinated effects, and collective dominance, as evidenced by the 
Sony/BMG merger conundrum. These pointers are being highlighted throughout 
the forthcoming analysis.  
 It is argued that the merger control regimes under examination have been unable to 
incorporate a coherent understanding of both the modus operendi of the music 
industry and of the business model itself. In reality, none of the merger control 
regimes examined herein is equipped with a framework capable of considering the 
business model as such. This becomes rather evident in the digital era, when market 
failures come to the forefront.  
To examine these issues in detail, this chapter is divided in two parts: the first part 
looks into merger control and the oliginomy across jurisdictions, whereas the second 
one is dedicated to the new emerging gatekeepers of the music industries operating 
under new business models. Consequently, this chapter pays attention to merger 
cases corresponding with the digital era, such as the Sony/BMG merger. 
Furthermore, it evaluates the merger between Live Nation and Ticketmaster, as 
anticipated. Thus, both market failures and business model innovation are being 
addressed, highlighting the need for a business model reading of the music 
industries. This realisation leads the thesis to its conclusion, which follows in the 
sixth chapter.  
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5.2 Merger control and the oligonomy through the years  
5.2.1 Federal Trade Commission v. Warner Communications, Inc.  
The first case which concerns a member of the oligonomy to be examined is Federal 
Trade Commission v. Warner Communications, Inc.685 Even though not widely 
reported, it nevertheless offers an unprecedented evaluation of the oligonomy for 
merger control purposes in the US, as well as a first attempt to place the end 
consumer in the supply chain for music and to comprehend end consumer 
preferences. Additionally, it ‘reunites’ the oligonomy with the FTC some years past 
the Columbia investigation, signalling a small, yet sought after victory for the 
agency.  
In brief, the FTC filed an action seeking a preliminary injunction to block the 
proposed joint venture in the distribution operations of Warner and PolyGram, 
under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act,686 alleging that this joint venture between these 
two majors would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act687 and Section 5 of the FTC 
Act.688 The District Court denied the Commission’s application leading to the FTC’s 
appeal at the Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, which reversed on the basis of the legal 
standard applied,689 supplemented by an assessment of a procedural error by the 
lower Court.690 The injunctive relief was warranted.  
                                                        
 
685 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984).  
686 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (West. Supp. 1985) “Whenever the Commission has reason to believe 
that any …corporation is violating or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by 
the Federal Trade Commission… the Commission… may bring suit in a district court of the 
United States to enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a proper showing that, weighing the 
equities and considering the Commission’s likelihood of success, such an action would be in 
the public interest, [the injunction may be granted].” 
687 15 U.S.C. § 18. It is repeated that under Section 7, mergers are blocked when “the trend to 
a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.” The substantive 
test deriving from the Clayton seeks to assess a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in 
the affected market.  
688 15 U.S.C. § 45.  
689 The lower court in its conclusions of law focused on ‘collusion’ as a standard required 
under Section 1 of the Sharman Act, whereas the FTC had alleged violation of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act instead, calling for the prohibition of mergers whose effect “may be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”  
690 The memoranda that the FTC contended were protected from disclosure under the 






Polygram, a subsidiary of N.V. Philips and Siemens AG, was the sixth largest 
distributor of pre-recorded music in the US and had agreed to close its distribution 
operations in the US, pursuant to the merger. Warner, a diversified communications 
company operating the successful labels of Warner, Atlantic,691 and 
Elektra/Asylum,692 was the second largest distributor at the time. The FTC initiated 
proceedings for violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as the act is intending to 
“arrest the anticipated anticompetitive effects of acquisitions and other 
intercorporate transactions in their incipiency.”693 The standard under Section 7 is 
a reasonable probability of anticompetitive effect and this was where the lower Court 
erred, as it incorrectly sought to establish collusive behaviour (inarguably a higher 
standard).  
In examining whether preliminary relief should be granted, the Appellate Court 
disregarded the District Court’s findings regarding relevant product market 
definition, market concentration, and barriers to entry for the determination of the 
likelihood of the FTC’s success on the merits and balance of the equities, since those 
were improperly disclosed.694 With regard to the above, since the Appellate Court 
was only required to make a preliminary assessment of the effects of the merger 
rather than establish a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, it was decided that 
the FTC had met its burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits, an 
extensive anticompetitive analysis not being required at that stage. As per the court, 
the FTC meets its burden if: 
it “raises questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful 
as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation, study, deliberation and 
determination by the FTC in the first instance and ultimately by the Court of 
Appeals.”695 
Hence, this case does not offer a thorough evaluation of the US merger regime at the 
time; neither does it allow for a detailed elaboration of the business model of the 
oligonomy, as it only touched upon the surface of the substantive issues. 
                                                        
 
691 One of the most successful record labels in the US, responsible for the ‘breaking’ of Aretha 
Franklin and Ray Charles, which had become a wholly owned subsidiary of Warner in 1967. 
More at http://www.atlanticrecords.com/posts/category/our-label.  
692 Acquired in 1970, http://www.elektra.com/?frontpage=true/.  
693 742 F.2d 1156 at 1160.  
694 Ibid at 1162.  






Nevertheless, some insight is offered in the face of the FTC’s views of the industry in 
the 1980s, two decades after the Columbia investigation. Interesting to note that, 
similarly to the Seventh Circuit at the Columbia case presented earlier, the relevant 
product market definition provided by the FTC was accepted in this case as well 
(notwithstanding the narrow aim of granting injunctive relief). Of equal importance 
is the fact that the FTC here adopted a broad relevant market definition, departing 
greatly from its compartmentalised definition of 1962,696 and mirroring the point of 
view of the then hearing examiner instead. Finally, the fact that the parties to the 
joint venture ultimately abandoned their plans following the decision should also be 
noted as a victory for the FTC.  
According to the FTC, the relevant market was the market for pre-recorded music 
inclusive of “all recorded sound performances sold to consumers in form of singles, 
long playing albums, cassettes, tapes, eight track cartridges and compact disks.”697 
On the other hand, and according to the defendants’ view, the relevant market was 
the one for recorded music, which also included home tapes.698  
The Court agreed with the FTC, reiterating that the relevant product market is 
determined by examining reasonable interchangeability of use between the product 
and its substitutes as per Brown Shoe, and that further, market boundaries are 
determined by factors such as industry or public recognition of the market, product 
characteristics and uses, production facilities, distinct customers and prices, and 
price sensitivity. It followed that the FTC had succeeded in meeting its burden of 
proof, by presenting how pre-recorded and recorded music had different structures, 
how the industry recognised them as separate, and how the two bore distinct 
characteristics. 
 Indeed, the pre-recorded music market was distinct in its ready-to-play capacity 
and its “attractive package which often includes artwork and liner notes,” and even 
though no direct consumer evidence were provided, home tapes and pre-recorded 
music were not found to be interchangeable.699 The FTC further provided evidence 
that an increase in the price of pre-recorded music “would not cause a massive shift 
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697 742 F.2d 1156 at 1163.  
698 Ibid.  






to home taping,” as there was a price difference of “approximately 300 percent” 
between the two.700 Lastly, the market for pre-recorded music was found to be 
moderately concentrated with a trend towards increased concentration that the joint 
venture would accelerate, whereas substantial barriers to entry were observed in 
distribution.701  
Naturally, the decision was considered a victory for the FTC that had been trying to 
‘break into’ the oligonomy since 1959. One commentator went as far as to indicate 
that the law was “providing a strong right arm” for joint ventures and mergers in 
the entertainment industries characterised as a “growing concern.”702 Indeed, the 
President of CBS, Walter R. Yetnikoff had just declared his interest in pursuing a 
course of acquisitions, motivated by Warner and Polygram: ''I never thought this 
sort of thing was legal… if it is given legal approval, then we too would like to 
pursue a course of acquisition.''703 
Victory though it might have been for the FTC, the decision surely did not ultimately 
affect the growing power of Warner, one of the oligonomy’s members still in 
existence (whereas Polygram is currently part of Universal). Nevertheless, the most 
fascinating part of the case comes the FTC’s relevant market definition provided, 
which seems quite ahead of its time in that homes tapes, or pirated music, were 
explicitly discussed as far back as 1983-1984.  
It is of interest to note how both the FTC and the Appellate Court agreed that home 
tapes are not substitutes for pre-recorded music based inter alia on product 
characteristics (artwork), and pricing, including the assumption that a price increase 
in pre-recorded music would not result in increased consumption of home tapes. 
                                                        
 
700 Ibid.   
701 Ibid at 1163. “The Commission presented evidence showing the difficulty of entering the 
distribution market due to high capital costs, lack of expertise, inability to attract top 
performers, disadvantages in obtaining radio air play and point sale promotion, and 
inability to demand and receive payment from retailers on an equal basis with established 
distributors.”  
702 J B Friedman, “Antitrust Law: FTC overdubs merger by recording giants” (1986) 6 Loy 
EntLJ 73.  
703 S Salmans, “CBS Seeks Record Companies: … Walter R. Yetnikoff, president of the CBS 
Records Group, said CBS had been motivated by the proposed merger of Warner 
Communications' recorded music business and Polygram Records, which is owned by 
Philips N.V. of the Netherlands and Siemens of West Germany” (1983) October 18, The New 







The mentioning of the considerable difference in prices the pre-recorded product 
and the home tape however, could have acted as an indicator of the actual value the 
end consumer attach to the recording per se, something that would become 
notoriously evidenced towards the end of the 1990s.  Unfortunately, the above were 
not backed by direct consumer evidence and they seem to contradict all the 
empirical studies conducted after the late 1990s, which explicitly suggest the direct 
substitutability between pre-recorded music and its ‘pirated’ version, as presented in 
the third chapter.704  
Nevertheless, the relevant market definition proposed by the FTC and accepted by 
the Court, attempts to perceive the business model holistically, as concentrated 
around the offering of pre-recorded music to end consumers in all formats (bar the 
illegal ones). From there, concentration and barriers to entry were assessed in the 
distribution operations, even though distribution was not singled out as a separate, 
distinct submarket per se, as in Columbia.  Even though this can be partly attributed 
to the altering landscape in US merger control after the introduction of the 1982 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines705 and to the limited time and scope of the case, it is 
nevertheless a holistic appreciation of the oligonomy’s business model as 
concentrated around the provision of pre-recorded music in all formats, and a 
realisation of its high levels of concentration, albeit only on distribution level. In 
addition, by acknowledging that “many other record companies have attempted to 
enter the distribution market but have failed,”706 the Court highlights and affirms 
how the smaller players can face substantial barriers by the oligonomy, which 
operates through successfully integrated key partners (distribution), reaffirming the 
business model of the oligonomy as consisting of various Building Blocks.  
To summarise, this case constitutes an initial victory for the FTC and offers a 
broader and holistic attempt to providing a relevant product market definition 
consistent with the oligonomy’s business model. However, this attempt also 
highlights the inability to understand or foresee consumer preferences and establish 
demand substitution patterns with precision and accuracy. As such, both the FTC 
                                                        
 
704 See e.g. (n 410) (n 413).  
705 As proposed by the FTC, since the Court is following precedent citing Brown Shoe and 
Equifax, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 618 F. 2d 63, 66 (9th Cir. 1980).  






and the Appellate Court failed to perceive the incredible power the end consumer 
possesses with respect to consumption. Nevertheless, this case is also one of the few 
instances where the end consumer appears in the supply chain of the recorded 
product, as according to the EU cases to be examined later, the supply chain mostly 
ends at retailer or wholesaler level, rendering end consumer demand substitution 
irrelevant.  
5.2.2 EU Merger Control and the oligonomy before and after Sony/BMG   
5.2.2.1 Decisions before Sony/BMG  
This part of the chapter is dedicated to the assessment of the oligonomy’s business 
model from an EU perspective.  For this reason, a brief overview of the legal 
framework that applies, as well as the scope of EU merger control are mandatory 
before proceeding any further. Firstly, it should be stated that the overarching EU 
competition policy framework is unique in its incipiency, in that it serves 
traditionally two (often conflicting) goals: the economic / consumer welfare one,707 
but also the goal of common market integration.708 To that dual aim, a plurality of 
objectives has been proposed, mostly broadening the welfare argumentation to 
encompass non-economic aspects, including protection of competitors and smaller 
actors, and also cultural diversity.709 Thus, the EU competition policy landscape 
remains rather contested, with many voices raised mirroring overall EU policies and 
interventionary approaches.  
This multiplicity of stated aims makes appearances in the examined merger cases: 
the interests of competitors (third parties) manifest in IMPALA’s attempts to block 
the Sony/BMG merger, and cultural diversity creeps into the EMI ‘break-up’ cases. 
Nonetheless, the European Commission’s analysis takes a more econometric / 
empirical approach with a strong focus on consumer welfare via effective 
                                                        
 
707 The economic objective is to prevent distortion of competition and thus, to safeguard the 
interests of consumers. According to Neelie Kroes “first is competition, and not competitors 
that need to be protected. Second, ultimately the aim is to avoid consumers harm.” In 
Bishop and Walker (n 581) 2-004.  
708 See Bishop and Walker ch 2.  
709 For an interesting reflective exercise on the above, see Ι Lianos “Some reflections on the 
questions of the goals of EU competition law” (2013) 3 Centre for Law Economics and 






competition and jurisprudence has developed in a similar manner. In any event, the 
present thesis argues that competition policy can be effective without consideration 
to aims outside consumer welfare, should a closer look be paid into the market 
failures resulting from the oligonomic business model and the role of the end 
consumer.  
Indeed, the world’s second most mature antitrust jurisdiction has been ‘meeting’ 
with the members of the oligonomy since the early stages of the EU’s first merger 
control regime, the Merger Regulation (ECMR) adopted in December 1989.710 The 
ECMR was aiming to assess whether concentrations between undertakings would 
result in a significant impediment of effective competition in the common market 
by the creation or the strengthening of a dominant position, as the substantive test 
originally stated.711 This first Merger Regulation was adopted in order to establish 
Community jurisdiction (one-stop-shop principle) over concentrations with 
Community dimension,712 thus alleviating prospective undertakings from the 
administrative burden of filing notifications across multiple member states.713 
Initially, the EU merger regime under the ECMR was concerned with the concept of 
single firm dominance, seeking to prevent the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position. This in turn caused great confusion in situations where a 
concentration between firms would affect competition without resulting in the 
creation or the strengthening of a single dominant position, particularly in situations 
of tacit collusion.714 At first instance, it would appear that a merger regime lacking a 
proper tool for asserting and preventing collective dominance was not fit to assess 
the music industries, and especially the doubly oligopolistic (oligonomic) business 
                                                        
 
710 Regulation 4064/89 OJ 1990 L257/13 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings.  
711 Art 2(2) ECMR 1989 art 2(2). 
712 Art 1 ECMR and Art 5 ECMR.  
713 The ECMR was accompanied by a series of texts by which the Commission is also bound, 
including the Notice on the definition of the relevant market OJ 1997 L 279/3. 
714 S Baxter and F Dethmers “Unilateral effects under the European merger regulation: how 
big is the gap?” (2005) 26 (7) ECLR 26 380-389. A dominant position is one where a single 
undertaking is able to act independently from the other players in the market (competitors 
and consumers alike). Also in Niels et al. (n 231) ch 7, and in particular 335-337. Also, in ch 3 
145 “For the purposes of competition law, tacit collusion can also be referred to as collective 
or joint dominance, coordinated effects, concerted parties, or conscious parallelism,” as the 
underlying principle is the incentive shared by the members of the an oligonomy to limit 






model. Nevertheless, a departure from the single dominance concept was achieved 
thanks to a series of decisions,715 and most importantly, thanks to Airtours v 
Commission,716 whereby the tripartite collective dominance test was introduced. 
 As per Airtours, in order to assert collective dominance, the Commission will look 
out for a number of factors: sufficient market transparency (allowing every member 
of the oligopoly to monitor the group’s behaviour and adopt similar policies), the 
existence of a retaliation mechanism (so that members of the oligopoly are not 
induced to abandon the common policy), which further secures the sustainability of 
the dominant situation, and the inability of current and potential competitors to 
jeopardise the oligopoly’s common policy. In other words, the adoption a common 
policy by an oligopoly must be “possible, economically rational, and hence 
preferable.”717 
Assessing the above factors in perplex market situations is no easy task. 
Nevertheless, a number of indicators can be employed in asserting a possibility of 
tacit collusion or collective dominance. For instance, transparency can be evidenced 
in a market with transparent pricing and homogeneous products, retaliation may be 
possible when there is excess capacity and participant contact in multiple markets, 
whereas a common policy can be sustained when an oligopoly is considered ‘tight’ 
with high barriers to entry, and demand is inelastic and rather stable.718 These 
factors are evident in Sony/BMG, as presented later on in more detail.  
Ultimately, the Airtours decision signalled a new era in EU merger control, leading 
to the adoption of the new EU Merger Regulation in 2004719 and the new substantive 
test (SIEC) under Article 2 (2): 
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 “a concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the 
common market or a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation 
or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the 
common market.” 
A further major change brought forward by the revised Merger Regulation is found 
in the concept of collective dominance, as replaced by coordinated effects on the one 
hand, and unilateral effects on the other.720 More specifically, according to 
paragraph 25: 
 “… mergers in oligopolistic markets involving the elimination of important 
competitive constraints … may, even where there is little likelihood of coordination 
between the members of the oligopology, also result in a significant impediment to 
competition.” 
Further, the impact of Airtours marked the introduction of modern oligopoly theory 
into EU competition law (as shaped by Stigler and the Chicago School), and raised 
the standard of proof required for the Commission to block a proposed merger. 
Hence, it marks an era of convergence with the US antitrust regime, marking 
departure from concerns over the merged entity’s market position, allowing for the 
consideration of a wider range of effects on consumer welfare.721  
Additionally, and closer to the Sony/BMG merger to follow, the decision in Airtours 
coincides with the time when the (formerly known as) Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities (hereafter CFI) started showing both willingness and ability 
to reverse the Commission,722 asserting flawed economic analysis, inter alia.723 This 
trend continued with the CFI’s decision in IMPALA v Commission,724 which sought 
to overturn the cleared merger between Sony and BMG as approved in 2004. Hence, 
following a series of reversals, the European merger control landscape was set to 
change drastically, as further evidenced by the length and depth of the Commission’s 
subsequent merger decisions.  
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For the purposes of the present, and putting the above into perspective, the merger 
decisions concerning members of the oligonomy before and after Sony/BMG come 
in sharp contrast in relation to their complexity and analytical level. Staring with the 
decision not to oppose the merger between Thorn EMI and Virgin Music in 1992,725 
all the way to the 2012 merger between Universal Music Group and EMI,726 
signalling the end of one of the historic members of the oligonomy, the 
Commission’s journey through antirust maturity coincides with its evolving 
assessment of the oligonomic business model. Hence, with the Sony/BMG saga 
acting as a benchmark, it is necessary to assess both the Commission’s attempts to 
provide a relevant product market definition, and most importantly, a 
comprehensive assessment of the competition levels in the music industry, by 
making use of the regulations and further accompanying texts, as well as EGC (ex-
CFI) jurisprudence.  
Indeed, the first encounters between the oligonomy and the Commission resulted in 
non-opposition at notification stage.727 Hence, Thorn EMI successfully acquired 
Virgin Music, a concentration which resulted in the loss of the “last remaining 
significant independent record company,”728 at the time. Seagram (operating 
through its subsidiary Universal Studio, Inc., but not a major record company in 
Europe at the time) and Polygram merged in 1998, 729 and Bertelsmann (BMG) 
acquired the whole of Zomba in 2002, eliminating once again “the largest 
independent record company word-wide.”730  
The European merger control regime, construed around the concept of the 
dominant position and the effect on competition of a given merger based on current 
market conditions, was in no position to delve into the past of the oligonomic 
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business model and evaluate the fate of the independent record companies ‘feeding’ 
into the few dominant players. 
In merger cases, the idea of the counterfactual is significantly forward thinking, as 
the situation expected to arise pursuant to the merger is compared against the 
situation expected to arise without the merger, yet inclusive of imminent but not 
materialised forthcoming changes. Hence, in a music industry context, the 
anticompetitive effects of the absorbance of the niche by a member of the oligonomy 
will always be negligent, whereas new niche players would always ‘pop up’ in the 
‘thriving and innovative’ environment that both the Columbia and the MMC 
investigations described in the past.731 This can be read quasi verbatim in both 
European cases concerning the absorbance / merger between a major and an 
independent: in an environment that is already highly concentrated, there is “no 
indication that the acquisition will fundamentally change conditions of competition 
in the market(s) for recorded music.”732  
A similar rationale was presented in Bertelsmann/Zomba,733 even though at this 
specific case of equal importance was the realisation by the Commission of another 
key characteristic of the music industry: Zomba was never truly independent of the 
majors, since both BMG (in North America) and EMI (in Europe) held stakes in 
Zomba’s manufacturing and distribution.734 What the Commission actually pointed 
at is that the competitive landscape of the music industry was part result of 
agreements signed between ‘independents’ and majors, or the “nexus” of smaller 
and bigger firms as observed in the third chapter.735 Indeed, throughout the 
decision, the word ‘independents’ appears in brackets, whereas additionally, their 
function and purpose in the industry was explicitly acknowledged as “to discover 
unknown talents to sign them…[…].”736 It appears that according to the Commission 
once an ‘independent’ had fulfilled its purpose, the natural next stage would be full 
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integration into a major, as was the case of Zomba, a company which had failed to 
break more ‘new stars’ prior to the concentration.737 
Loss of an independent aside, and adding the Seagram/Polygram738 merger into the 
equation, these cases further offer some initial findings regarding the perception of 
the relevant markets operating in the music industry and of the relevant supply 
chain that determines substitutability of demand: the Commission discerns between 
recording, publishing, distribution and manufacturing as relevant product markets, 
and further segregates ‘pop’ music from ‘classical’, and as well as mechanical, 
performance, and synchronisation rights in the publishing sector.  This segregation 
continues in both Sony/BMG and the EMI cases to follow, and is representative of 
the Commission’s viewing of the supply chain of music: the retailer is the purchaser 
of the recorded product739 and as far as publishing is concerned: “the exploitation 
according to different sources may lead to definition of separate product 
markets.”740 This is of great importance for the purposes of the present thesis, since 
the end consumer-driven changes in the music industry, and their subsequent ability 
to alter substitution and complementarity patterns, are of no significance in a supply 
chain, where the end consumer is not recognised as such.  
Another characteristic of the Commission’s short-sightedness can be observed in the 
fact that, when it comes to the product markets defined above, it appears that each 
Building Block of the business model is able to constitute its own market, rather 
than be evaluated in its business function, i.e. in its support of the main offering to 
the end consumer. Yet, the Commission was part correct in its realisation that pop or 
popular music is indeed the product, nevertheless, pop music featured as an element 
of either the recording or the publishing sector. What this viewing of the relevant 
product markets results in is a constant ‘bouncing’ within the boundaries of the 
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business model, as the Commission aims to assess the competitive landscape 
between the several Building Blocks, rather than between the business model as a 
whole (in the face of its offering) and the end consumer, who might be denied access 
or face high prices and limited choice. Taking a holistic view of the business model 
and its resulting product (hits or wannabe hits) would entail assessing these vis-à-
vis the end consumer, who seeks access to the offering per se.  
 Distribution and manufacturing in particular, as key partners in the oligonomic 
business model presented by Osterwalder, constitute the network that sets the 
business model in motion, securing optimisation and economies of scale.741 Thus, 
their function is to empower the oligonomic business model and create synergies 
that would directly affect competitiveness in the provision of popular music, creating 
significant barriers to entry. However, even though such vertical integration was 
acknowledged in both Thorn EMI/Virgin and Seagram/Polygram, barriers to entry 
in music recording and distribution were not significant,742 and naturally so, since it 
is not the entry that is being problematic as repeated throughout the present (and 
addressed in both Columbia and the MMC’s report);743 rather it is successful and 
sustainable entry, able to distort rather than empower the oligonomy. 
Nevertheless, merger control and competition law as a whole are not concerned with 
this directly, unless an ultimate harm to competition to the detriment of the 
consumer can be assessed. Be that as it may, and as it has already been pointed out, 
up until this particular set of cases the end consumer is not of the Commission’s 
concern either.  
On the antipode of these non-oppositions, the Commission decided to open a full 
investigation into the merger between Time Warner and EMI in 2000.744 Serious 
concerns were raised regarding the creation of dominant oligopoly of four (Time 
Warner/EMI, Universal Music Group, Bertlesmann Music Group, and Sony Music) 
in the recorded music market, and the emergence of Time Warner / EMI as 
dominant on its own in both music publishing and digital delivery of music. Digital 
delivery of music was of concern due the (eventually) successful concentration 
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between America Online and Time Warner745 that the Commission was investigating 
simultaneously.746 Ultimately, the Time Warner/EMI concentration was abandoned 
by the parties, to the ultimate detriment of the EMI, the only major that remained 
without a strong corporate parent at a time when the oligonomy’s business model 
started to crumble. The break-up and sale of EMI’s recording and publishing 
activities to the remaining majors marked the end of an era for the recorded music 
industry and the oligonomy as a whole.747 
Back to the proposed concentration between AOL and Time Warner, this was 
investigated as to its music dimensions, since AOL and Bertelsmann had entered a 
four-year agreement in 2000, in light of the latter’s planned exit from AOL Europe.  
The concentration was assessed as to its effect on the markets for online music and 
music software (music players) alongside internet dial-up and broad-band access. 
Thus, the investigation concentrated on online delivery and access to content via the 
internet for the first time in 2000.748 A concentration between Timer Warner and 
EMI would result in considerable foreclosure of the music content, as Time Warner 
would own the music catalogue of three former members of the oligonomy, securing 
exclusivity in the provision of online content and its delivery.  
Inarguably, asserting this level of concentration and assessing that a position of 
single dominance would be created was an ‘easier’ task for the Commission than the 
assessment of collective dominance in the traditional business model of the music 
industry’s oligonomy (especially before the 2004 Regulation and the decision in 
Airtours). Indeed, the ability of the Commission to appreciate content foreclosure at 
the emerging internet markets is commendable, as is the attempt to investigate end 
consumer consumption patterns by addressing both downloading (“a new form of 
distribution of music to consumers over the internet”)749 and streaming (“a method 
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of transmitting audio over the internet… transforms the computer into a virtual 
jukebox”).750  
The Commission’s observation that “a company holding a dominant position in the 
market for the licensing of music publishing rights required for on-line delivery 
would be in position to play the gatekeeper’s role dictating the conditions for the 
delivery of music via the Internet by refusing to license or threating to withhold 
rights,”751 is both very astute and ironic when placed in its historical context. Aiming 
to engage with the role of the digitally active end consumer, the Commission 
overlooked the fact that at the time of the proposed concentration, the end consumer 
had already started to engage in online activities that by-passed foreclosure and 
drove the value of online music publishing rights closer to zero.  
Ultimately, the Commission concluded that there existed an emerging market for 
online music delivery to the end consumer, whereby a dominant firm could exercise 
considerable market power by refusing to license and by increasing the relevant 
prices. Hence, the AOL/Time Warner merger was only deemed compatible with the 
common market, after the merged entity had proposed considerable structural 
remedies, including Bertelsmann’s progressive exit from AOL Europe SA.752 
Even though the Commission’s assessment of the emergence of digital technologies 
and online content delivery does not deviate substantially from the truth, and even 
though the end consumer is indeed placed in the supply chain of the music content 
this time, it is still evident that the Commission was struggling with the traditional 
business model of the oligonomy and the establishment of collective dominance, as 
well as with the continuous ‘absorbance’ of smaller independent players by the few. 
Potentially, merger control could have had a role play in relation to the absorbance 
or disappearance of the niche, as seen in the Virgin and Zomba concentrations. The 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines acknowledge that, should the concentration lead to 
the disappearance of a maverick firm, this needs to be evaluated as a factor that 
facilitates coordination.753 Nevertheless, the Commission had established early on 
that the role of the independents was not to provide a constraint on collusion, but 
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rather to feed into it by being an integral part of the business model. Thus, for the 
purposes of EU merger control, an independent firm was never seen a maverick the 
disappearance of which could attract the Commission’s scrutiny. 
5.2.2.2 Sony/BMG 
5.2.2.2.1 Introductory remarks  
Against the changing background of the EU merger regime post-Airtours came the 
proposed merger between two key members of the oligonomy, Sony and BMG. More 
specifically, it concerned the creation of three or more joint ventures under the name 
of Sony/BMG, active in the fields of A&R, marketing and sales of recorded music. 
The case was assessed under the old Regulation, since the concentration was notified 
before the 2004 revised Merger Regulation had entered into force. Hence, the 
Airtours tripartite test was employed to examine collective dominance.  
Before it all else, it is worth explaining that the Sony/BMG ordeal lasted for five 
years, counting from notification on 9 January 2004 to June 2009, when the CFI 
held that no more adjudication on the matter was to take place. This brings back 
memories of the Columbia investigation in the US, highlighting that despite the 
many years that had passed, and the crossing of regimes and jurisdictions, the job of 
the competition authorities with respect to the oligonomy was still no easy task. 
It should also be noted that the first unconditional clearance of the proposed joint 
venture by the Commission follows the clearance of the same joint venture by the 
FTC, due to lack of sufficient evidence that the venture would “facilitate 
coordination in the relevant market in violation of the antitrust laws,” and despite 
the reluctance noted by the (then) Commissioner Thompson.754 The FTC’s clearance 
might have contributed to the ‘sloppy’ job the EU Commission did with respect to 
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the proposed joint venture, as acknowledged later on by the CFI, and as reported in 
the media e.g. in The Financial Times.755  
Specifically, following the 2004 clearance by the Commission, IMPALA, the 
Independent Music Companies Association,756 appealed the Commission’s decision 
at the CFI,757 securing a Pyrrhic victory, as the Commission re-approved the merger 
in 2007. IMPALA set to appeal this second approval as well, even though in 2008, 
Sony Corporation acquired sole control of Sony BMG,758 following the non-
opposition of the Commission. Further, in July 2008, the merging parties lodged an 
appeal to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), annulling the CFI’s judgment. Hence, 
the judgement was sent back to the CFI for re-assessment. Ultimately, on the 30th of 
June 2009, the CFI acknowledged that any IMPALA appeal would be void, given 
that BMG would not be in position to return to the market so as to restore 
competitive levels to those prior to the first approval of the merger.759 
The above coincided with a time of fast-paced advancements and tremendous 
consumer empowerment in the music industries, as presented in the third chapter. 
Dragging the case from the Commission to the CFI, and from there to the ECJ and 
back again, was not serving any purpose that could be beneficial to either the market 
participants or the consumers. Similarly to the Columbia saga, the European regime 
appeared too slow to follow industrial and business model advancements. Indeed, 
the Sony/BMG case came at a time when history was being made and changes were 
being affected in the music industries. It was already presented earlier that this time 
was characterised by apparent market failure, in that the consumers chose to 
migrate to alternative methods of consuming the offering of hit music, which was 
met by the oligonomy’s wrath (lawsuits and lobbying for stronger IP protection).  It 
is therefore rather unfortunate to observe how the EU competition regime got in its 
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own ‘trap’, at a time when it could have had a decisive role to play in promoting 
consumer welfare.  
5.2.2.2.2 The first approval  
The first approval of Sony/BMG is characterised as rather laconic, as opposed to the 
extensive second investigation that followed. The Commission was almost forced to 
clear the merger, partly due to the high standards that the Court of Airtours had 
required. Repeating that no sufficient evidence to prove collective dominance could 
be provided throughout the decision, the Commission cleared the proposed 
concentration unconditionally.  
Firstly, with regard to the markets identified, the Commission noted three fields of 
activity: recorded music, online music markets, and music publishing. In relation to 
the first, the Commission cited both Thorn EMI/Virgin and Seagram/Polygram 
providing a brief description thereof,760 but concluded nevertheless that: 
 “it is … not necessary to decide whether the various genres or categories constitute 
separate markets as, whatever the market definition considered, no creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position arises.”761  
Rather, more attention was paid to the emerging online music markets, 
characterised by up and coming players such as Apple’s iTunes, and operating under 
several business models, such as streaming and downloading.762 The Commission, 
giving an overview of the different approaches to how end consumers operate in the 
physical versus the online environment, concluded that this market is distinct from 
the physical recorded music one, especially due to these distinct business models in 
operation, and to the different structures for online music delivery. Thus, the 
relevant product markets defined were the wholesale market for licences for online 
music, and the retail market for distribution of online music.763  
The Commission confirmed the importance of the emerging market for granting 
licences to online music providers, illustrating how separate rights give birth to 
distinct markets, depending on the applicable intellectual property right (f.i. 
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communication to the public for streaming, right to copy in downloading).764 The ‘as 
many rights that many markets’ approach gets reaffirmed later in the present, as the 
Commission proceeds with the definition of relevant product markets in music 
publishing.765 Further, it features in more recent merger cases between the 
publishing legs of the oligonomy’s members.766 As such, it configures the segregated 
appreciation of the business model by following each right’s supply chain.767  
As subsequently concluded: 
 “the licensing of publishing rights therefore involves publishers and/or collecting 
societies on the supply side, and online music service providers on the demand side. 
It is therefore not part of the market at stake in which, on the supply side, record 
companies license the performing artists’ copyrights (which are assigned to them) 
and/or their own rights, and the online music service providers are on the demand 
side.”768  
Nevertheless, no further consideration was given and no evaluation was attempted, 
as the competitive assessment would have been the same either way. Similarly, and 
turning to the retail market, it was found to consist of content providers such as 
iTunes and the major themselves, without any further evaluation of consumption 
patterns from the part of the end consumer, ‘emerging’ though they were found to 
be.769 
Hence, the Commission did not spend more time at the relevant product market 
definition stage. Nevertheless, interesting remarks regarding the impact of illegal 
downloading and file-sharing were to be found later at assessment stage, when the 
development of demand in markets for recorded music was discussed. The 
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Commission described the impact of illegal downloading and file-sharing as 
overestimated, citing the study conducted by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf,770 even 
though the existence of contradictory studies was acknowledged (but not 
provided).771 According to the Commission, the strengthening of copyright laws on 
EU soil,772 coupled with the litigation attempts in the US, and the digital rights 
management (DRM) systems in operation, were sufficient reasons to divert the 
blame of the recorded music sector’s decline from copyright infringement. As per the 
Commission, the recovery of the recorded sector was estimated.773 Indeed, 
describing the market as growing in demand is in the Commission’s best interest at 
the present stage, as a growing market offers little incentive for collusion, something 
that had also been acknowledged in Airtours.774 
Thus, turning to the examination of a possible strengthening of a collective 
dominant position in recoded music markets,775 the Commission focused on the five 
biggest markets at the time (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and 
Spain) analysing their market structure, based on data provided by price surveys. 
The Commission proceeded with the provision of the Airtours criteria, examining 
whether there existed a situation of collective dominance that would significantly 
impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part thereof. 
Firstly, the Commission looked into price coordination: could there be a coordinated 
price policy of the majors identified in the five biggest markets and in the three to 
four years prior to the merger?776 As the Commission did not find sufficient evidence 
to establish existing collective dominance this way,777 the investigation proceeded 
with further factors that facilitate collective dominance, namely, product 
homogeneity, transparency, and retaliation.  
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Product homogeneity has been established in the present as being at the core of the 
business model the members of the oligonomy operated (recording of hits and 
wannabe hits marketed top-down). The parties to the merger however, provided 
that their products were heterogeneous; as such collusion would be more difficult to 
achieve in a differentiated market. Indeed, ‘toying’ with product homogeneity and 
heterogeneity in the recorded music markets has been featuring since the days of the 
Columbia investigation, and proving either is a strong asset to the party making the 
claim.778  
In the present case, the Commission did appreciate the heterogeneity of each 
recording (heterogeneity in content), but further acknowledged that “despite the 
heterogeneity of the content, the way in which albums are priced and marketed on 
the wholesale level appears to be quite standardized,”779 coming closer to the 
business model reality. Nevertheless, the conclusion was reached that “the 
heterogeneity in the content, with these implications for pricing, reduces 
transparency in the market and makes tacit collusion more difficult since it 
requires some monitoring on the level of individual albums,”780 without further 
elaboration on the matter. However, as Fabio Polverino accurately notes, products 
characterised by content heterogeneity can still be homogeneous when considering 
Stigler’s argument of uniform pricing; as price becomes uniform so does the 
product, leading to feasible and sustainable collusion.781 This argument seems to 
complement the business model reality that views the homogeneous product 
marketed and delivered as such, and certainly helps explain collusion by the 
members of the oligonomy through the years.782  
Turning to transparency, the Commission did not find sufficient evidence to justify 
collusion here either, commenting on product heterogeneity indirectly “despite the 
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fact that sales of albums take place in few price points, the variety of albums priced 
at different list prices could complicate the monitoring of a tacit agreement.”783  
What the Commission points to, is the existence of various campaign discounts that 
can reduce transparency in the market, notwithstanding the aforementioned 
uniform prices to retailers. Further, it was observed that transparency can be 
achieved by the publication of weekly hit charts, and by the existence of long-term 
relationships between the majors and the retailers (their direct customers),784 
leading to a large part of the majors’ sales of recorded music being channelled not 
only to a limited number of customers,785 but also at uniform prices.  
Ultimately, the Commission managed to describe a highly transparent situation, 
only to arrive to the contradictory conclusion that the situation it presented was not 
‘evidence enough’ for the establishment of collusion. Furthermore, it should be 
repeated that the retailers are channels of the business model; hence, the constantly 
open paths of communication are vital for the delivery and the success of the 
offering. It is worth contemplating here whether homogeneous products with 
uniform prices would also presuppose a homogeneous and uniform way of 
communication between the oligonomy and its channels.  
The last factor the Commission chose to evaluate in relation to collective dominance, 
was the prior employment of retaliatory measures against any ‘cheating’ member.786 
The Commission looked into the retaliatory function of compilations, the success of 
which depends on the possibility to offer songs by as many record companies as 
possible, in return for advertisement and exposure. No evidence was found that such 
a retaliatory measure had ever occurred, “although these measures could in general 
represent credible possibilities for retaliation by the majors in the markets for 
recorded music.”787 This point was subsequently picked up by the CFI, reminding 
the Commission that the mere existence of credible and effective retaliation 
mechanisms suffices, and that there is no need to prove that they have actually been 
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employed in the past.788 Overall, the Commission concluded that the markets for 
recorded music do have characteristics of conduciveness to collective dominance, 
but that there was no sufficient evidence that the concentration would lead to the 
creation or the strengthening of collective dominance.  
Regarding the online markets (and the wholesale market for licensing music online 
more specifically), those were described as being at a stage of infancy,789 with 
insufficient data to establish a possibility of collective dominance. Additionally, an 
interesting point was raised regarding potential downstream foreclosure in the 
distribution of online content, should Sony choose not to license its back catalogue 
to competitors (e.g. Apple’s iTunes).790 In addition to credible data not being 
available yet, the Commission further stated that “Sony would forego considerable 
licence revenues for the tracks sold by competing platforms,” and hence it “appears 
very doubtful whether this could be a profitable strategy.”791  
The role that EU competition law could play in such a scenario, where consumers 
are deprived of new and innovative products, and where Sony, or any member of the 
oligonomy as a matter fact, would be abusing a dominant position, was not 
addressed herein. Neither was there established a possibility of a spill-over effect in 
the merging parties’ publishing activities,792 as it fell outside the scope of the 
proposed concentration.  
The Commission had arrived at its decision that no sufficient evidence of collective 
dominance existed in any of the markets examined. In retrospect, this decision can 
be partly justified, despite the outcry that it caused and the ordeals that it led to. For 
once, and following Airtours, the Commission had sought to establish that there 
already existed coordination in the market, and the merger would stabilise this 
coordination further. Nevertheless, supporting this with the requisite “sufficiently 
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cogent and consistent body of evidence”793 was not possible, meaning that the 
required standard of proof was not, according to the Commission, possible to be 
met. This hardly comes as a surprise given that the since the days of the Columbia 
investigation, every competition authority examined herein had already tried and 
failed to address (at least) the “sameness in prices” issues in a sufficiently cogent 
and sufficiently evident manner. 
Nevertheless, this unconditional clearance from the part of the Commission opened 
the gates to one of the most contested merger cases in the EU, where both the EU 
merger regime and the courts’ role in it were placed under scrutiny. As far as the 
present thesis is concerned, the Sony/BMG conundrum comes to highlight once 
more the gap between the business reality and the competition regime called to 
assess it. More specifically, during the time the Sony/BMG was discussed, the so 
called ‘seismic’ changes in the music industries were occurring contemporaneously, 
and the end consumer was demanding offerings outside the traditional business 
model. Still, the Commission, the CFI, and the ECJ were concerned with whether 
collective dominance or more specifically, whether evidence of collective dominance, 
existed in the recorded music industry at the first place…  
5.2.2.2.3 IMPALA appeals  
The clearance was met with an appeal by IMPALA, and was later annulled by the 
CFI in 2006, only to return to the Commission for re-approval in an unprecedented 
turn of events. Many commentators started considering the future of the European 
merger control regime and the ever-increasing role of judicial review in light of those 
developments.794  Of particular concern was the fact that Sony and BMG were 
already operating as a merged entity for two years by the time of the CFI’s 
decision.795 The role of the CFI in the merger trio was addressed earlier in the 
present796 and its ability to affect change was noted when the relevant decisions were 
                                                        
 
793 Sony/BMG 2004 at 68.  
794 Brandenburger and Janssens, 2007, “The Impala judgment: does the EC merger control 
need to be fixed or fine-tuned?”3 (1) Competition Policy International 301, E Vranas-Liveris 
(n 723).  
795 The author of the present worked at Sony/BMG in Greece, in 2006.  
796 Decisions of the Commission under the EUMR are subject to judicial review by the EU 
Courts under article 263 TFEU (ex-23) “on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of 
an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law 






discussed culminating in Airtours. Nevertheless, overturning cleared mergers was 
not the norm,797 and as such the decision to overturn a ‘done deal’ caused great 
concern in the recorded music industries, the parties, and the business world in 
general.798 Here, the CFI appeared highly critical of the Commission’s rushed 
approval of a merger it had prima facie opposed.799  
Seeking to examine whether the Commission had committed a manifest error of 
assessment, the CFI concluded that the “decision is vitiated by, first, inadequate 
reasoning and, second, a manifest error of assessment.”800 The decision was 
ultimately annulled in respect of two out of the applicant’s five pleas.  
Indeed, IMPALA had originally put forward five pleas in law, the last three of which 
the Court found no need to examine: a. a manifest error of assessment and error of 
law in not finding that a collective dominant position in the market for recorded 
music existed before the merger and that that dominant position would be 
strengthened, b. a manifest error of assessment and error of law in not finding that 
the merger would result in a collective dominant position on the market for recorded 
music, c. alleged infringement of Article 2 of the Merger Regulation in that the 
Commission did not consider that a collective dominant position on the worldwide 
market for online music licences would be created or strengthened, d. manifest error 
of assessment and error of law in not finding that Sony would achieve an individual 
dominant position on the market for online music distribution; and finally e. a 
manifest error of assessment and infringement of (former) Article 81 EC, in 
conjunction with Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation, in concluding that the 
                                                        
 
797 Case T-156/98 RJB Mining v Commission [2001] ECR II-337, C-68/94 and C-30/95, 
France v Commission (Kali + Salz) [1998] ECR I-1375, Case T-114/02 BaByliss v 
Commission [2003] ECR II-1279, up to the time of the decision.  
798 See e.g.  “Takeover Makeover” (2006) August 9 Financial Times, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bda61f86-2742-11db-80ba-
0000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4b8l6KbnE.  
799 Indeed, prior to the merger’s approval, the Commission had issued a statement of 
objections noting that the proposed concentration is incompatible with the common market. 
Evidently, the subsequent decision to unconditionally clear the merger constitutes a so-called 
u-turn, which the Commission never fully justified. See Impala v Commission at 9.  






proposed concentration would not have the effect of coordinating the parties’ 
publishing activities.801    
The most ground-breaking aspect of the Court’s judgment was the complete re-
evaluation of the case. The CFI chose to re-examine the case and conduct its own 
analysis, thus taking an even more aggressive approach towards the Commission 
than the one witnessed in the Merger Trio cases. The hard stance towards the 
Commission’s merger decisions could potentially be viewed as a welcomed fact-
checking and review mechanism, had it not been the case that at least in the case of 
the recorded music industries (and the same few members of the oligonomy) this 
has led nowhere in particular in the past; indeed, viewing the Sony/BMG merger 
ordeal retrospectively, does not allow for any direct conclusion as to the level of 
transparency in the market and the possibility of collusion, since the Commission on 
the one hand and the EU Courts on the other (including the ECJ that would set the 
CFI’S judgment aside later on) provided alternating perspectives, at a time of fast-
paced developments.  
Turning to the re-examination of collective dominance, the CFI first revisited the 
Airtours criteria and provided that: 
 “in the present case, the alignment of prices… over the last six years, even though 
the products are not the same, and also the fact that they maintained at such a 
stable level, and at a level seen as high is spite of a significant fall in demand, 
together with other factors (power of the undertakings in an oligopoly situation, 
stability of market shares, etc.), … might, in the absence of an alternative 
explanation, suggest, or constitute an indication, that the alignment of prices is not 
the result of the normal play of effective competition and that the market is 
sufficiently transparent in that it allowed tacit price coordination.”802 
This observation raised by the Court could have indeed allowed for the oligonomic 
business model to be scrutinised, as it would rid of the Airtours requirement to 
establish transparency. Indeed, the Court acknowledged the validity of such a 
theory, albeit indirectly. This was not raised by the applicant, who chose to rely on 
the incorrect application of the Airtours’ criteria by the Commission instead.803 Thus 
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the Court, in view of the inter partes principle, was obliged to follow that approach 
as well, interesting though such an investigation would have been.804 
Rather, the Court focused on the issues of transparency, homogeneity, and 
retaliation with regard to Impala’s first plea, reaching the following result: 
“the assertion that the markets for recorded music are not sufficiently transparent 
to permit a collective dominant position is not supported by a statement of reasons 
of the requisite legal standard and is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment in 
that elements on which it is based are incomplete.”805  
Indeed, the greatest part of the judgment at this stage is dedicated to the analysis of 
transparency in the market,806 finding insufficient reasoning from the part of the 
Commission, which itself was reason enough to annul the Decision. The Commission 
was criticised for making contradictory remarks and for deviating from its own 
assessment in order to reach its desired outcome, often without providing further 
explanations.807 Especially with respect to the issue of product heterogeneity (which 
the Court acknowledges as a fact),808 the Court notes how the Commission reached 
the conclusion that the market did not present the requisite degree of transparency, 
despite its assessment that “the list prices of the best-selling albums appeared to be 
rather aligned,”809 even though it had asserted earlier that “heterogeneity in the 
content and its … implications for pricing reduced transparency.”810 Moreover, 
with regard to retaliation, the Commission’s assessments were indeed found to be 
vitiated by an error of law and a manifest error of assessment, since the mere 
existence of retaliation mechanisms suffices for that part of the Airtours test to be 
satisfied.811 
Having addressed IMPALA’s first plea, the Court went to examine the second in the 
interest of completeness, where the Commission’s examination on whether there 
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existed a risk that a collective dominant position would be created post-merger, was 
characterised as succinct812 and superficial.813 The Court emphasised once again the 
error of law in necessitating that a retaliation mechanism had been used in the past, 
and also highlighted that such mechanisms did indeed exist, as a major could be 
excluded from a compilation in the future.814 With the applicant’s first and second 
pleas answered, the Court annulled the Commission’s decision, and so the merger 
was returned for re-examination.  
Before proceeding any further with the Commission’s second approval in 2007, it 
should be noted that seeking to address the Airtours criteria in the oligonomic 
business model does not seem to lead to any tangible result, especially with respect 
to the issues of transparency and retaliation. In an industry born out of mergers, 
acquisitions, and a close nexus of connections, relying on price transparency within 
the business model’s own channels cannot provide answers about the competitive 
environment where the business model operates (if such an environment exists at 
all).  
Additionally, as previously mentioned, the timing of the Sony/BMG merger case 
coincides with the era of drastic changes in the music industries that did see the 
oligonomy shrink in power. This was due to a series of empowered consumer choices 
and the entry of new players in the markets for the provision of music to the end 
consumer, and not necessarily in the markets identified for competition law 
purposes. Nevertheless, taking a ‘screen shot’ of the music industry at the time 
would not have necessarily provided an outcome corresponding to years of business 
model reality, especially should one consider the need to conduct a prospective 
analysis as per Airtours.  
As evidenced throughout the present, at the time of Sony/BMG, it was the consumer 
who sought to alter the business landscape. Where does this leave the issue of 
collective dominance as far as the EU regime is concerned? At that stage, it would 
have been best to evaluate the collective reactions of the oligonomy’s members vis-à-
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vis the end consumer,815 and the efforts to re-capture the value of copyrighted 
content (either through legislation or via business models such as a 360 degree 
deals), in order to assess the majors’ dominance. Indeed, this was a time 
characterised by an evident market failure; as such, it would have been best to see 
the Commission’s (and the Court’s) efforts dedicated to appreciating exactly that.  It 
follows that if the relevant answers to assess the above are not to be found in 
competition law, updating competition law and policy should be considered instead.  
5.2.2.2.4 Second approval  
In 2007, the Commission was called to re-assess the already completed merger 
between Sony and BMG. Indeed, such an unprecedented occurrence was surprising 
at best: The Commission would have to re-apply the Airtours criteria and the ECMR 
4064/89, three years after the new Merger Regulation had entered into force. This 
meant that instead of applying the newly introduced concepts of coordinated and 
unilateral effects, the previous (and problematic) narrative had to be employed once 
more.  
Nevertheless, of critical importance is the fact that, for the purposes of the second 
examination, the Commission would have to apply current market conditions,816 
which means conditions that represent the market reality at that time. As a matter of 
fact, the Commission underwent a thorough and detailed examination across the 
whole of the EU, analysing perplex quantitative data, retaining the economic 
approach. How did this methodology allow the Commission to take into account its 
contemporary market developments? And how was the issue of end consumer access 
accommodated therein? These are the issues that the present section seeks to 
address in light of the Commission’s second approval of the ‘done deal’ that was 
Sony/BMG.  
At first instance, it is of interest to note that the Commission defined relevant 
product markets for both the physical recorded activity, and for music recorded in 
digital formats, spending a great part of the analysis on the latter.817 With regard to 
the definition of the online markets, it was found that “piracy and the ability to 
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consumers to choose music other than bundled in the form of a CD have challenged 
the music industry’s business model.” 818 The Commission added that digital sales 
had yet to offset the decline of the physical market, caused by unauthorised copying 
and downloading, and “the growing importance of other entertainment 
products.”819 
Despite these timely observations, the market identified was the wholesale market 
for licensing content to providers, as separate and distinguished from the market for 
publishing services to artists.820 It appears that for as far as the Commission is 
concerned, once again the direct customer of the record company is the 
intermediary. Further, in the specific case it was highlighted that the digital market 
bears distinct characteristics with respect to pricing mechanisms and marketing 
strategies vis-à-vis the digital service provider, as opposed to the retailer of the 
physical world. Ultimately, the Commission did not appear to be convinced by the 
parties’ statements that final users do substitute between physical and digital 
versions of music, highlighting differentiated product characteristics such as the 
CD’s better sound quality and added value,821 contrary to the empirical studies 
presented in the third chapter of the present.822 Thus, despite the empowered nature 
of the end consumer and the acknowledgment that this is the case, the supply chain 
once again stays within the business model boundaries.  
The Commission then turned to the examination of the compatibility with the 
common market of the online and offline markets separately, dedicating the greatest 
part of the decision to the digital format. The Commission chose to address not only 
the Airtours criteria, but a number of further indicators too, as an answer to the 
CFI’s earlier criticisms that not enough evidence was provided during the first 
approval. Indeed, the digital market was characterised as emerging and growing, 
with room for further development and growth opportunities, even for independents 
and newcomers. Additionally, it was presented as dynamic with rapid entry, but also 
uncertain, as to business model success and sustainability. Here, a la carte 
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downloads, play-lists, and subscription services were specifically addressed.823 A 
further characteristic noted, was the fact that in the online markets, the prices were 
uniform, despite the heterogeneity in content. This was justified as an attempt to 
help the market take off, following the ‘one size fits all’ iTunes’ pricing model.824 
Thus, this time, the evident and apparent “sameness in prices” was justified against 
a heterogeneous content as a market necessity, in a vibrant and growing market, and 
as such it did not raise any transparency concerns.  
The role of the digital retailer was considered separately, as the interface between 
the record company and the end consumer, not unlike the traditional retailer, who is 
the direct purchaser in the supply chain of the recorded product. The investigation 
shows that “all majors have indicated … that non-vertically integrated digital 
music providers will remain their most important channel to the market.”825  Of 
course, this is in direct alignment with Osterwalder’s old business model canvas, 
where both physical retailers and digital providers are described as channels. For 
business model purposes, the power that Apple/iTunes possessed is not unlike the 
power of the traditional retailer of the physical environment e.g. HMV. Hence, even 
though new entrants in the provision of digital content operating under various 
business models appeared constantly at that time, the Commission still addresses 
the same dominant business model of the traditional record company in its 
assessment. Overall, the Commission attempted to paint a picture of a market closer 
to what Osterwalder describes a “business model playground.” Nevertheless, it still 
appears not eager to discern between separate business models and various blocks of 
one and the same business model.  
Against this background, the Commission proceeded to find that, even though the 
recorded music industry had already been highly concentrated prior to the 2004 
notification the merger had not led to a position of single dominance in the national 
markets for the distribution of music.826 With respect to issues of foreclosure, 
neither digital music retailers nor independent records companies were found to 
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have faced such anticompetitive issues, thanks to the dynamic nature of the 
internet.827  
Subsequently, the Commission turned to the issue of collective dominance and the 
application of Airtours once more: 
“The question investigated is whether the Sony BMG merger could, in an already 
concentrated market, be seen to have enabled or significantly facilitated the majors 
to jointly control the wholesale licensing of digital music. Tacit collusion would, on 
the one hand, generally be considered incompatible with the dynamic, unstable 
and uncertain nature that characterises the emerging digital market. On the other 
hand, the market investigation assessed to what extent the majors have aligned 
price levels in their contracts with digital music providers, and where a certain 
degree of wholesale price alignment could be observed, whether this was the likely 
result of coordination or rather of competitive factors such as the bargaining 
power of large digital retailers or of the nascent state of the digital markets.”828 
Indeed, having established that the market had already been concentrated and that 
the prices were uniform, countervailing abilities of competitors (independents) and 
customers (iTunes being the largest) would have a more decisive role to play than 
transparency and retaliation, in the present case. In fact, it was already established 
earlier and repeated here that “Apple has reportedly refused to abandon its one 
price fits all policy”829 even though the majors were attempting to introduce 
differentiated pricing. Expanding on this, and addressing the issue of transparency, 
the leverage that Apple/iTunes possessed was emphasised once more. In any event, 
price coordination and collusion “with regard to iTunes pricing in order to control 
other online download contracts,”830 was not feasibly reached and sustained given 
that new and emergent business models to the one iTunes operated were observed 
(e.g. Amazon, Myspace, YouTube).831   
Further, Universal was provided as an example of a major that significantly reduced 
its prices to encourage albums sales, a course of conduct not followed by the 
others.832 Equally, EMI attempted to offer new premium types of agreements via the 
iTunes platform (DRM-free and better quality content), which again was not 
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followed, showcasing that there did not exist a collusive behaviour with a credible 
retaliation mechanism in place.833 Amidst the ever-changing landscape of online 
content delivery and the countervailing abilities that Apple possessed at that time, 
collusion and collective dominance were almost impossible to discern. Nevertheless, 
the fact that Apple possessed tremendous power vis-à-vis the oligonomy tells us 
nothing about the role of the end consumer, who was simply faced with new 
gatekeepers around the content. Addressing the online markets at the second 
Sony/BMG approval was indeed the time to undertake an elaborate view of supply, 
demand, and consumption patterns of music. It is actually reassuring to see 
innovation, business model innovation to be specific, feature in the Commission’s 
analysis as a way to describe a dynamic and forward-thinking market. The only 
problem was that from a competition law perspective, the analysis never left the 
borders of the oligonomic business model.  
To conclude the second Sony/BMG approval, a brief look into the physical recorded 
music markets should also be offered. Similar to every other investigation and case 
examined herein, the Commission described a fierce and competitive market for the 
signing of new talent,834 and further provided that the internet had enabled the 
establishment and the promotion of new acts independently,835 alleging a 
competitive constraint upon the oligonomy. This way, the Commission sought to 
also address culture diversity concerns that had been raised by independent market 
observers and by IMPALA explicitly, not only in the appeal but also after the second 
clearance.836 According to the Commission, since cultural diversity was promoted by 
                                                        
 
833 Ibid at 143.  
834 Sony/BMG 2007 at 415-428. 
835 Ibid at 477.  
836 Impala Press release, “Sony/BMG merger Impala background note” (2007) December, 
available at http://www.impalamusic.org/arc_static/docum/04-
press/2007/Press%20Release%2013-12-07%20Background.htm. “As in other sectors, it is 
the SMEs in music that drive creativity and innovation. There is no issue competing if they 
have the same chance as the big companies. The problem lies where the playing field is not 
level due to severe market access problems created by over concentration in a cultural 
industry.” Indeed, the cultural diversity arguments feature strongly in EU competition 
policy, especially with respect to the Media sector (plurality and diversity issues) and stem 
directly from Article 167 (ex 151) TFEU. Viewing the matter from a cultural diversity 
perspective can be a valid point. However, the present thesis seeks to address the business 
model and end consumer welfare perspective, attempting a retrospective evaluation across 
jurisdictions (especially since a relevant cultural argument cannot be raised under US 






new technologies, and by opportunities provided by the internet for the distribution 
and retail of new content, it could not be negatively affected by the merger.  
Apart from the ‘disruptive’ internet, the overall decline of demand for recordings in 
physical format also acts as a panacea against transparency. Here the Commission 
chose to quote the Court at Kali and Salz, turning to the point of evolution of 
demand “a failing market is generally considered to promote, in principle, 
competition between the undertakings in the sector concerned.”837  
The Commission conducted an elaborate empirical investigation across the EU, as 
opposed to the first approval, and highlighted that a prospective analysis at that 
stage (with the merged entity already in operation) would be limited. This gave the 
Commission ample of grounds to dismiss the proposed theories of harm as: 
 “(i) terms of coordination leave significant flexibility so that they are not 
compatible with tacit coordination; and (ii) that there is not sufficient 
transparency on the market for recorded music to verify that allegedly colluding 
major recording companies comply with the terms of coordination.”838 
 Indeed, the theories of harm proposed during the investigation, including those 
suggested by IMPALA, focused either on coordination to stabilise net wholesale 
prices of physical albums above the competitive level, or on foreclosure issues 
potentially faced by independents vis-à-vis the retailers.  
An interesting remark can be found at the evaluation of the theory that majors 
coordinate at the level of their general pricing policy, by enjoying a stable and 
predictable business environment, which inevitably results in similar prices.839 Even 
though this theory seems closer to the appreciation of the business environment of 
the oligonomy and its business model, it is not difficult to understand why and how 
the Commission could not easily classify it under coordinated effects, or justify it as 
a token of common policy. As it is the Airtours criteria and the old Merger 
Regulation that are being applied, the timing was rather inappropriate for such an 
evaluation to be made. Additionally, it appears that what the Commission suggests 
by raising this theory is closer to what is described in the present thesis as a business 
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model, rather than to the notion of the environment in a business context, which 
comprises of both internal and external influences upon a business e.g. legal, 
geographical, socio-economic, political, and operational factors that impact 
decision-making.840  
Proceeding and turning to non-price coordination, the Commission addressed, apart 
from the independents’ access to retail, competitor foreclosure to radio play, 
influencing chart rules, and coordinating publishing and recording activities, among 
other things.841 Access to retailers was not found to be coordinated as shelf space is 
allocated by retailers independently,842 notwithstanding the aforementioned 
observation made by the Commission, of how the internet has opened new channels 
to independents. Access to airplay was merely discussed in passing, even though the 
same topic has been evaluated as of critical importance to the sustainability of the 
business model in the US, as of course, radio deregulation came early on across the 
pond. The effects of radio deregulation can explain the overall growth of the 
oligonomy historically,843 as well the emergence of new gatekeepers e.g. Clear 
Channel; however, this evaluation was of no interest and of use to the Commission 
at that point.  
Lastly, the Commission turned to the possibility of coordination between publishing 
and recording activities, only to reaffirm the strong position of collecting societies, 
recognising that publishers can hardly exercise any influence on the market for 
recorded music.844 Treating this side of the business model in isolation and outside 
its business model functions, whilst further separating markets per copyright,845 
again does not highlight how the oligonomy functions so as to bottleneck the 
content, and consequently, this theory of harm was rejected as well.  
The overall analysis provided by the Commission presented a strong, dynamic online 
market, a “playground for business model innovation” as per Osterwalder at 
                                                        
 
840 See indicatively I Worthington and C Britton, The Business Environmen (2014), D Otter 
and P Wetherly, The Business Environment: Themes and Issues (2011). Such an angle would 
make for an interesting debate, but it falls outside the scope of the present at this stage.  
841 Sony/BMG 2007 at 604-635. 
842 Ibid at 610. 
843 E.g. (n 446), (n 477).  
844 Sony/BMG 2007 at 629. 
845 Indeed, each right was presented as potentially forming its own market here as well. 






distribution or channels level (iTunes and related players), and a failing one in the 
physical layer. Therefore, the timing could not have been better for the Commission 
to re-approve the merger, having taken “due account of the findings of the Court of 
First Instance in the Impala Case.”846 Hence, it would be business as usual for both 
the Commission and the merged entity from that moment on, despite Impala’s 
objections.847 As for the role of the end consumer and the fact that new players were 
on the rise, competition law and policy should be looking for answers elsewhere, as 
two decades of EU merger control did not account for the end consumer’s role in the 
supply chain for the recorded music product as such. Ultimately, it is worth 
repeating how the Sony/BMG conundrum highlights the separation between the 
slow-moving application of the law and the fast-paced nature of the music 
industries, something that the US authorities were already familiar with, due to the 
basis of a stale record.848 
Moreover, as the above was ongoing, Universal made a step to acquire BMG Music 
Publishing’s leg, a merger that was approved by the Commission following a series of 
structural remedies,849 whereas, in 2008, the Sony Corporation of America acquired 
sole control of the Sony/BMG joint venture, a concentration that did not meet any 
opposition from the part of the Commission.850  With the dismantling of EMI to 
follow in 2012, the members of the oligonomy were reduced to three.  
5.2.2.3 Post Sony/BMG: The break-up of EMI marks the ‘death’ a major  
The final cases bringing the EU Merger Control regime under evaluation are the 
more recent decisions in Universal Music Group/EMI Music851 and 
Sony/Mubadala/EMI Music Publishing,852 both of which deal with the unfortunate 
fate of EMI and the separation of its recording from its publishing leg in 2012. This 
                                                        
 
846 Opinion of the Advisory Committee on Mergers given at its meeting of 17 September 2007 
on a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M333 Sony/BMG Rapporteur Denmark OJ 2008 
C94 at 11.  
847 See IMPALA’s press release, available at 
http://www.impalamusic.org/arc_static/docum/04-press/2007/Press%20Release%2013-
12-07%20Background.htm.  
848 (n 497).  
849 Case No COMP/M4404 Universal/BMG Music Publishing OJ 2007 L230. 
850 Case No COMP/M5272 Sony/SonyBMG OJ 2008 C259. 
851 Case No COMP/M6458 Universal Music Group/ EMI Music, September 21, 2012.  







section examines the Commission’s view by following the Universal/EMI decision 
more closely, and comments on the differences and similarities with 
Sony/Mubadala/EMI when needed. The former decision relates to the end 
consumer facing side of the oligonomic business model and indeed, the Commission 
provided in Universal/BMG that: “the publishing business has no direct 
relationship with final/end consumers and can therefore be considered as a 
wholesale market.”853 It follows that this observation lies at the core of the 
compartmentalised stance of the Commission vis-à-vis the business model. 
The cases, apart from the immediate result of reducing the oligonomy’s players to 
three (their lowest number ever), further mark the end of an era in recorded music 
history.854 EMI had a rich history and was responsible for the ‘breaking’ of numerous 
successful artists from Nat King Cole, to the Beatles and the Beach Boys, to Pink 
Floyd, Mariah Carey, and Coldplay. Its financial woes were marked earlier in the 
present when the Time Warner/EMI concentration was ultimately abandoned in 
2000, leaving EMI without a strong corporate parent.855  
Nevertheless, EMI was at the foreground of the business model developments that 
marked the past decade, not least thanks to the introduction of the first ever 360-
type deal with superstar recording artist Robbie Williams,856 evolving from the 
traditional recording contract to incorporate a stake on all future earnings even 
outside recording, a pattern that EMI later followed with metal band Korn. EMI’s 
swan song was to attempt its transformation into a service company in partnership 
with its artists as, according to Roger Faxon who was appointed Head in 2010, “we 
cannot continue… as being limited to selling CDs.”857 Either solely due to its 
financial woes or due to a combination of its own financial problems and the overall 
decline in the recorded music industries, EMI briefly found itself at the foreground 
                                                        
 
853 Universal/BMG 5 ft 4.  
854 See B Southall (n 124).  
855 For the transition of EMI into an ‘independent’ major and its final control by private 
equity firm Terra Firm and by Citibank, see JR Wueller, “Mergers of majors: applying the 
failing firm doctrine in the recorded music industry” (2012-2013) 7 BrookJCorpFin & ComL 
589.  
856 See earlier in D Passman (n 48), but also in L Marshall “The 360 deal and the ‘new’ music 
industry” (2012) 16 (1) European Journal of Cultural Studies 77-99.  






of business developments and attempted to capitalise on the patterns of substitution 
and complementarity, as presented in the third chapter of the present.858 
Unfortunately, following a series of attempts by Terra Firma, the private equity firm 
behind EMI, to restore it to solvency, the main creditor (Citibank) gained control 
and put EMI up for auction, separating the recording from the publishing 
business.859 Hence, the recorded music division was sold to Universal Music Group, 
and the publishing to a consortium led by Sony Entertainment.860 In dealing with 
the proposed Universal/EMI merger, the FTC chose to ‘work closely’ with its 
European counterparts,861 even though different outcomes were reached, since 
market characteristics in the jurisdictions differ greatly, and the concentration levels 
in the EU were found to be significantly higher. Interestingly for the purposes of the 
present, the very final sentence of the FTC’s statement that “the remedy obtained by 
the European Commission to address the different market conditions in Europe 
will reduce concentration in the market in the United States as well,”862 is a most 
welcomed (even though indirect) realisation of the extensive business model the 
majors had been operating under, as well as of its impact. 
In Europe, the proposed merger between Universal and EMI was viewed as a merger 
between the largest record company and a close competitor or an “important 
competitive force,”863  despite the many financial troubles that EMI was undergoing. 
The merger was, of course, considered under the ‘new’ Merger Regulation,864 thus 
departing from the need to prove collective dominance following the Airtours 
criteria. The Commission’s decision span over 400 pages, attesting that the ‘rushed’ 
days of Sony/BMG were long gone. Indeed, the detailed analysis conducted by the 
Commission relied only partially on official industry (IFPI) data, providing that “no 
industry source gives a completely reliable view of the merged entity’s position 
                                                        
 
858 (n 413), (n 378), (n 393).  
859 See e.g. “Citigroup agrees sale of EMI for $4bn” (2011) November 11 The Financial Times, 
available at https://www.ft.com/content/80efb2e0-0bfe-11e1-9861-00144feabdc0.  
860 And including Michael Jackson, David Geffen, and other private investment firms.  
861 FTC, Statement of bureau of competition director R A Feinstein in the matter of Vivendi 
SA and EMI recorded music, (2012) September 21, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/proposed-acquisition-
vivendi-s.a.emi-recorded-music/120921emifeinsteinstatement.pdf.  
862 In ibid.  
863 Summary of Commission Decision 220/08 OJ 2003 C 220/15 at 36.  






post-merger,”865 and relying on a wealth of sources instead, including a relativity 
exercise between the four majors in a hypothetical market.866 The Commission 
concluded that the merged entity would have been an inevitable and undisputed 
market leader, which comes in sharp contrast with both Sony/BMG approvals, 
whereby efforts were placed in proving collective dominance instead. 
The Commission, having in its arsenal many years of relevant empirical experience 
and a trial-and-error relationship with the European Courts, as evidenced through 
Sony/BMG inter alia, was indeed ideally positioned to carry out an extensive 
investigation of this kind, with apparently several never addressed issues being 
flagged up. 
At first instance, with respect the A&R, the Commission contemplated (even though 
the outcome was to the contrary) whether A&R activities should be analysed as a 
separate product market or: 
 “even whether the recorded music market should be viewed as a two-sided market, 
where the strength of a record company on one side of the market … has a positive 
influence over its market position on the other (wholesale of recorded music) and 
conversely.”867 
 This point brings the Commission closer to evaluating and assessing the oligonomy 
as such, even though the strength of the majors in A&R was to be ultimately assessed 
as contributory to the market position in wholesale and vice versa. Even though 
pursuing this line of thinking holds merit, strictly speaking, a two-sided platform 
faces demand by two groups of customers creating positive externalities between 
them, and attracting both sides as participants, which is crucial to their survival. In 
this sense, they act as ‘meeting’ places of two or more separate groups and create 
strong associations between them.868 The traditional oligonomic business model is 
however, designed vertically with the majors foreclosing the product, as they operate 
as powerful buyers and powerful sellers simultaneously. 
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866 Universal/EMI Music at 348.  
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Nevertheless, the progress made vis-à-vis the nature of the music industries should 
be noted, as should the similarly fated contemplation of whether ancillary industries 
(such as artist management services, merchandising and live show and event 
management services, referring to 360-degrees deals explicitly) should be defined, a 
matter on which the Commission did not ultimately take a view.869  
Additionally, and still in relevant product market definition stage, the Commission 
had a say on the long-lasting debate of recorded / pre-recorded music 
substitutability, concluding that, contrary to the notifying party’s claims: 
 “it is not appropriate from the demand or from the supply side, to consider legal 
and illegal music as part of the same relevant product market,”870 since 
notwithstanding end consumer consumption patterns, the two “do not appear to be 
substitutes from the point of view of the record companies’ direct customers – 
physical and digital music retailers.”871   
The Commission’s stance towards piracy was reaffirmed in the competitive 
assessment, whereby it was concluded that even though piracy ‘shrinks’ the overall 
market, this in itself could not constraint recorded music companies in their 
commercial behaviour,872 since piracy is not affecting the negotiations between 
majors and their customers, and also, since piracy is constantly becoming less of an 
issue.873 
Similarly, in Sony/Mubadala/EMI, the Commission further noted that: 
“if one were to assume that there is perfect substitution between legal music and 
illegal music content … a decision by the merged entity to increase royalty rates or 
advances or impose other onerous licensing terms would still likely result in 
anticompetitive effects.”874  
In the aggregate, by combining the two decisions, it appears that the Commission is 
of the view that piracy does not have an anticompetitive effect in either the recording 
or the publishing leg, which in extension reduces the effect of piracy on the 
oligonomic business model as such. Thus, and despite the holistic approach that the 
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referring again to the plethora of empirical studies conducted, see Universal/EMI ft 412-419, 
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Commission attempted, the problematic issues identified in the present e.g. 
substitutability and complementary from the part of the end consumer cannot be 
addressed as to their market dimensions. Once again, what the end consumer does, 
does not fit the debate.  
At assessment stage, in Universal/EMI the Commission focused on horizontal non-
coordinated effects,875 relying on a wealth of data sources, as stated above, to 
conclude that: 
“the existing competitive dynamics, which are based on a certain balance of power 
between, at least the majors (despite Universal’s already existing market 
leadership), would be completely altered by the proposed transaction in favour of 
the merged entity.”876  
EMI was viewed as a strong competitive force and a close competitor to Universal 
with considerable power in terms of its back catalogue, which would be eliminated 
pursuant to the merger. This comes despite EMI’s financial troubles that, as raised 
by Lee Marshall,877 could have made EMI qualify for the rescue merger (failing firm 
defence in the US). The defence can apply when a firm "would in the near future be 
forced out of the market if not taken over by another",878 something that the author 
argues was in line with EMI’s contested future.879  Instead, the Commission 
considered that: 
 “EMI was a viable, competitive and financially viable business, with a very strong 
back catalogue and some successful active artists, which, absent the proposed 
concentration, would have continued to constitute a close competitor to Universal 
and a strong competitive force in the relevant recorded music markets,”880 despite 
the loss of its publishing leg pursuant to Sony/Mubadala /EMI. 881 
The Commission examined the power of the merged entity vis-à-vis their direct 
customers (the retailers), who would have limited ability to switch between suppliers 
since the merged entity’s repertoire would be a “must have”.882 This would make the 
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876 Summary at 35.  
877 L Marshall (n 855).   
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879 As the defence was never raised, this remains but an interesting speculation.  
880 Universal/EMI Music at 413. 
881 Sony/Mubadala/EMI at 229-230, whereby the Commission focused solely on the effects 
of adding EMI’s publishing catalogue to Sony ATV’s. 






retailers particularly vulnerable to price increase,883 readily ‘exploited’884 by the 
merged entity. In the market for digital distribution of music more specifically, 
Universal was found able to obtain more favourable licensing terms and conditions 
from its customers than its competitors, EMI included, a bargaining power that 
could extend to EMI’s repertoire post-merger.885  
This could be particularly onerous to smaller independent digital customers, since 
the data showed that “the rent that recorded music companies can extract increases 
with their size,” an effect pronounced for smaller platforms, but not absent vis-à-vis 
platforms with greater bargaining power. It was particularly noted how “there is a 
positive relation between the size of a recorded music company’s repertoire and the 
wholesale price it negotiates with online platforms.” 886 Thus, the Commission 
concluded that in digital distribution the merger would result in higher prices for the 
digital distributors, the platforms. 887 
Pursuant to this, the Commission attempted an astute evaluation of the oligonomic 
business model: the combined market position of the oligonomy in the recording 
music and in the music publishing sectors.888 Thus, the Commission examined the 
role of the majors as publishers more closely. It was noted that the publishers had 
started to withdraw the online mechanical rights for Anglo-American repertoire 
from collecting societies, which were traditionally viewed (i.e. in the second 
Sony/BMG approval) as exercising great power between publishers and recording 
                                                        
 
883 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at 31. It is reminded that ‘increase of prices’ is used as a 
shorthand for any competitive harm that may result from a proposed merger, which includes 
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innovation. Horizontal Merger Guidelines at 8.  
884 Universal/EMI Music Summary at 37 “… and the merged entity’s ability to exploit 
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885 Summary at 38-40. 
886 Summary at 43.  
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digital customers. The Commission looked into their respective commercial agreements in 
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Telekom, Deezer, Virgin Media and YouTube.” Universal/EMI Music at 453. 






companies, and to subsequently re-acquire control over their exploitation.889 This 
would leave the digital platforms willing to offer as much music as possible to the 
end users in a position of disadvantage, having to negotiate separately with 
recording companies, collecting societies, and publishers with respect to the Anglo-
American repertoire.890 Of course, consumer welfare can also be negatively 
impacted.  
The Commission assessed the above relying on ‘control shares’,891 meaning the 
percentage of control the merged entity would have over a song in both the 
publishing and the recording dimension.892 Hence, for a realistic and a holistic 
understanding the merged entity would hold vis-à-vis the digital retailers, the 
Commission accurately decided to evaluate the combined market position in both 
recording and publishing: 
“In other words, in this case, the Commission considers control shares as an 
‘aggravating factor’, which exacerbates the anti-competitive effects deriving from 
the proposed concentration based on the combination of the merging parties' 
activities in the recorded music sector.”893 
Indeed, this aggravating factor is intensified by the trend to withdraw the Anglo-
American repertoire from the hands of the collecting societies,894 illustrating how 
the oligonomy responds to changes in the aggregate market for music, by seeking a 
more active participatory role in the supply of the product, by controlling “as much 
                                                        
 
889 For this part of the case, the Commission relied heavily on its previous decision of 22 May 
2007 in Case No COMP/M.4404 Universal/BMG Music Publishing. 
890 Universal/EMI Music at 554. See also Sony/Mubadala /EMI Music Publishing at 148. As 
a matter of fact, this trend began with the Commission Recommendation 737/2005 OJ 2005 
L276/54 on collective cross-border collective management of copyright and related rights for 
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Universal/BMG, the Commission concluded that a publisher with a higher control share 
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893 Ibid at 560.  
894 Note however that this was not the case for mechanical and performance publishing 
rights offline, whereby collecting societies were still found to exercise control and power. 






as possible”, as per Ted Cohen in the third chapter.895 Consequently, the oligonomy 
fulfils its function of being the bottleneck of the music product, something which has 
been noted since the beginning of the present thesis. By choosing to gain control 
over an activity traditionally placed in the care of collecting societies, a vital part of 
the oligonomic business model comes into the limelight, and raises relevant 
anticompetitive concerns. Indeed, the Commission concluded that the proposed 
transaction would likely lead to a significant impediment to effective competition, 
taking into account the ‘control shares’ of the merged entity and the power it could 
exercise vis-à-vis the digital customer.  
Here, the Commission had the opportunity to further assess the impact of the 
merger upon the end user (or end consumer) as well, following the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines,896 by acknowledging the competitive harm upon the end users of 
digital services,897 in terms of reduced innovation and choice. This could either be 
the result of costs being passed on to the end user/consumer898 from the merged 
entity’s customers, the result of a reduction in innovative business models and 
relevant digital services, or finally, the result of the negative impact of the merger on 
cultural diversity.899  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the impact on cultural diversity was not given 
more thought than necessary for the Commission to comply with the provisions of 
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896 Horizontal Merger Guidelines ft 105 “pursuant to Article 2(1)(b), the concept of 
‘consumers’ encompasses intermediate and ultimate consumers, i.e. users of the products 
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de la Société Génrale des Grandes Sources and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-1213 at 
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the Treaty,900 and no extensive arguments were provided other than that cultural 
diversity is intrinsically linked to consumer choice, and should consumer choice be 
restricted, there would be a negative impact on cultural diversity as well, something 
taken axiomatically.901  However, it is worth considering how the impact on cultural 
diversity in this case in particular might have been negative, given that it was the 
Anglo-American repertoire (and the popular one most importantly) that Universal 
would be leveraging its power over, as stated earlier. Instead, the present thesis 
argues that paying consideration to business model innovation as such, is enough to 
justify anticompetitive concerns. Even though business model innovation was 
examined in relation with the oligonomy’s customers rather than from an end 
consumer perspective, their importance in the competitive assessment cannot be 
underestimated.  
Indeed, the Commission made a connection between the issues of end consumer 
choice and business models. Third party-provided evidence attested how Universal 
leveraged its power to impose restrictions on the business models of the digital 
platforms,902 which according to the Commission, constitutes efforts to hinder 
business model innovation and increase prices to the ultimate detriment of the end 
consumer.  
Additionally, the Commission’s assessment and the accommodation of end 
consumers concerns therein are a most welcome development, as stated previously. 
Even though in the Universal/BMG Music Publishing decision the impact of a price 
increase on end consumers and their ability to access the music of their choice was 
also considered,903 what was missing was the explicit connection between business 
model innovation, price increase, and consumer welfare in a competition law 
context. This decision does provide enlarged assessment dimensions, departing from 
the stricter economic rationale of the past decade, yet it remains elaborate and 
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detailed at assessment stage, consulting a wealth of empirical evidence. Here, it is 
suggested that an enlarged appreciation of the operating business model, could have 
enabled the Commission to assess significant impediment on effective competition 
in the market where the business model operates, as this results in reduced 
consumer welfare.  From there, the Commission could have proceeded to ascertain 
that promoting innovation and competition through competition law and policy in 
such markets is imperative, affirming the arguments brought forward by Potts and 
Cunningham, at the beginning for the present thesis.  
To summarise, the merged Universal/EMI would be in position to negatively impact 
direct customers and end consumers, as well as business model innovation and 
cultural diversity. Further, it was concluded that there did not exist any adequate 
evidence of either countervailing buyer power904 or competitors that could attempt a 
timely and sufficient entry905 and that could counter the anticompetitive effects. 
Contrary to the Sony/BMG decisions, Apple/iTunes and Spotify were presented as 
no longer in position to pose a constraint to the merging party.  Hence, according to 
the Commission, even though in the mid-2000s the recorded music industry was 
relying heavily on the pipelines provided by their distributing channels, this was no 
longer the case once the market had stabilised. At present, the recorded music 
industries are faced with a newfound wave of growth especially thanks to services 
such as a Spotify and more recently Apple Music.906 Given that the major recorded 
music companies’ business model has not altered in the interim, what we are faced 
with is the replacement of the traditional retailer or distributer with a powerful 
digital service. In effect, it can be argued that even though the players have changed, 
the game has not, as regards the oligonomy. Consequently, it is in the best interest of 
the oligonomy, adhering to the norms of the traditional business model, to create 
strong ties with these key partners and channels in order to maximise profits.  
                                                        
 
904 Universal/EMI Music at 713-723, whereby it was noted that both Apples/iTunes and 
Spotify depend upon the merged entity’s catalogue.  
905 At 727-734. Indeed, this merger concerns the reduction of the oligonomy’s members to 
three for the first time in history.  
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Ultimately, the Commission was able to establish a viable theory of harm without 
the need to provide an elaborate assessment of coordinated effects, which has 
proven to be a hurdle in the past. Indeed, the Commission reiterated that: 
 “the majors active on markets for the wholesale of recorded music are not likely to 
easily reach a common understanding on the terms of coordination, given their 
complexities and the relative lack of transparency on the market.”907 
 Paying attention to non-coordinated effects had freed the Commission from the 
requirement to prove collusive behaviour and most importantly, retaliation, and still 
arrive at the sought-after result. Thus, the Commission concluded that the 
transaction would lead to a significant impediment on effective competition as a 
result of the creation of a dominant position in the markets for the wholesale of 
digital music, to which Universal provided a thorough and elaborate commitments 
package, including extended divesture of assets as well as behavioural remedies.908 
This combined with the fact that a major’s recording and publishing activities were 
separated and sold separately, can address power consolidation.909 However, caution 
should be paid when these are acquired by the remaining members of the 
oligonomy, given that the industry does move in cycles and returning to 
consolidation is always possible, if not imminent.   
5.2.2.4 Conclusions on EU merger control  
To conclude this EU part, it is argued that the Commission’s perception of the 
oligonomic business model in the EMI cases was as accurate as it could be, given the 
regulatory framework (mainly the new Regulation, the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, and settled case-law) at its disposal. From the first cases in the early 
1990s all the way to 2012, the Commission was faced with the constant changes in 
the landscape of the music industries and was called to apply a competition toolkit 
that traditionally excluded the end consumer from music’s supply chain, despite 
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consumer welfare constituting EU competition law’s stated aim.910 The conclusion 
of the dominant position Universal would enjoy pursuant to the merger with EMI 
perhaps comes to highlight that the recorded music industries have gone full circle 
and are enjoying growth and potential expansion, despite the woes of the last 
decade.911 This becomes evident as the oligonomy members declare digital profits 
and their digital key channels and partnernships grow.  
Indeed, the business model reality presented in the third chapter has suggested 
cycles of disruption, which however, find the oligonomy bounce back, and continue 
its gatekeeping function. It is important, however to further raise the red flag with 
respect to the end consumer, who is actually faced with more gatekeepers than ever 
before. Oligonomy aside, the power of Spotify and Apple should be stated, despite 
what the Commission suggested in EMI when addressing their buyer power. In fact, 
with the launch of Apple’s streaming service in 2015, its CEO announced his 
intentions to undercut competition with Spotify by using Apple’s ‘economic muscle’ 
to pay more for music licenses than Spotify and to even operate at a loss in order to 
gain Spotify’s market “whilst being dominant with iTunes,” and benefit the sales of 
iPhones.912 Even though this has not materialised at the time of writing, caution 
should be paid to the fact that more powerful gatekeepers are being added vis-à-vis 
the end consumer, and especially ones possessing market disruption abilities and 
perhaps, intentions. And since according to EU settled case law streaming and 
downloading activities belong in separate markets as they exploit different rights, 
Apple’s (or Spotify’s) potential dominance in a market for access to music as such 
would be harder to argue.  
Perhaps there is no better time for the Commission to realise and address consumer 
access in the markets for music, given the current shape the music industries are 
taking. The end consumer, even though no longer passive, as well-established in the 
past decade, is now faced with the traditional oligonomy and its new powerful 
                                                        
 
910 More on this contested issue can be found at S Alboek “Consumer welfare in EU 
competition policy” (2013), available at 
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911 “Warner Music logs highest sales in 8 years on streaming growth” (2016) December 8 The 
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channels and partners, and with emerging gatekeepers guarding access to 
complementary and substitute products such as live music, streaming and 
downloading. Even though the Commission has considered that the end 
user/consumer benefits from the existence of innovative business models, this is but 
half the story. It needs to be addressed explicitly that these business models operate 
as a result of consumer demand and are thus, demand-driven. This will enable the 
Commission, and any other competition authority to view and assess the markets for 
music bottom-up instead of top-down. By extension, issues of price and access in a 
business model context are paramount to safeguarding consumer welfare, and the 
Commission needs to evaluate these matters holistically. 
Finally, empirical data presented in the third chapter from as recently as December 
2015,913 confirm complementarity and substitutability patterns from the point of 
view of the end consumer and support the argument that the music product is 
consumed holistically. Even though the Commission did find anticompetitive 
concerns in its most recent encounters with the oligonomy, it still failed to take the 
above issues into consideration. Nevertheless, the Commission appears to have been 
‘circling’ a business-model-compatible evaluation of the music industries. It is worth 
exploring whether an ‘extended’ application of the SIEC test compatible with the 
business model perspective is possible, and thus, if it can address these issues per se.  
 
5.3 Live Nation Entertainment: new gatekeepers, but who’s listening?914  
5.3.1 Re-introducing the live music industry  
As a direct consequence of the presence of many gatekeepers described above, the 
thesis would be incomplete without an evaluation of gatekeepers in live music. There 
is no need to repeat to the same extent that live music transitioned from an ancillary 
industry, supportive of the offering of recorded hit music, to a lucrative music 
industry. Additionally, the third chapter attested the complementarity and potential 
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substitutability between the consumption of the recorded and the live music 
product, as a justification of both the Bowie Theory and of the 360 degree deals 
(operated not only by the defunct EMI but also by live music promoters), which aim 
to capture the end consumer’s ‘wallet share’.915  
Building on the empirical studies presented in the third chapter, the thesis 
proceeded with the evaluation of the radio and its deregulation in the US, in order to 
highlight the past and present of players with immense power vis-à-vis the 
oligonomy, such as Clear Channel, and the various payola scandals of the past.916 It 
was presented how Clear Channel was not a stranger to either the US authorities or 
the courts,917 and how it “attempted to create a solid bottleneck around the exposure 
of music to the audience,” ultimately being forced to divest what was to become Live 
Nation, in 2005. Live Nation Entertainment (hereafter LNE) the fully vertically 
integrated artist-to-fan platform, followed pursuant to the Live 
Nation/Ticketmaster merger.  
Before the merger, Live Nation had expanded vertically to engulf the whole supply 
chain of live music production, even touching upon the recorded music industry 
entering in 360 degree deals with artists such as Madonna and Jay Z.918 The 
‘Madonna deal’ led leading music magazine NME to wonder back in 2007: “could it 
be a new business model for the music industry?”919 At a time when the music 
industries, and the recorded music industry in particular, were undergoing seismic 
changes, it would appear that Live Nation was strategically positioned to profit 
directly from the identified end consumer consumption patterns through its 
integrated business model.  
According to LNE’s annual report of 2015, it operates: 
                                                        
 
915 (n 55).  
916 See “Intervention by proxy” in the previous chapter.   
917 (n 476).  
918 NME news (2007) October 16, available at http://www.nme.com/news/music/madonna-
411-1350310#CshBzbkhvzI0t7kY.99. “In a joint statement issued today by Madonna and 
Live Nation, the singer said “The paradigm in the music business has shifted and as an 
artist and a business woman, I have to move with that shift.”  






 “in five main industries within the live entertainment business; live music events, 
venue operations, ticketing services, artist management and services, and 
sponsorship and advertising sales.”920  
Thus, the presence of LNE post-merger, expands into the aggregate music 
experience remaining artist-focused, and brings the Bowie Theory to life. Further, 
with respect to the end consumer, the business model of LNE confirms a two-sided 
market, with the company operating as a platform that connects not only artists to 
fans (as the company purports), but also advertisers to fans.  
Indeed, fans are an asset (or a key resource) according to the company: 
 “Our database of fans and their interests provides us with the means to efficiently 
market our shows to them as well as to offer other music-related products and 
services. This fan database is an invaluable asset that we are able to use to provide 
unique services to our artists and corporate clients.”921 
By extension, contrary to the traditional business model of the oligonomy, the end 
consumer is vital for this model’s survival, by becoming an integrated part. If we 
were to attempt ‘canvassing’ the business model LNE operates, the result would be 
further revealing: LNE is active (activities) in live shows promotion, artist 
management, ticketing, venue operation, and the attraction of sponsoring and 
advertising. As key partnerships operating through the relevant key channels, we 
could therefore identify ticket agents, venue operators, and advertisers. LNE 
however, following the merger with Ticketmaster, sells its own tickets and promotes 
shows by its own-managed artists in its own venues,922 which leads to a significantly 
reduced cost structure, resulting in a strong portfolio of activities.  
Further, LNE’s revenue streams consist of ticket sales, the percentage of the artists’ 
income through their respective revenue streams as contracted, the rental of own 
                                                        
 
920 Live Nation Annual Report 2015 4, available at 
http://investors.livenationentertainment.com/files/doc_financials/2015/Annual-
Report.pdf.  
921 In ibid.   
922 Annual Report 2 “Live Nation owns, operates, has exclusive booking rights for or has an 
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District of Columbia, Case: 1:10-cv-00139, United States oF America et al., Plaintiffs, v. 
Ticketmaster Entertainment Inc., et al., Defendants, Competitive Impact Statement 






venues to third parties, and of course the sponsorship and advertising deals. 
Operating a two-sided platform, LNE’s customers are both advertisers and fans. 
More specifically, with respect to the latter, what is on offer to them is both ‘access’ 
to the hit or popular artist per se, and an extended music ‘experience’. Indeed, the 
‘experience’ materialises in the introduction of VIP ticket packages, ‘megatickets’, 
promotional ‘meet’n’greet’ sweepstakes, and the Premium Seats programme, which 
includes closer to the stage seats, merchandise, parking, and priority newsletters.923 
Thus, it appears that LNE segregates and price discriminates between fans 
(customer segments), introducing price categories of tickets. This segregation 
however, is a vital asset for LNE’s advertising activity, offering crucial clientele 
information to potential advertisers.  
To summarise, LNE’s business model is both end consumer and artist centred, and 
as such it either has the ability to indeed offer what it purports to (direct access to 
the artists) or to ‘bottleneck’ access even further. Therefore, when the proposed 
merger was notified in the US (and in the UK),924 the competition authorities were 
called to evaluate a new business model and a new supply chain in live music 
production. It should come as no surprise to note how once again, the competition 
regimes called to evaluate this business model did not have the ability to address 
consumer access issues.  
5.3.2 The merger in question  
With regard to the merger in question, it had both horizontal and vertical 
dimensions, since Live Nation was about to become Ticketmaster’s direct competitor 
in ticketing. Prior to the merger, Ticketmaster and Live Nation had entered a 
contractual agreement, whereby the former was acting as the primary ticket agent 
for the latter.925 However, in December 2007, Live Nation entered into an exclusive 
                                                        
 
923 More at the official website, available at http://www.livenationpremiumtickets.com/. 
Currently available only in the US.  
924 The analysis will remain US-focused as in the UK the merger was found unlikely to result 
in a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in the examined markets. The US-focused 
approach is further justified by LNE’s past (Clear Channel), by the innovative remedies 
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925 Competition Commission, Ticketmaster and Live Nation a report on the completed 
merger between Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc and Live Nation Inc, 7 May 2010 at 5. The 






agreement with German Eventim. Under that agreement, Eventim would provide 
Live Nation with the technological know-how that would enable it to enter the 
ticketing market. As a result, Live Nation would become a direct competitor to 
Ticketmaster.926 Additionally, prior to the merger, Live Nation owned music venues, 
promoted tours and concerts, and had started expanding upstream in artists’ 
management.927 Ticketmaster, apart from being the largest primary ticketing 
company in the US,928 had also entered the upstream market for management 
services to the artists, having acquired Frontline Management Group Inc. in 
2008.929  
In anticipation of anticompetitive effects should the merger between the two parties 
materialise, the US government (Department of Justice, hereafter the DOJ) made its 
move. On the 25th of January 2010, the US government, seeking to enjoin the 
merger, filed a civil antitrust complaint, which provides us with the plaintiffs’ 
objections to the proposed transaction, with market participants’ testimonies, and 
with the competitive impact statement. Along with the complaint, the plaintiffs also 
filed a hold separate stipulation and order, and a proposed final judgment, which 
included behavioural and structural remedies designed to eliminate the 
anticompetitive effects of the proposed acquisition.930  
As mentioned previously, Ticketmaster was the largest primary ticketing company in 
the US offering two principal primary products to its customers (concert venues): a 
Ticketmaster-managed platform named Host, which was designed to sell tickets 
through Ticketmaster-managed channels, and Paciolian, a platform which allowed 
venues to sell their own tickets.931 As stated earlier, following the agreement with 
Eventim, Live Nation entered the market for primary ticket services to major concert 




926 J Baker “The merger and the damage done: how the DOJ enabled an empire in the live 
music industry” (2013) 3 NYU Journal of IntellProp & EntLaw 76.   
927 A Meese and B Richman (n 2).  
928 (n 2) 13-14. 
929 Competitive impact statement at B. Live Nation and Ticketmaster’s fields of operation 
were similar in the UK, apart from Frontline Management, which did not operate this side of 
the Atlantic. 
930 Case: 1:10-cv-00139 United States of America, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ticketmaster 
Entertainment, Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., Defendants, Competitive impact statement.  






venues in the United States in 2008. It was rapidly evolving to become a significant 
competitor to Ticketmaster.932 Consequently, despite any vertical relevance, the 
DOJ’s primary focus lied on the horizontal effects of the proposed acquisition. It was 
examined whether these would substantially lessen competition in the ticketing 
market.933  
By applying the hypothetical monopolist test (SSNIP), it was concluded that in the 
event of a significant rise in prices above levels that would have prevailed absent the 
transaction, the major concert venues in the US would have no alternatives for their 
primary ticketing services.934 The provision of primary ticketing services to major 
concert venues was a relevant price discrimination market and a ‘line of commerce’ 
within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Indeed, the market definition 
included only major concert venues and not smaller ones, given that ticket agents 
were considered able to price-discriminate among different venues.935 It was 
observed that venues and ticket agents negotiated their individual contracts on 
different terms, and that most of the times, venues were prohibited from reselling 
primary ticket services.936 Moreover, major concert venues required more 
sophisticated ticketing services in order to deal with heavier transaction volumes. 
Indeed, it was Ticketmaster which attracted most of the major concert venues as 
clients, thanks to its established presence in the market and its good reputation.937 
Live Nation was the only company capable of competing with Ticketmaster in 
serving major concert venues. This was a result of its presence in the concert 
promoting market, and a result of its strong reputation, which had enabled it to 
establish long-term professional relationships with many major concert venues.938 
For example, SMG, the largest venue management company in the US, had agreed to 
switch from Ticketmaster to Live Nation to cover its primary ticketing needs, if Live 
Nation was to develop a first class ticketing platform.939 SMG was looking forward to 
establishing a contractual agreement with Live Nation in order to secure Live 
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Nation-promoted concerts. This proves that upon entering the ticketing market, Live 
Nation would not only become a direct competitor to Ticketmaster, but it would also 
gain an advantage, thanks to its vertically integrated structure, and more specifically 
thanks to its concert promoting activities.  
Ultimately, the Department of Justice, distinguished a market where entry is both 
time-consuming and costly.940 Further, this market is characterised by high barriers 
for competitors to successfully, substantially and profitably enter and expand, due to 
a number of reasons laid out in the competitive impact statement.  
Firstly, entry in the market required technically advanced and expensive ticketing 
platforms like those that Ticketmaster possessed. These costs made it quite 
impossible for entrants to obtain the scale required to compete efficiently.941 
Furthermore, new entrants lacked Ticketmaster’s reputation, and did not possess its 
extensive client databases that enabled Ticketmaster to establish long-term 
contractual relationships with venues.942 Due to these contractual relationships, 
entry becomes time consuming for the potential competitor.  
The only firm that managed to circumvent these barriers and enter the market 
efficiently was Live Nation. Live Nation’s entry was followed by a series of pro-
competitive effects. Indeed, Ticketmaster had altered the terms of contracts which 
were about to expire by making them more appealing to customers, for fear that they 
might switch to Live Nation.943 In addition, as presented above, Ticketmaster 
operated a vertically integrated business model by acquiring Frontline in October 
2008.944 For a moment it appeared that Ticketmaster and Live Nation would ‘fight 
on equal terms’ in their quest for market share acquisition.  
However, by agreeing to the proposed transaction, Ticketmaster chose to eliminate 
competition with Live Nation, and the DOJ feared that this would result in a series 
of anti-competitive effects. The merged entity would have less initiative to offer 
lower prices to its clients and to invest in better ticketing technology, since it would 
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be enjoying all the benefits of a vertically integrated monopolist imposing even 
higher barriers to entry.945 
As stated in the complaint filed by the plaintiffs on the 28th of January 2010, the 
market for primary ticketing for major concert venues was highly concentrated. The 
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) post-acquisition would be over 6,900,946 
resulting in an even more concentrated market.947 In conclusion, the merger posed a 
serious threat to competition in the specific market, by resulting in a substantial 
lessening of competition in violation of antitrust laws. However, the parties to the 
case managed to reach a settlement agreement, notwithstanding these threats. 
5.3.3 Vertical thoughts  
The above come as no surprise, since operating an innovative and vertically 
integrated business model does not give rise to anticompetitive concerns per se,948 
as further attested by Christine Varney949 in 1995: 
“vertical integration can lower transaction costs, lead to synergistic improvements 
in design production and distribution of the final output product and thus enhance 
competition.”950  
However, such issues arise should both the upstream and the downstream market be 
concentrated with significant barriers to entry.951 Further, during the Clinton and 
later during the Obama administration, post-Chicago theories of foreclosure found 
their way in antitrust policies, bringing vertical integration, and by extension vertical 
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946 Amended Complaint Section VI at 38-39.  
947 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (revised 1997). 
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mergers, under close-r examination than under conservative administrations.952 As 
per the US Supreme Court in Brown Shoe: 
 “the primary vice of a vertical merger … is that by foreclosing the competitors of 
either party from a segment of the market otherwise open to them, the 
arrangement may act as a clog on competition, which deprives …. rivals of a fair 
opportunity to compete.”953 
Indeed, the ability of the merged entity to foreclose competitors was evidenced in 
both the high levels of concentration in the ticketing market, and in the market 
shares that both parties enjoyed. With respect to the latter, Pollstar954 reported that 
prior to Live Nation’s downstream integration to ticketing Ticketmaster enjoyed a 
market share of 82.9 percent, with the second largest competitor having a market 
share of only 3.8 percent. On the other hand, post-Live Nation’s entry, 
Ticketmaster’s share dropped to 66.4 percent, with Live Nation acquiring a market 
share of 16.5 percent “almost overnight.”955 Thus, the merger would result primarily 
in the loss of a strong, nascent competitor, giving rise to anticompetitive horizontal 
effects, in addition to its vertical dimensions.  
Equally, with respect to levels of concentration, the market for primary ticketing for 
major concert venues was described as highly concentrated. As stated earlier, 
according to the amended complaint:956 
 “the proposed merger will further increase the degree of concentration to levels 
raising serious antitrust concerns…using a measure of market concentration called 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘HHI’) …  the post-acquisition HHIs increase by 
over 2,190 points, resulting in a post-acquisition HHI of over 6,900.”957  
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As seen, with respect to ticketing, the market was further characterised by 
significant barriers to entry. This was evidenced in both Ticketmaster’s and Live 
Nation’s ability to offer highly sophisticated ticketing platforms, based on complex 
technologies requiring high fixed costs to develop and maintain.958 Further, and 
perhaps most importantly, both parties held “unparalleled access to individual 
consumer data”959 that would have taken potential competitors considerable time 
and effort to amass. These, combined with the parties’ “reputation for delivering … 
sophisticated primary ticketing services,”960 would hinder potential competitors 
from entering the market significantly.  
As a result, not only would the merger signal the loss of competition from a 
horizontal perspective, leading in substantial lessening of competition961 in the 
provision of ticketing services to major concert venues,962 but it would further raise 
serious vertical concerns.  
Even though the DOJ opted to focus on the horizontal aspects (as these would be 
easier to argue and justify) vertical concerns can be read in the competitive impact 
statement: 
 “while appreciating that vertical integration may benefit consumers in some 
situations, the United Sates does not fully credit Defendants’ efficiency claims 
because they each could realize many of the asserted efficiencies without 
consummating the transaction ... but for the proposed transaction, venues and 
concertgoers would have continued to enjoy the benefits of competition between 
two vertically integrated competitors. A vertically integrated monopoly is less 
likely to spur innovation and efficiency.”963  
Thus, the DOJ remained close to the pro-vertical integration school of thought, 
whilst managing to maintain a critical stance towards the proposed merger. From 
the DOJ’s point of view, the concertgoer would be worse off as a result of the loss of 
competition between the parties, even though the business model per se has pro-
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competitive effects, since it results in innovative services to the market. Thus, the 
DOJ was rather concerned with the inability of future competitors to expand in 
upstream and downstream markets and “compete effectively.”964 Hence, the DOJ 
did not concern itself with the merged entity’s ability to tie or bundle its products, 
e.g. by coercing venue operators wishing to book a LNE managed artists (content) to 
also employ their respective ticketing services.965 Such a practice would have 
intensified foreclosure issues and would have left ‘non-compliant’ venue operators 
without a viable alternative.  
Equally, the DOJ took the negative impact to concertgoers at face value and did not 
analyse this further. Interesting to notice how, similarly to the authorities’ 
encounters with the oligonomy, the end consumer’s interests lie in reaping the 
benefits of competition indirectly. Content foreclosure issues were addressed vis-à-
vis the independent promoter and the venue operator rather than the end consumer 
as such. Hence, the opportunity to address access from the point of view of the end 
consumer, who readily substitutes or complements between recorded and live 
music, was missed here as well.  
Nevertheless, neither Live Nation966 nor Ticketmaster were stranger to end 
consumers themselves, as evidenced by several cases heard in front of US courts. 
End consumers alleged anticompetitive practices, monopolisation, and attempt to 
monopolisation from the part of Clear Channel, Live Nation, and Ticketmaster.967 In 
Campos for instance, end customers (concertgoers) alleged that Ticketmaster 
monopolised the market of ticket distribution and that it used its power to levy fees 
to the end customer, resulting in increased ticket prices.  The Court however, found 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing as the direct purchasers of Ticketmaster were the 
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venues, affirming what has been presented herein since the very beginning of the 
thesis.  
5.3.4 ‘I got the poison, I got the remedy’  
Ultimately, the DOJ sought to address both horizontal and vertical concerns in its 
Final Judgment, offering a creative bundle of structural and behavioural 
remedies.968 The Final Judgment was followed by severe criticism from competitors, 
artists, consumer advocates and scholars alike, who described the settlement 
agreement as a ‘failure’ from the DOJ’s part and the merged entity as ‘diabolical’.969  
As for the chosen remedies, the US agencies had always shown a preference for 
structural remedies as they considered them ‘clean and certain’,970 whereas conduct 
or behavioural remedies require the agencies’ and the courts’ involvement in market 
practices, and are considered costlier to monitor.971  Nevertheless, in the present 
case the DOJ aimed to create through divestiture two new vertically integrated and 
financially viable competitors, namely Anschutz Entertainment Group, AEG, and 
Comcast-Spectator.972  
With respect to behavioural remedies, the final judgment included an anti-
retaliation provision aiming to prevent potential foreclosure of competitors in any 
level of the live music events supply chain. As such, the merged entity was 
prohibited from retaliating against any venue owner that chose to collaborate with a 
competing firm for primary ticketing services,  by conditioning the provision of live 
music events on the basis the same venue owner contracts with LNE for primary 
ticketing services, and vice versa (conditioning the provision of ticketing services on 
the basis that a venue operator contracts with LNE for event promotion).973  This 
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remedy would prevent ‘leveraging’ power in either direction of the supply chain, 
prohibiting the merged entity from eliminating competition at any stage.  
Moreover, in order to address the issue of Ticketmaster’s extensive clientele 
databases that could be used against potential competitors, the final judgment 
required that any client (venue operator) that chose not to renew a contract for 
primary ticketing services would be provided with a copy of all client and buyer 
ticketing data for that specific venue.974  In addition, Live Nation Entertainment was 
not to disclose any client ticketing data to any of its employees, unless required by 
their specific job functions.975 Finally, Live Nation Entertainment was prohibited 
from acquiring directly or indirectly any competitor in the market for primary 
ticketing without prior notification to the plaintiffs, and it was also prohibited from 
reacquiring any part of the divested assets.976   
Ultimately, just before the issue of the final judgment in July 2010, the DOJ 
promised to keep a “watchful eye” on the merged entity for a decade.977 Christine 
Varney characterised the settlement as “vigorous antitrust enforcement - only with 
a scalpel not a sledgehammer,” and used Shakespeare’s words to emphasise that the 
specific remedies sought to “make assurance double sure” and guarantee that 
concertgoers, artists, and all stakeholders eventually benefit from the settlement’s 
results.978 
5.3.5 Concluding remarks on Live Nation and the future of live music promotion  
The reaction to the merger was fierce, and LNE was characterised as 
‘Monsternation’, ‘Satan’s Box Office’, and even ‘Microsoft of the Music World’.979 
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Bruce Springsteen spoke of “abuse of fans.”980 Further concerns about the concert-
going experience had already been raised by New York hardcore pioneers Sick of it 
All: 
“in New York Live Nation owns everything. Every venue is a Live Nation venue 
and if you don’t comply with the rules you are left with no other option… this has 
changed the way we reach out to our audience.” 981 
It is argued that the DOJ had failed to properly realise the pivotal for the music 
industries times, and was not able to oppose this jigsaw merger between 
Ticketmaster and its nascent, aggressive competitor.982 Moreover, the business 
model operating in the live music industry was indirectly acknowledged as pro-
competitive, building on efficiencies produced by vertical integration, with the 
problem being the size of the specific parties. However, a similar observation to the 
European Commission can be made: the DOJ took a compartmentalised approach 
and assessed one part of the business model (ticketing), instead of appreciating the 
business model holistically vis-à-vis the consumer. 
Nevertheless, the present thesis argues that the end consumer is faced with a 
business model able to foreclose access to content, and that even further, this 
content is not dissimilar from the content offered by the oligonomy, as evidenced by 
end consumer consumption patterns. Faced with a merged entity the size of Live 
Nation, whose past even reveals close connections with the traditional oligonomy, 
does not look positive for the future. If anything, speaking strictly in economic 
welfare terms, the prices of tickets have skyrocketed in past years, to the point of 
even being considered a luxury.983  
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For the sake of completion, in order to assess the efficiency of the proposed 
remedies, it should be acknowledged that Anschutz Entertainment Group, LNE’s 
competitor, is indeed financially viable and vertically integrated, as envisioned by 
the DOJ. As per its official website, it owns, controls or is affiliated with a collection 
of companies, including over 100 of the world’s preeminent facilities such as the 
STAPLES Center in Los Angeles and The O2 in London. 
 All of these “are part of the portfolio of AEG Facilities; AEG Merchandising, a full 
service merchandising company; and AEG Global Partnerships, responsible for 
worldwide sales and servicing of sponsorships naming rights and other strategic 
partnerships.”984 AEG Presents, the live music division “is comprised of touring, 
festival, broadcast and special event divisions, fifteen regional offices and owns, 
operates or exclusively books thirty-five state-of-the-art venues.” It represents 
names such as Bruno Mars, Bon Jovi, Paul McCartney, Taylor Swift, and The WHO. 
It remains the largest producer of music festivals in North America (including 
Coachella Valley Music & Arts Festival and New Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival). 
Lastly, AEG is integrated into ticketing through its AXS platform.  
Comcast-Spectator is mainly active in the promotion of sporting events. However, 
through its Spectra division, it is also a third-party venue manager, a food and 
drinks supplier, and it offers ticketing and fan management services to the overall 
MICE (meetings, incentives, conferences, and events) industry.985 As such, it is not 
really ‘obvious’ where and how it is posing a competitive constraint to the other two 
companies.  
Therefore, even though the DOJ succeeding in creating (at least one) viable 
competitor to LNE, it did so by facilitating the creation of a new oligopoly (or 
perhaps an oligonomy) in the overall artist-to-fan experience, at least in the US. 
Keeping a watchful eye, as Christine Varney once promised, remains of paramount 
importance to secure end consumer welfare.  
This aside, the present thesis has tried to show that the end consumer faces double 
foreclosure vis-à-vis products considered substitutes or complements, and this has 
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been a direct result of the business models operating in the music industries. The 
evaluation of the merger between Live Nation and Ticketmaster came to attest that 
this is indeed the case. Despite the operation of novel and innovative business 
models in the music industries, end consumer welfare has yet to be addressed in a 
direct manner. The difference in the live music industry as opposed to the traditional 
oligonomy however, lies with the fact that the former came as a reaction to the 
market failures brought by the latter. Hence, history has shown that end consumers, 
when faced with a dilemma, can ‘vote with their feet’. To that however, comes the 
ever-expanding hand of both the old oligonomy and of the new gatekeepers, seeking 
to engulf what is valued, thus leading to inevitable cycles of consolidation. This is 
met by the inability of the competition authorities to ‘see things’ from an end 
consumer perspective.  
Additionally, the fact that new, innovative business models operate in the music 
industries (like the vertically aligned live music promoter), has been attested since 
the beginning of the thesis as inviting intervention with respect to the promotion of 
innovation and competition. This is not miles away from what Christine Varney 
promised when LNE’s competitors were being created. Even if the DOJ’s intention 
was ‘noble’ at the time, the inability to address foreclosure and access renders this 
endeavour incomplete (e.g. applying the SSNIP test in the narrow ticketing market). 
Nevertheless, it can be observed that thanks to ‘creative’ structural and behavioural 
remedies, competition design can be possible in this context. However, it is crucial 
that the end consumer has a key role to play in it.   
Some key thoughts and reflection on these, as well as on the overall work, follow in 












6 ‘YYZ’: Concluding Remarks and Further Reflections 
 
The thesis has shown that the music industries are in need of policy 
design capable of accommodating their business models, in order to 
safeguard consumer welfare and promote innovation and competition.  
 
The thesis has attempted a long journey, and not only in historical terms. Starting 
from the time when an industry for copyright exploitation, operating under a stable 
business model and catering to the mass market, was born, it reached the current 
narrative of the music industries, characterised by fast-paced and consumer-led 
business model innovation. The thesis ‘stopped’ along the way to introduce the most 
important developments in business models and technology and contemplate on 
their relationship with the law. Furthermore, this ‘journey’ reached the most 
relevant jurisdictions for both industry-specific and competition-specific reasons. 
Thus, it provided a holistic appreciation of the arising issues and identified common 
patterns in the US, the EU, and in the UK. Even though a plethora of patterns, 
arguments, and issues emerged, the thesis is concerned with the evaluation of its 
main question: has a role for competition law and policy been established through 
this journey? Are the music industries due for intervention through competition 
design? 
Hence, among a wealth of arguments raised along the way the thesis focused on the 
two most prominent themes, as emerging by the research conducted: the safeguard 
of consumer welfare and the promotion of competition and innovation. The thesis 
concludes that in both areas shortcomings were identified throughout the years and 
across jurisdictions, not least due to the particularities of the business models in 
operation. It is indeed the role of competition law and policy to address these 
explicitly and place the end consumer in the forefront of both market and legal 
developments. To this aim, the thesis employed business model literature, especially 
as developed by Alexander Osterwalder’s Business Model Generation, in hope that it 






the music product and of the innovative process in the music industries, in the face 
of business model innovation.  
Following this narrative enables the justification of competition policy making: a 
market characterised by business model innovation following ‘disruptive’ patterns of 
consumption, is a market that needs to safeguard the smooth operation of 
competition between those purporting to provide what the consumer values. In 
other words, competition policy should ensure that end consumers end up ‘better 
off’ in the markets for the consumption of music, whilst acknowledging the 
bottlenecks that an intellectual property product is bound to attract.  
In any event, the history of the music industry since its inception has offered 
grounds for questioning the ability of the competition authorities and the legal 
regimes in operation to prima facie raise the appropriate concerns or to successfully 
‘see them through’. It was further attested that, even when accurate relevant 
concerns were raised, the fast-paced nature of the music industries moving in cycles 
of consolidation, made their holistic evaluation rather impossible. In its most 
practical form this was evidenced by the lengthy cases and investigations brought 
forward by the relevant authorities, even spanning across decades as in the case of 
Columbia. Indeed, whereas the FTC was concerned with the anticompetitive 
practices of a single company, the market where that company operated had altered 
drastically by the time of the appeal in front of the administrative court. This was 
also the case in the merger between Sony and BMG, despite the passing of the time 
and the crossing of jurisdictions. It follows that the business model the traditional 
music industry operated, and probably more recent business models as well, 
transcend jurisdictions and give rise to the same causes of concern: end consumer 
welfare under an oligonomic prism.  
Apart from the oligonomic business model and the issues it raised with respect to 
end consumer welfare, the thesis identified that the music industries are also able to 
justify competition policy design, should they be viewed as a ‘business model 
playground’ thriving in innovation, with respect to the way value is generated, 
marketed, delivered, and ‘measured’ by the end consumer. In that regard, the role of 
competition policy is to guarantee that this continues to be the case. Safeguarding 






prolongment of competition in the music industries, where the oligonomy of the 
past still operates and where new ones are born. 
 
6.1 Key findings  
Addressing the above, the chapters of the thesis reached the following conclusions: 
the first chapter, also acting as in introduction, set out to phrase the lacuna at the 
intersection of competition law and the music industries by raising the relevant 
research question and respective hypothesis. As such, first and foremost it aimed to 
identify that the ‘music industries’ debate is in fact an end consumer debate and that 
all relevant issues should be evaluated under this light: a market designed to deliver 
a homogeneous product to the mass market top-down is not a market where much 
attention is paid to end consumer welfare as such. Hence, when the end consumer 
started disrupting the ‘market status quo’, the resulting business models were 
constructed around the provision of products alternative to the one that the 
traditional oligonomic business model had always offered. Nevertheless, as 
identified in more recent cases,986 newer and innovative business models regarding 
the method of the delivery of the recording still operate within the oligonomy, 
offering new channels and partnerships to those that still bottleneck the music 
product. If anything, history has shown that since the oligonomy moves in cycles of 
consolidation, such concentration is still imminent, if it has not already occurred.   
 Additionally, the first chapter argued that since the music industries are 
characterised by innovation in their business models, this on its own can also justify 
competition policy making, as proposed inter alia by Potts and Cunningham with 
respect to the overall creative industries. Furthermore, the discussion on business 
model innovation invites a closer evaluation of what a business model actually is and 
how it can assist in the justification of relevant policy making.  
It was examined that business model literature has been employed in the past with 
respect to the music industries and more generally with respect to industrial 
organisation. Thus, its employment can be prima facie justified. Subsequently, the 
thesis hypothesised that a specific business model generates a specific market and 
                                                        
 






that it is this market that competition law should acknowledge in the relevant cases 
and market investigations. Further, it was argued that business model literature can 
place the end consumer in the centre of attention, evaluating developments from an 
end consumer point of view. As such, it can help competition authorities adopt a 
holistic approach to defining a relevant product market without risking overly 
departing from their traditional narrow perspective; a business model perspective 
can help by introducing the question of how does the offering reach the end 
consumer and what constraints are identified along in the way, in the face of the 
relevant Building Blocks.  
After having established the relevance of business models in both the music 
industries and competition law, the thesis sought to address business models in 
markets for music in particular. To this aim, the second chapter evaluated the 
traditional business model of the music industry as constructed around copyright 
exploitation. The second chapter therefore, examined how an industry for dealing in 
musical recordings was born alongside its dominant business model. Indeed, the 
second chapter addressed the relationship between copyright and business 
modelling, aiming to assess whether the law impacts the business model or vice 
versa. To this aim, it was presented that the industry for the provision of the patent-
protected hardware turned into the industry for the provision of the copyright-
protected software, once it made commercial sense to do so; once the law provided 
the necessary protective framework in the face of copyright accretion that would 
justify the respective return on investment. Thus, the business model of the music 
industry is a de facto monopolistic business model, able to sustain only those players 
that channelled parent funds into the marketing and the delivery of the music 
product top-down. 
Ultimately, the second chapter recognised the importance of competition law in a 
IP-centred industry, even though the justification would become clearer later in 
history, when this top-down designed market stopped catering for what the 
consumer valued (what the thesis describes as a market failure). Additionally, this 
initial stage of the music industry is characterised by an era of relevant growth, as 
the commercial activity of dealing in music becomes established as an industrial 
practice, seeking to generate surplus value in its respective market. The second 






oligonomic, industry were laid since the industry’s very first steps. It was a matter of 
time before the foreclosure of the end consumer would become evident. 
In this vein, the third chapter proceeded with the analysis of business model 
evolution per se, highlighting the establishment of a dominant and omnipresent 
oligonomy bottlenecking the provision of music through the continuous absorbance 
of the niche (the smaller independent firms) and of additionally arising 
‘disturbances’ e.g. technological developments. As the market resulting from the 
dominant business model was characterised by the top-down delivery of the 
recorded product, little attention was paid to the end consumer, but for research 
conducted in cultural studies. Thus, through the presentation of the supply-side of 
the market, the operation of the dominant business model by the members of the 
oligonomy became clearer, as did the issues of actual content foreclosure. Turning to 
the demand side, it was shown that little to any attention had been paid to the end 
consumer in literature, a key characteristic of a mass market narrative.  
The role of the end consumer was pronounced only in the digital era, once 
alternative ways of consumption started to emerge, firstly through the sharing 
culture enabled by the internet. The thesis examined a number of empirical studies 
conducted on the demand side, trying to evaluate the role of end consumer and the 
generation of new and innovative business models as a response to what the end 
consumer actually values. The thesis acknowledged the existence of patterns of 
complementarity and substitutability between products for music and contemplated 
on whether these should be identified as relevant product markets for music from a 
competition law perspective.  
Indeed, in that regard the third chapter of the thesis, examining business models 
from a historical perspective, commented on how the competition authorities, and 
the US Federal Trade Commission in particular, had shown an interest in 
‘approaching’ the oligonomy in the past e.g. through regulatory intervention, even 
though this did not bear any fruit. This way, the third chapter laid the foundations 
for the evaluation of the stance of the competition authorities primarily in the US, as 
home of the relevant legal developments in both intellectual property and in 
antitrust law, and subsequently in the EU, and in the UK. 
In the early 2000s, a plethora of new and innovative business models emerged, 






by the emergence of the ‘music industries’ discourse. As the traditional oligonomic 
business model seemed to be surpassed by new and innovative ones, competition 
policy was invited to ensure that the end consumer remained in the forefront of the 
developments, for fear that the music product would be further foreclosed. 
Additionally, the fact that this ‘multiple business models’ era is seen as an era of 
industrial innovation justifies competition policy making with respect to the 
promotion and sustainability of competition and innovation per se.  
Against this background, the thesis proceeded with the evaluation of the relevant 
interventions, investigations, and merger cases. To this aim, two chapters were 
devised, dedicated to ex post and ex ante evaluations. The role of the competition 
authorities and the courts was emphasised with respect to the perception of the 
business models and the music industries in general. As such, the need to approach 
several Building Blocks was established. Hence, the radio was chosen as an attempt 
to regulate, or rather deregulate, an aspect of the oligonomic business model. 
Investigating the US radio offered a wealth of evidence of power consolidation in the 
business model itself. Further, it showcased the ability to foreclose what the 
consumer values from various angles (e.g. the emergence of Clear Channel and Live 
Nation).  
That aside, in terms of assessing the traditional oligonomy itself, it was posited that 
the legal regimes in place, both in 1960s US and in 1990s UK, were in no position to 
successfully intervene in the anticompetitve and welfare reducing practices of the 
oligonomy. This was either a result of the encounters with the administrative courts 
in the US, or of the ‘lack of purpose’ and the accompanying vagueness that 
characterised the UK competition law landscape at the time.  
Additionally, the thesis attempted to shed light into the role of end consumer in the 
market for music as perceived by the intervening authorities, only to conclude that 
the role is contested at best. As far as the ex post investigations are concerned, the 
end consumer’s role is reaffirmed as the mass market that would purchase the 
oligonomy’s offering, the question being how. 
It was shown that the narrow product markets that the competition authorities 
define, leave little room for end consumer involvement and follow the supply chain 
of the product within the confines of the business model instead e.g. downstream to 






chapter). Thus, even when the authorities’ intentions are ‘noble’, their ability to 
assess the oligonomy and the role of the end consume therein remained 
questionable.  
What further follows, and is indeed repeated across jurisdictions, is that the music 
industry’s main players remained in fierce competition with each other for the few 
major names that would subsidise least successful artists, perpetuating the business 
model in operation. From this realisation stemmed the ever-lasting issue of same 
prices, as first addressed in Columbia and scrutinised in the MMC report. 
Ultimately, sameness in prices, seen as the result of ‘fierce competition’, was treated 
like a non-issue, despite the arising remark made by the thesis: if the so-called ‘fierce 
competition’ results in similar prices, an issue unchanged through the years, then 
the ‘fierceness’ or even the existence of effective competition should be re-visited.  
In the aggregate, the two investigations into the old business model of the oligonomy 
failed to bear any fruit and were criticised in their inability to do so. This approach 
remained in line with the viewing of the oligonomy as catering to the mass market. 
The neglected end consumer relationships that Osterwalder had included in his 
presentation, were configured as such. Even when attention turned to the other side 
of the bottleneck, the oligopsony towards the artists, the oligonomy’s practice of 
exclusive contractual relationships was not found to impact on the public interest 
directly, as the matter concerned the artists themselves (as per the MMC report).  
It was argued that a doubly oligopolistic business model, at the core of which lies the 
issue of access to the music product, needs to be regarded as such. Only then can the 
issues of foreclosure vis-à-vis the end consumer be clearly observed.  
It follows that similar observations were made in the fifth chapter, which addressed 
merger control in the oligonomic business model and in business models operating 
in the music industries. Even though the FTC in Warner was able to address the role 
of the end consumer at product market definition stage and secure a much-needed 
victory against two key oligonomic players, it missed the opportunity to accurately 
assess the substitutability between ‘official’ and ‘pirated’ music, and as such it failed 
to adopt the end consumer point of view.  
As far the EU merger control regime is concerned, this was evidenced to be 






absorbance of niche as ‘normal’ and the absence of the end consumer from the 
product’s supply chain. Furthermore, the merger between Sony and BMG came to 
highlight the EU merger control regime’s inability to deal with the fact-paced 
developments occurring at the time of the notification. Additionally, this case 
highlighted the shortcoming of merger control to adopt a holistic approach vis-à-vis 
the rich past of the oligonomy that could have potentially identified anticompetitive 
conduct. Ultimately, ‘bouncing’ between competitive assessment and judicial review, 
showcases stalling effects like the ones observed in the US (in Columbia).  
Finally, at the time of the second approval, the merged entity was found to operate 
in a rather competitive environment characterised by business model innovation, 
where collusion would not be possible to sustain. Here, the thesis argues that a legal 
regime not equipped with the ability to evaluate foreclosure in an oligonomic 
business model but affirming a competitive environment instead, is in need of 
updating with respect to end consumer welfare. This, the thesis argues, is possible by 
adopting a business model approach. 
Indeed, when the thesis turned to the evaluation of the most recent cases attesting 
the ‘break-up’ of EMI, it was argued that perhaps the separation of a major’s 
recording and publishing activities could provide an answer to consolidation. 
Nevertheless, the relevance of this measure in the case of the ‘failing’ EMI and the 
fact that these ‘legs’ were acquired by the remaining members of the oligonomy, 
should be viewed with extra caution.  
Nevertheless, the post-Sony lengthy and detailed assessment that the Commission 
attempted was noticed and so was the ‘enhanced’ approach, reaching the ultimate 
consumer or end user specifically. Here however, attention should be paid to the fact 
that the end consumer is faced with new channels, which support the same 
oligonomic business model leading to re-enforced consolidation, should attention 
not be paid to access as such.  Thus, even though the final EU cases that the thesis 
investigates, are as ‘up-to-date’ as they can be, it is still argued that the EU 
competition regime, and more specifically merger control, need to adopt an end 
consumer focused narrative within the auspices of the SIEC test. This narrative 
should be able to assess the provision of the product via a business model’s 






Hence, the holistic and business model inclusive approach would help appreciate 
not only end consumer access and the role of the oligonomy, but also the role of new 
supportive cannels, such as the digital retailers and subscription services providers. 
It is repeated that at a time of business model innovation, or in other words in a 
‘business model playground’, competition policy is invited also with respect to 
safeguarding innovation and competition as an end in itself. However, attention 
should be paid to the fact that these new and innovative business models now 
operate within the oligonomic business model, acting as its new channels and 
partnerships.  
Further, attention should be paid to trends of foreclosure in formerly considered as 
ancillary industries, such as live music promotion. Not only is the end consumer 
faced with new consolidated gatekeepers born out of strong corporate parents, such 
as Live Nation Entertainment, but also new concerns arise in the discussion of 
access to music per se; concerns that current competition law regimes are not able to 
address, since they insist on the adoption of compartmentalised views of the markets 
for music. The need to ‘broaden’ the perception of what a market for music consists 
of by adopting an end consumer perspective is therefore critical for competition 
assessment. Indeed, the business model that live music promoters the size of Live 
Nation operate, has managed to ‘tap into’ the complementarity between the 
recorded product and the live music ticket, as seen from the point of view of the end 
consumer, and expand into the market for the ‘overall music experience’ instead. If 
the ‘overall music experience’ constitutes a market on its own, then there should be a 
possibility for competition law to appreciate exactly this.987 Ultimately, with respect 
to the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger, the thesis ‘welcomed’ the DOJ’s attempts to 
introduce ‘creative’ remedies and sustain competition. However, this was done by 
inviting new vertically aligned powerful players and hoping that the end consumer 
benefits indirectly. Apart from inviting foreclosure as in the case of the traditional 
oligonomy, the thesis observed that the live music industry is characterised by an 
innovative vertical business model and so, competition policy is invited as resulting 
from Potts’ and Cunningham’s innovation model.  
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To summarise this section, it should be noted that even though the aim of the 
present is not to offer a comparative approach to jurisdictions but to follow a 
business model journey instead, some inevitable conclusions can still be drawn, 
especially between the EU and the US, as per above.  
In the field of merger control par example, the post-Airtours ‘era of convergence’ 
with the US regime was noted in the relevant chapter. However, the more recent 
cases of EMI and Live Nation/Ticketmaster allow for divergent realisations. The EU 
regime appears to ever-expand its scope and to remain more faithful to both its 
econometric and jurisprudential approach, attempting to address ancillary concerns 
by the letter of the law and the EU Merger Regulation more specifically. It was 
argued that business model concerns can find their way into the narrative, as 
cultural diversity concerns seem to do. In contrast, the US merger control regime 
and antitrust enforcement more generally, remain an administrative exercise, 
undertaken by the relevant authorities, and prone to the country’s political 
landscape (e.g. a Democratic administration being more rigorous vis-à-vis antitrust 
enforcement than a Republican one). Overall, the EU seems to be moving towards a 
more end consumer-compatible stance as opposed to the US, whereby the end 
consumer is traditionally excluded from the competitive process and will reap the 
benefits indirectly.  
Both however, seem to be favouriting creativity and innovation when it comes to 
designing and proposing remedies, the impact of which should be measured by 
subsequent research. At first instance, it can be agreed upon that remedies can 
provide a modern and efficient way of antitrust enforcement, as Christine Varney 
once argued, provided that the jurisdictions do not mirror each other’s practices 
(despite their convergence and the globalised business landscape) and arrive at 
bespoke and market-informed solutions instead.  
Additionally, both regimes seem to invite lengthy processing times due to procedural 
restraints either on EU level or at the US administrative courts.  Here, both 
jurisdictions appear to be in need of more flexibility, when dealing with fast-paced 
industrial advancements and innovative business models. Going back to the very 
beginning of the thesis, where it was asked “how much flexibility and ‘broadening’ 
can the authorities accommodate,” it is suggested that any policies to be formulated 






concern itself with the advancement of consumer welfare in substantial terms, but 
also in procedural ones. The thesis questions to what extent inviting the competitors 
in the legal process (the IMPALA appeal) and excluding the end consumers 
altogether in the US (e.g. lack of standing in re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation), 
answers questions about consumer welfare as such.  
 
6.2 Key remarks: one step beyond  
6.2.1 Markets for music  
Having aligned each chapter with its crucial observations, this concluding part can 
now offer some further remarks on the key issues identified above. It is worth 
repeating that, even though the thesis was initiated by the need to examine relevant 
product market definition in the music industries with Live Nation/Ticketmaster as 
an initial point of concern, this demand-driven perspective helped the thesis embark 
on a quest to identify why and how the end consumer remained disenfranchised 
through the history of the music industry and consider whether this remains the 
case.  
This ‘tale of disenfranchised consumer’ helps reflect on the need to perhaps align the 
concept of a market, as resulting from business models in operation, and the concept 
of a relevant product market in competition law. Indeed, the thesis acknowledged 
that these concepts differ in a legal context yet, the prevailing questions could 
perhaps be: why, and should they?988  
Indeed, viewing a market as the social mechanism or the construct for exchange 
purposes that it is, can assist in the placement of the end consumer in the evaluation 
followed by competition authorities. This realisation could have been crucial at the 
time of market failures: the fact that the price of the oligonomy’s traditional offering 
was valued at close to zero, is a signal that conveys information about what the 
market is and about the end consumer’s role in it.989 This signal should have been 
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‘picked up’ in a competition law context, as it would have assisted in the definition of 
a market as such.990 It was established however, that this is not possible for as long 
as the competition authorities’ assessment remains closer to the perception of an 
intermediate market991 at relevant product market definition stage.  
Further, as the inherent design of the broader creative sector is to capture as much 
value as possible and maintain a diverse portfolio of content, this explains the 
monopolistic or oligonomic in the present case, nature of the markets in 
operation.992 This of course, affirms the relevance of the respective competition 
policy to safeguard both access and the competitive process per se. It is therefore in 
the best interests of competition to adopt an end consumer narrative and depart 
from the cultural policy debate e.g. one that seeks to identify externalities in the 
creative output993 in order to justify intervention. Even though this approach crept 
into EU merger control with respect to cultural diversity, it was worth considering 
whether this perpetuates rather than addresses the main issue; a cultural output 
approach justifies the mass market narrative, whereas a consumer-focused approach 
can address access and bottlenecks to content as such. Indeed, this approach is 
easier to achieve on EU level, exactly thanks to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
providing for the role of end consumer or user to be evaluated in merger cases.  
Going full circle, markets for music should be understood as markets in their literal 
sense and it is worth elaborating on the possibility to ‘transplant’ this approach in a 
competition law context. The business model narrative proposed herein can help 
accommodate such end consumer concerns, as the analysis conducted throughout 
the thesis has shown. Viewing markets as resulting from business models and 
considering how consumers access what they value, can be a way forward for the 
competition authorities concerned, especially in the context of markets for music, 
                                                        
 
990 For the sake of clarification, this is not a debate on whether public intervention with 
respect to market failures can arise from externalities. Here, the debate is internalised as to 
appreciate whether the provision of what the end consumer values is met with the relevant 
supply, in an efficient and welfare enhancing manner.  
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meaning markets that more recently responded to end consumer demand and 
redefined their business models and dynamics.  
6.2.2 Business models and innovation  
This realisation brings us closer to the concepts of business models and innovation, 
around which the thesis is construed. Competition policy appreciates and interferes 
to promote innovation, and as proven thus far, business model innovation does 
constitute a form of innovation that fits in a competition law narrative. The thesis set 
out to align the concept of markets with their accompanying business models, 
hypothesising at first instance that a business model results in a specific market for 
the provision of an offering to the end consumer. The third chapter of the present 
was dedicated to this point exactly, examining first and foremost, the gatekeeping 
dimensions of an oligonomic business model. The subsequent discrepancy between 
this realisation and the way markets are defined in the jurisdictions examined, 
followed right after.  
Against this background, the thesis argued that it is not only market failure that 
justified intervention, but also innovation in the face of business modelling. In fact, 
in the first chapter of the present it was argued that borrowing from the Innovation 
Markets discourse, could assist in the bespoke treatment of the creative sector as 
well. Even though for the reader in 2017 this debate perhaps sounds a bit dated, 
some concepts are still relevant to the creative markets discourse, including the 
future-facing negative effects on competition based on the parties’ market positions 
and on high levels of concentration.994 Here it was argued that “speedy and efficient 
introduction of products… as well as competition in this market”995 is key. This 
characteristic was found to be borne by the music markets, where competitors to the 
oligonomy could exist only through a consolidated nexus of channels in a business 
model context. Hence, further research and contemplation is invited with respect to 
this perspective. Future market development is indeed of great concern in the 
context of the music and the overall creative industries, especially in a business 
model innovation terms.  
                                                        
 
994 Here, Marcus Glader speaks of concentrated capabilities in R&D, however A&R could be 
accounted for as well. In Innovation Markets (n 14) 313.  






Indeed, safeguarding the innovative process is of paramount importance to 
consumer welfare and the role of competition policy is to sustain healthy levels of 
competition for the consumer’s benefit through the relevant laws. Perhaps, 
introducing the concepts of business modelling and innovation in this debate can 
bear the sought-after results, by establishing an end consumer-centred perspective. 
Leaving the end consumer outside the supply chain of the product offered, does not 
help in that respect. Introducing the possibility for competition law and policy to ‘do’ 
business modelling as such, especially since the concept has started figuring in the 
relevant cases one way or the other, is of critical importance, the thesis argues. 
This perspective could have been accommodated in the more recent merger cases in 
both the EU and the US, as it would have enabled the DOJ to place consumer 
consumption patterns with respect to innovative business models in live music into 
perspective and ‘foresee’ foreclosure as such. Additionally, a business model 
perspective could have addressed the interventionary attempts and the deregulation 
of the radio in the US as Building Blocks of the same business model. To further 
illustrate, a business model approach could have also justified the artist side of the 
oligonomy in the MMC report and address the issue with the “sameness in prices” as 
such. Of course, the purpose of the thesis is not to argue that business models are a 
panacea for anticompetitive concerns. However, adopting this narrative can result in 
a diversified perspective of the operation of the respective markets and can also help 
address non-previously answered concerns.  
Thus, borrowing from what Marcus Glader once argued with respect to the 
Innovation Markets, a more future-facing approach is vital. Indeed, this could have 
enabled the FTC to successfully justify its interventionary attempts even at the time 
of Columbia, when all the signs were evident; however, they failed to fit the box that 
the law prescribed. If anything has been observed with almost mathematical 
certainty throughout the thesis, it is that taking screenshots of the music industry, or 
even the music industries more recently, for competition law purposes is not enough 
to shed light into the long history of foreclosure and consolidation. The cycles in 
which the music industries move call for such a holistic evaluation. A business model 
perspective can assist in the future-facing evaluation of anticompetitive practices 
and concerns, and it can do so by delving into the distant past. This way, the role of 
the end consumer becomes pronounced and so does the purpose of promoting 







6.2.3 Music industries as a key component of the creative industries  
Last but not least, the thesis seeks to open the door to the study of the same issues as 
pertaining to the overall creative industries, as per the first chapter of the present. 
The application of business modelling in competition law cannot be confined to a 
music industries debate, but can expand and be accommodated into the overall 
creative sector. Indeed, in order to study the music industries, key concepts were 
borrowed from the studies conducted by Potts, Cunningham, and Hartley et al. in 
the aggregate creative industries. Examining the relationship between business 
model innovation and other copyright markets, as prone to the same issues of 
foreclosure and monopolisation, can offer fresh and enlightening perspectives in the 
fields of both competition law and cultural studies. The groundwork has been laid 
since the late 1990s, as the creative industries discourse entered an era of de-
clustering with respect to research and study, with much being written on 
developing policies and programmes for the sustainability of particular creative 
sectors. With the concepts of markets and industries coming closer together in the 
creative economy discourse, it is high time the end consumers were appreciated as a 
market participants as well, in addition to any cultural and aesthetic dimensions 
they might have. Thus, this thesis can assist in this interdisciplinary dialogue in both 
the jurisdictions identified as leaders in the creative economy and in other countries 
were similar patterns arise.996 
 
6.3 Concluding remarks on the thesis  
As a final remark, the thesis has also laid out two retrospective analyses of the music 
industries that can be employed as tool in any related future research project: a 
business model overview and a competition law retrospective analysis of the key 
market investigations, antitrust, and merger cases. This way, the thesis also hopes to 
serve as a canvas or point of reference for future work. Even though the scope of the 
present work remained limited to the confines of answering the set research 
                                                        
 






question, the wealth of the material consulted cannot be underestimated. It was 
mentioned earlier in the thesis that good knowledge of history can avoid the 
repetition of similar mistakes in the future. This cannot be more accurate in the 
current state of the music industries, should one take into account the 
aforementioned cycles of consolidation and concentration.997 Having conducted an 
analysis of the key cases in the key jurisdictions, the thesis can confirm that this is 
indeed the case. Thus, the present thesis can further fit in a ‘Global Competition’998 
discourse, as the music industries are characterised by multinational oligonomists 
and by ever-expanding new players.999 It follows that under this lens jurisdictions, 
consumers, and competitors can learn from any shortcomings of the past and plan a 
viable, competitive future accordingly.  
Similar observations can be made about the employment of business model 
literature in competition law more generally, should one consider the overarching 
question of whether there is and whether there should be room for this type of 
literature in a competition law context.1000 Even though this debate can deviate 
substantially from the purposes of the present, more thinking is invited also in the 
context of aligning the perception of markets with the aims of competition law; 
something the thesis posits can be achieved through the employment of a business 
model and end-consumer perspective.  
Ultimately, the thesis has shown that when the narrative excludes the end consumer 
as such, so does the benefit of competition. This is true not only in the assessment of 




                                                        
 
997 Meaning the ability to internalise disruptive forces whenever the oligonomy’s market 
shares are in peril, as seen in the 1950s and later the digital era.  
998 See e.g. D J Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (2010). 
999 e.g. both LNE and AEG Live operate worldwide.  
1000 An example of this would be the software industry where integrated platforms operate. 
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